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Abstract
The scope of this work is analysing how economic policies chosen by govern-
ments are inuenced by the power of social groups. The core idea is taken from
the Single-mindedness Theory, which states that preferences of groups and their
ability to focus on the consumption of goods, or issues, enable them to achieve
a great political power and eventually to obtain the most favourable policies.The
general framework I designed departs from the tradional models which are based
on the Median Voter Theorem (Black (1948), Dows (1957)) and which illustrate
how in equilibrium political candidates choose the policy vector preferred by the
median voter. Instead, my approach exploits the advantages of Probabilistic Vot-
ing Theory (Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook (1970); Enelow and Hinich (1983),
Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), (1993), Coughlin (1992), Persson and Tabellini
(2000)) which are the ability to manage the multidimensionality of policies and
the possibility to study more precisely how politicians tailor their policies to
groups features. Nevertheless, unlike classic probabilistic voting models, the
theory I propose assumes that the density function which captures the distri-
bution of political preferences of voters depends on consumption of goods and
preferences of individuals. The higher the consumption of goods (or leisure), the
higher the density, the higher the political power. This mechanism is better ex-
plained by considering the role played by swing voters, those individuals who do
not have any particular preference for candidates. Since these voters are pivotal
to changing the political equilibrium, candidates must favour them, because they
realise that even a small change in policy could force them to vote for the other
candidate who would win the elections. In other words, the lower the loyalty of
voters for parties, the higher the benet they obtain. There is no way for the
candidates to avoid the threat represented by more powerful groups, as long as
they are concerned with winning elections. As a consequence, these groups are
better o¤ and represent the winners of the political process.
The Single-minded Theory may be applied to several elds of Political Econ-
omy, both theoretical and econometrical. From a theoretical point of view I used
the Theory in three papers.
The rst deals with Social Security Systems and assumes that, in a soci-
ety divided into two generations (the young and the old), one generation has
greater preferences for leisure than the other. Furthermore, two vote-seeking
candidates run for election and have to choose a vector of policy encompassing
marginal tax rates on labour. The balanced-budget constraint they have to clear
is no longer based on lump-sum transfers, as in the traditional literature, but on
labour income distortionary taxation. In this constant-sum game, a generation
obtains a benet, whilst the other must bear the entire cost of social security
systems. Furthermore, I demonstrate via numerical simulations that the gener-
i
ii
ation which is more single-minded on leisure is better o¤, because it is more able
to capture politicians. Finally, I demonstrate a set of useful results to be used in
probabilistic voting models with distortionary taxation and single-minded gener-
ations: stando¤ in political competition, convergence of policies, characteristics
of internal and corner equilibria when the value function is not strictly concave.
The second and the third papers analyse the problem of indirect and direct
taxation moving from the hypothesis that Governments do not maximise a typ-
ical Social Welfare Function but the probability of winning elections, instead.
For indirect taxation, results show how it is neither the goal of equity by the
government nor the weight that society attaches to the utility of single individu-
als which drives the equilibrium policy, but the weight that candidates attach to
the power of groups, instead. The essential basic principle stated by the Ram-
sey rule (1927) modied by Diamond (1975) is maintained, because it is still
the distributive characteristic which drives the optimal tax rate in equilibrium;
nevertheless, this time the distributive characteristic is a function of the size
and density of groups, and it can be demonstrated that the optimal tax rate is
a function of their political power. If in Diamond the poor were the better o¤
groups and the rich the worse o¤ groups, due to social weights attached by soci-
ety, here the more powerful and single-minded groups are better o¤, whilst less
powerful groups are worse o¤. The same thing happens to a model of direct
taxation, where again I move from the hypothesis that candidates maximise the
probability of winning elections and not a welfare function as in Mirlees (1971)
and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980). The optimal tax rate depends again on the
density and size of groups and not on the importance attributed by society to
individualswealth. In turn, these two models demonstrate how taxation loses
its function of transferring resources from the rich to the poor, whilst they con-
sider it a tool used by politicians in order to win elections. These models also
o¤er a possible explanation for the existence of indirect taxation, when it was
demonstrated that indirect taxation is not necessary under an optimal income
tax structure (Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976)) and even if this structure were not
optimally designed (Laroque (2005), Kaplow (2006)) . Considering that direct
taxation is progressive, whilst indirect taxation is mildly regressive, we may un-
derstand how some social groups have more than an interest in preventing a
substantial shift from indirect to direct taxation.
Finally I also wrote a fourth contribution which represents the empirical ev-
idence of my work. From this point of view, there was a need to empirically
demonstrate the validity of the assumptions on which the theory is based. Some
claims, such as the existence of a di¤erence in preference for goods and leisure
amongst individuals, especially the young and the old, could appear too ad-hoc
and deserved to be demonstrated. Using the British Election Study I was able
to nd the data needed to demonstrate how judgments and political preferences
of individuals are related to age, along with other characteristics of individuals.
To do that, I uses LOGIT/PROBIT regressions and non-parametric estimates
in order to capture these di¤erences amongst cohorts. In particular, results
demonstrated how age is almost always a signicant variable to explain polit-
ical orientations, judgements given on governments policies and the political
activism of voters. Furthermore, Kernel Density estimation and Kolmogorv-
Smirnov tests showed how cohorts have di¤erent distributions with respect to
political parameter of interest (i.e. position of the right-left scale), corroborating
the idea that the old and the young are di¤erently minded about political a¤airs.
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The Single-Mindedness Theory:
Micro-foundation and
Applications to Social Security
Systems
"We work in order to have leisure" (Aristotle)
Introduction
The participation in the labour force of older persons in the U.S. labour market
has been steadily declining over the last century. If the labour force participation
of men aged 65-69 was around 60 per cent in the 1950s, the same gure had
fallen to 26 per cent in the 1990s (Diamond (1997)) (Figure 1). In many OECD
countries, workers withdraw from the labour market well before the o¢ cial
retirement age. Eventually this long-term decline, associated with an increase
in life expectancy, has led to a considerable increase in years spent in retirement.
Also, Government expenditure on social security has been skyrocketing and so
has the percentage of workers covered by the system (Figure 2). This situation
risks becoming nancially unsustainable over the next years, unless governments
undertake structural reforms as suggested by many economists (see Feldstein
and Liebman (2001) amongst the others).
Over the last few years, the economic literature has been trying to give
plausible explanations for this strong change in old workers lifestyles. Ac-
cording to an OECD survey (OECD (2005)) nancial incentives embedded into
public pensions and other assistance schemes pull old workers into retirement.
Nevertheless, the OECD makes a distinction between pull factors of retirement
and push factors of retirement. The former include all those nancial benets
that incentivise workers to anticipate their retirement, whilst the latter refer to
negative perceptions by old workers about their ability or productivity and to
socio-demographic characteristics.
In this paper I will distance myself from the OECDs view, which considers
nancial benets as a pull factor which reduces the amount of work. I suggest
5
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that preference of workers for leisure shapes the characteristics of modern social
security systems. Thus, generosity of governmentstransfers is not exogenously
given but it is rather the e¤ect of a precise political mechanism; this is driven by
old workers who use their political power to obtain what they need to nance
their retirement years.
To explain the early retirement phenomenon, I will use an overlapping gener-
ation model (OLG) which considers a society divided into two groups of workers:
the old and the young. I will assume that there is political competition between
two candidates who must choose e¤ective marginal tax rates on labour in order
to maximize the probability of winning elections.
The core assumption of the model is based on the idea of single-mindedness,
introduced by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999). They assumed that the old
prefer leisure more than the young; this structure of preferences would explain
why the old require (and eventually obtain) more generous transfers from the
government and why social security expenditures have been increased so much
in recent years. They adopted an OLG model where society is divided into old
and young workers and showed that
retired elderly can concentrate on issues that relate only to their age
such as the pension or the health system
while the young have to choose amongst
age-related and occupation issues
Eventually, they concluded,
the elderly are politically powerful because they are more single-
minded and (. . . ) more single-minded groups tend to vote for larger
social security programs that benet them
According to this theory the group of old workers, because more single-
minded, would have a greater leverage over politicians and they are more able
to inuence policy outcome (a sort of tyranny of the elder or Gerontocracy,
to quote authors).
Indeed, neither Demographics nor the need for assistance would explain the
skyrocketing increase in the governmentsexpenditure for social security systems
and the broad reduction in retirement age over the last decades, but preferences
of the old for leisure would provide a more suitable explanation to this upward
6
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trend. In a recent work, Diamond (Diamond (2005)), attempting to describe
the linkage between the social security system and the retirement in the U.S.,
wrote in his conclusions:
there is clear evidence from both previous work (. . . ) that the broad
structure of the SS program inuences retirement timing. Evidence
on the e¤ects of variation in the benets provided by this program
is less clear, however.
In particular, I will assume that the Government has to decide how to di-
vide the revenues generated by the taxation of the two groups. In doing this, it
exploits a balanced budget constraint which is based on (distortionary) labour
income taxation. Eventually, I will demonstrate that the older generations ob-
tain a higher tax credit (or a reduction in the e¤ective marginal tax rate) than
the younger generations and that they get a higher amount of leisure. This is
a situation which is consistent with the olds needs, since their preferences are
more oriented toward retirement than toward work. The work also explains the
importance of the single-mindedness of social groups and the role of preferences
of individuals in political competition. The more single-minded a group, the
higher is its political power, captured by a density function which is assumed
to be monotonically increasing in the level of leisure. Since more single-minded
groups are, other things being equal, more politically powerful, they are more
able to obtain favourable policies from political candidates in equilibrium.
7
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Figure 1 - Partecipation Rates by Age and Sex in the U.S.
Figure 2 - Expenditures in social security programmes by cohort in the U.S.
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The basic model
I consider an overlapping generation model, where each generation lives for two
periods: youth and old age. At any period of time, the generation of youths
coexists with the generation of the elderly. At the beginning of the next period,
the elderly die, the young become old and a new generation of youths is born. As
a consequence, there are two overlapping generations of people living at any one
time. Generations are unlinked, meaning that for whatever reason, a generation
does not leave any bequest to another generation. Individuals consume all the
available income earned at a given period of time; thus, it is not possible either
to save or to borrow money.
Then, at time t = 0; :::;+1, let a continuum of voters of size one be par-
titioned into two generations of workers I = t  1; t. The old represent the
generation born at time t 1 and it is denoted by t 1 whilst the young repres-
ent the generation born at time t and it is denoted by t. The two generations
have same size, which does not change over time1 . A single worker is denoted
by i 2 0; 12.
Each worker i has to decide how to divide his total endowment of time
T between work, Lit > 0 and leisure, l
i
t > 0. If leisure is equal to the total
endowment of time, I assume that the worker retires.
Every voters welfare depends both on scal policies chosen by two polit-
ical candidates j = A;B which a¤ect his consumption, known by both parties,
and on personal attributes of candidates, which are only imperfectly observed
by rivals. Both candidates have an ideological label (i.e. they are seen as
Democrats or Republicans), exogenously given. In other words, I assume that
individualspreferences for consumption are perfectly observable, whilst other
political features, such as ideology, are not (Linbeck and Weibulls stochastic
heterogeneity (1987)). The deterministic component of workerswelfare is cap-
tured by a quasi-linear utility function in consumption and leisure, whilst the
stochastic component is captured by the expression DB  (i;It + ), where
DB =
(
1 if B wins
0 if A wins
The term  Q 0 reects Bs general popularity amongst the electorate and it
is only realized between the announcement of partiespolicy vector and elections.
It is not idiosyncratic, it is known by candidates, and it is uniformly distributed
as
9
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  U

 1
2
;
1
2

with mean zero. Otherwise, the term i;It Q 0 represents an individual com-
ponent of preferences for B. It is known by candidates and uniformly distributed
as
i;It  U

  1
2sI
;
1
2sI

with mean zero and density sI .
A representative old worker at time t has the following utility function:
U i;t 1t = c
t 1
t +  
t 1 log lt 1t +D
B  (i;t 1t + ) (1)
where ct 1t is consumption and  
t 1 2 [0; 1] is a parameter representing the
intrinsic preference of the old worker for leisure.
The old worker consumes all his income:
ct 1t = w
t 1(1   0t 1t )(T   lt 1t ) (2)
where wt 1 is the unitary wage per hour worked, 
0t 1
t := 
 
1  at 1t

the ef-
fective tax rate on labour income equal to the nominal tax rate  2 min; max
net of the tax credit at 1t 2

at 1mint ; a
t 1max
t

, with at 1mint < 1 and a
t 1max
t >
1.
I assume that  is equal for every generation and steady over time. min and
max denotes the minimum and maximum legal tax rates, whilst amin and amax
the minimum and maximum tax credits, both written in a budget law.
Similarly, preferences of a representative young worker t are given by the
following utility function:
U i;tt = c
t
t +  
t log ltt + (c
t
t+1 +  
t 1 log ltt+1) +D
B  (i;tt + ) (3)
subject to
ctt = w
t(1   0tt )(T   ltt) (4)
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ctt+1 = w
t(1   0tt+1)(T   ltt+1) (5)
where  is a discount factor and att 2

atmint ; a
tmax
t

the tax credit, with
at 1mint < 1 and a
t 1max
t > 1.
Conditions aImint < 1; a
Imax
t > 1 make a redistribution programme feasible
because, as we will see later in studying the budget constraint of the Govern-
ment, it allows a generation to obtain positive transfers which are paid by the
other generation.
Denition of Single-Mindedness
I introduce two essential denitions:
Denition 1 generation A is said to be more single-minded than generation B
with respect to leisure if its marginal utility of leisure is greater than Bs. That
is if  A >  B.
This denition states that generations are not focused (single-minded) on
leisure in the same way. They attribute di¤erent weights to leisure and thus are
less or more prone to substitute it with consumption goods. I will provide later
some empirical results which demonstrate that a di¤erence between the young
and old for leisure exists.
Denition 2 generation A is said to be more politically powerful than genera-
tion B if its density is higher than Bs. That is if sA > sB.
The political power of a generation is represented by its ability to inuence
candidateschoices, when they have to take decisions about the optimal policy
vector. In traditional probabilistic voting models this power is expressed by a
density function which captures the distribution of the constituency.
Axiom 3 the density function of a generation is monotonically increasing with
the level of leisure. That is sI = s(l), with @s@l > 0.
Note, that this axiom brings something new with respect to previous prob-
abilistic voting models, where the density function was only a constant and did
not depend on anything.
In the resolution it will be demonstrated that lI = l ( ) and @l@ > 0; that
is, leisure in monotonically increasing in preferences for leisure. This result
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enable us to show that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the single-mindedness of
a generation entails an increase in its political power. To demonstrate this, it
is su¢ cient applying the chain rule to obtain ds
I
d I
=
>0z}|{
@sI
@lI

>0z}|{
@lI
@ I
> 0.
This result says that the linkage between preferences of a generation and
its political power passes through an increase in the level of leisure which the
density depends upon. In other words, it must be the case where over leisure,
di¤erent generations have di¤erent preferences for political parties. A greater
level of single-mindedness entails higher values of the density function which
tends to give to the distribution a ticker shape.
Di¤erent preferences for leisure
I introduce an axiom which refers to a fundamental di¤erence between the young
and the old.
Axiom 4 the old are more single-minded for leisure than the young; that is,
 t 1 >  t.
This axiom is certainly strong but it is supported by robust empirical evid-
ence. As a matter of fact, Economics has produced many works providing
possible explanations of the existence of a di¤erence in preferences. Besides,
recently other social sciences like Sociology and Psychology have added very
useful contributions. In summarizing the most important achievements, I will
make a distinction between economic reasons and non-economic reasons.
The economic reasons are contained mainly in works by Mulligan and
Sala-i-Martin (1999).
1. Differences in labour productivity. Since labour productivity de-
clines with age, the old are less productive than the young and, as a
consequence, they earn a lower wage. This theory would explain the will-
ingness of the old to retire early: less productive workers in the labour
market nd it protable to devote relatively more of their time and e¤ort
to political activity, in order to gain monetary transfers that they would
not obtain if they relied on the labour market. Nevertheless, for the theory
to hold it is important to assume that leisure devoted to political activities
is a normal good. That is, an increase in total leisure time provokes an
12
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increase in leisure devoted to political activities, due to the income e¤ect.
Of course these assumptions are not unanimously accepted in literature.
In particular, evidence about the e¤ects of age on productivity and wages
does not lead to clear-cut conclusions. For example, a work by Skierbekk
(2003) found that individual job performance decreases from around 50
years of age and that productivity reductions at older ages are particu-
larly strong for work tasks where problem solving, learning and speed are
needed, while in jobs where experience and verbal abilities are important,
older individualsmaintain a relatively high productivity level.
2. Differences in Human Capital Accumulation. The young are more
engaged in self-nanced human capital accumulation, while they work,
than the old. As a consequence, the value of time for the young may be
higher than their average hourly wage (see Sta¤ord and Duncan (1985)).
3. Long-term employment contracts. The empirical evidence shows that
due to Lazear-type contracts, labour productivity for workers aged 60+ is
signicantly lower than wages.
As for the non-economic reasons, I refer to a work by Hershey, Henkens
and Van Dalen (2006). In comparing the Dutch with the U.S. social security
system, the authors discovered that the Americans had signicantly longer fu-
ture time perspectives, higher level of retirement goal clarity and they tended
to be more engaged in retirement planning activities. Thus, these ndings
are able to explain the existence of sociocultural di¤erences in the preferences
for retirement. They go on a¢ rming that American workers think, prepare
and save more for retirement... beginning in early adulthood, focusing on dif-
ferences between societies, where there exists a major di¤erence in nancial
responsibility, di¤erent level of uncertainty for future pension payouts and dif-
ferent psychological pressures. Finally, in concluding that the success of political
initiatives depends in part on changing the dimensions of the psyche that mo-
tivate individuals to adaptively prepare for old age, they implicitly recognize
that preferences of individuals for leisure may endogenously change over time,
again due to cultural and psychological issues.
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A graphical illustration
In order to ease the comprehension of the relation between single-mindedness
and political power I provide a graphical illustration. Figure 3 shows an example
of di¤erent distributions amongst cohorts.
The gure shows how distributions of generations depend on leisure and that
the old generation (red) has a thicker distribution than the young generation
(orange). The distribution is assumed to be uniform. The broadness of the
interval
  1
2sI
; 1
2sI

is changeable, because s is a monotonically increasing func-
tion of leisure, and higher levels of leisure increase s, reducing the broadness of
the interval. As a result, we obtain a higher concentration of "swing voters",
those voters who are indi¤erent to the two candidates, around .
Figure 4 shows the e¤ects of an increase in  in a generation. A change in  
(from  to  0, with  0 >  ) entails an increase both in l and s. Since s stands
at the denominator of the expression representing the endpoints of the interval,
the broadness of the interval reduces and the distribution becomes thicker.
-1/2s(lt) 1/2s(lt)1/2s(lt-1)-1/2s(lt-1)
s
Figure 3 - Distribution functions of single-minded generations
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-1/2s(l(ψ)) 1/2s(l(ψ))1/2s(l(ψ’))-1/2s(l(ψ’))
s
Figure 4 - E¤ects of a change in a generationpreferences on distribution
The Government
I consider two self-interested candidates j = A;B who choose an element qjt =n

0t 1j
t ; 
0tj
t
o
, encompassing the two e¤ective tax rates 
0t 1j
t and 
0tj
t , from
the (common) strategy set Q R2.
Furthermore, I introduce the budget constraint of the Government at time
t:
jt :=
1
2

0t 1j
t (T   lt 1t )wt 1t +
1
2

0tj
t (T   ltt)wtt = 0 (6)
where 12
0t 1j
t (T   lt 1t )wt 1t represents the total revenues collected by the
taxation of the old and 12
0tj
t (T   ltt)wtt the total revenues collected by the
taxation of the young.2
Since revenues are proportional to the amount of labour, taxation entails
ine¢ ciencies, as it distorts workersdecisions on the amount of labour supplied.
As suggested by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), I assume the existence of a
balanced-budget redistribution where the government cannot redistribute more
resources than those available in the economy, and cannot use tax revenues
for any other purpose than redistribution so that the condition jt = 0 says
15
Emanuele Canegrati Essays on the Single-mindedness Theory
that revenues collected via labour taxation are only used to redistribute wealth
amongst cohorts. To avoid the case in which a di¤erence in wage levels is the sole
reason for early retirement I assume that wages are equal for every generation:
wt 1t = w
t
t = w. Furthermore, without loss of generality, I normalize the wage
rate to the unity.
The advantage of adopting a budget constraint with distortionary taxation
like 6 is realism. Economists like Profeta (2002) and Mulligan and Sala-i-
Martin (1999) formalized models attempting to explain the linkage between
inter-generational redistribution and early retirement; nevertheless, they seem
to be a¤ected by a fundamental problem due to the use of lump-sum transfers.
In Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin an interest group may tax its members with a
labour income tax and distribute the proceeds to them in a lump-sum fashion;
Profeta used lump-sum taxation to transfer wealth both within and amongst
cohorts. Finally, Linbeck and Weibull studied a redistribution model with polit-
ical competition where gross incomes are xed and known and, rst-best (in-
dividual) lump-sum redistributions are in principle feasible. Unfortunately, a
redistributive system with the presence of lump-sum taxation does not exist in
the real world. All the most recent studies on features of social security systems
around the world show that the taxation on income is the only source of n-
ancing social expenditures. For instance, Diamond (2005) found out that The
Social Security system in the U.S. today is nanced by a payroll tax which is
levied on workers and rms equally, whilst Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, adopt-
ing a cross-section analysis of 89 countries, recognized that the 96 per cent of
social security programs are nanced via payroll taxes.
The political competition
The Lindbeck and Weibull framework
As said before voterswelfare depends both on a deterministic and a stochastic
component. The presence of uncertainty, captured by variables related to pref-
erences for political nominees, guarantees the existence of a NE in a multi-
dimensional space (see Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan
(1994)). In the absence of uncertainty candidates would be perfectly able to
observe how voters cast their ballots and then each voter would abruptly switch
backing toward the candidate who promises him the most favourable policy. In
such a case the non-existence of an equilibrium is due to the fact that any chosen
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policy would be beaten by another policy. Therefore, traditional Downsian elect-
oral competition models lead to a negative result where no Condorcet winner
exists. Probabilistic voting models, instead, smooth out this discontinuity be-
cause a small change in the policy chosen entails only a small change in the
probability of backing from voters and not a total loss of backing. Smoothing
out the discontinuity in the probability of winning reopens the possibility that
an equilibrium returns.
Each voter i in generation I votes for candidate B if and only if Bs policy
vector provides him with a greater utility than that provided by candidate As
policy vector. That is i votes for B if and only if:
V I(qBt ) +  + 
i;I
t  V I(qAt ) 8i (7)
where V I(qjt ) represents the indirect utility function which generation I obtains
under the policy vector chosen by candidate j, qjt .
The role of swing voters
In each generation there is a fraction of swing voters , represented by all of
those individuals who are indi¤erent between voting for A or B. For these
voters the condition 7 holds with equality:
;It = V
I(qAt )  V I(qBt )   (8)
Otherwise, all voters i with i;It < 
;I
t vote for A and all voters with 
i;I
t >
;It vote for B. Swing voters are pivotal, since even a small change in the
policy vector may force them to vote for a candidate. Suppose we start from a
situation where As policy, qAt , is exactly equal to Bs policy, q
B
t . A candidate
knows that, should it move away from that policy, some swing voters would be
better o¤ (and vote for him) and some others would be worse o¤ (and vote for
the other candidate). Thus, in choosing a policy, a candidate must calculate
the number of swing voters which he gains and compare it with the number
of swing voters he loses; a change in policy should be made if and only if
a candidate evaluates that the number of swing voters gained outweighs the
number of swing voters lost. For example, suppose that A increases its transfer
to group t   1 by a small amount, due to an increase in the tax credit. Each
old worker receives @
A
t
@at 1At
. But since a change in the tax credit modies the
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level of leisure, and the density of the group accordingly, as a result the cut-
o¤ point represented by equation 8 modies as well. The magnitude of the
shift is equal to the extra consumption that an individual obtains multiplied by
the marginal utility of consumption @
A
t
@at 1At

@IUF t 1t
@at 1At

, where IUFt denotes the
Indirect Utility Function. Nevertheless, since candidates must stay within the
budget, candidate A increases the taxation of the other group by @
A
t
@atAt

@IUF tt
@atAt

.
Therefore, A nds the shift in a policy which favours the group of the old to its
advantage if and only if
@At
@at 1At

@IUF t 1t
@at 1At

st 1  @
A
t
@atAt

@IUF tt
@atAt

st (9)
This condition states that the group which is more ready to switch its vote in
response to a change in policy is treated more favourably by political candidates.
I denote the expected share of votes for candidate A in generation I at time
t by A;It :
A;It =
1
2
sI [It +
1
2sI
] =
1
2
sIIt +
1
4
(10)
and substituting (8) into (10) I obtain:
A;It =
1
2
sI [V I(qAt )  V I(qBt )  ] +
1
4
(11)
The total number of expected votes which A obtains must sum the expected
number of votes of the two groups:
At =
At 1tz }| {
1
2
st 1[V t 1(qAt )  V t 1(qBt )  ] +
1
4
+
Attz }| {
1
2
st[V t(qAt )  V t(qBt )  ] +
1
4
(12)
Notice that At is a random variable since it depends on  which is also
random and how, ceteris paribus, an increase in Bs general popularity amongst
the electorate reduces At . Candidate As probability of winning is simply the
probability to obtain the simple majority of votes:
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pAt
 
qAt ;q
B
t

= Pr[At 
1
2
] = Pr[
tX
I=t 1
sI [V I(qAt )  V I(qBt )  ]  0]
Rearranging terms we obtain:
pAt
 
qAt ;q
B
t

= Pr[At 
1
2
] = Pr[
tX
I=t 1
sI [V I(qAt )  V I(qBt )]  
tX
I=t 1
sI ]
Denoting
P
I
sI = s and 1s
P
I s
I [V I(qAt )  V I(qBt )] = b we obtain:
pAt
 
qAt ;q
B
t

= Pr[At 
1
2
] = Pr[  b] := F b
where F
b denotes the comulative density function. Finally, we also take
into account the distribution of the random variable & to write a nal expression
for the probability of winning:
pAt
 
qAt ;q
B
t

= Pr[At 
1
2
] = [b + 1
2
]
Candidate B wins with probability pBt = 1 pAt .
Notice that pjt
 
qAt ;q
B
t

may be written as the sum of probability of win-
ning with respect to each generation, weighted by the size of the generation,
equal to 12 ; that is p
j
t
 
qAt ;q
B
t

= 1s

1
2p
j;t
t
 
qAt ;q
B
t

+ 12p
j;t 1
t
 
qAt ;q
B
t

, where
pj;It
 
qAt ;q
B
t

denotes the probability of winning for candidate j for generation
I. I will use this decomposition in the following propositions.
Each candidate maximizes the probability of winning3 ; that is a candidate
wants either to maximize the expected margin of victory or to minimize the
expected margin of loss, given the other candidates policy vector.
We now have all the elements to dene a two-person, constant-sum and
symmetric game   where the two candidates j = A;B are players, the two policy
vectors qjt 2 Q R2 the strategies and the probabilities of winning pjt
 
qAt ;q
B
t

:
QQ !R the payo¤s.   is written as  Q;Q; pAt  qAt ;qBt  ; pBt  qAt ;qBt . It is
also useful to remind that in a two-person, constant-sum game a pair of policies 
qAt ;q
B
t
 2 QQ is an equilibrium if and only if it is a saddle point for the
game
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  =
 
Q;Q; pAt
 
qAt ;q
B
t

; 1  pAt
 
qAt ;q
B
t

Denition 5 A Pair
 
qAt ;q
B
t
 2 QQ is called a (pure strategy) Nash equi-
librium (NE) of   if and only if pjt
 
qAt ;q
B
t

6 pjt
 
qAt ;q
B
t

6 pjt
 
qAt ;q
B
t

,
8 qAt ;qBt 2 Q which satisfy the budget constraint.
Timing of the game
The game has three stage. In the rst the two candidates, simultaneously and
independently, announce (and commit to) their policy vectors.
In the second stage elections take place. A candidate wins if and only if she
obtains the majority of votes; in the case of a tie a coin is tossed in order to
decree the winner. Finally, in the third stage, workers choose their leisure, given
the level of tax credits chosen by the Government.
Calculate the equilibrium
I solve the game by backward induction, starting from the nal stage.
A representative old worker solves the following optimization problem:
max
flt 1t g
ct 1t +  
t 1 log lt 1t +D
B 

i;t 1t + 

s:t: ct 1t =

1   0t 1t
  
T   lt 1t

The optimal amount of leisure which solves the problem is:
lt 1t =
 t 1
1   0t 1t
(13)
Substituting (13) into (1) we obtain an expression for the Indirect Utility Func-
tion:
V t 1t = T

1   0t 1t

   t 1 +  t 1 log t 1    t 1 log

1   0t 1t

+DB 
i;t 1t + 

with 1   1  at 1t  > 0 =) at 1t > 1  1 for the existence of the logarithm.
I do the same for the representative young worker:
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max
fltt;ltt+1g
ctt +  
t log ltt + 
 
ctt+1 +  
t 1 log ltt+1

+DB 

i;tt + 

s:t: ctt =

1  
0t
t
  
T   ltt

ctt+1 =

1   0tt+1
  
T   ltt+1

The resolution of the problem yields the optimal level of leisure at time t
and t+ 1 and the Indirect Utility Function:
ltt =
 t
1   0tt
(14)
ltt+1 =
 t 1
1   0tt+1
(15)
V tt = T

1   0tt

   t +  t log t    t log

1   0tt

(16)
+

T

1   0tt+1

   t 1 +  t 1 log t 1    t 1 log

1   0tt+1

+DB 

i;tt + 

Comparative statics shows that the optimal level of leisure is increasing in
preferences of groups for leisure and decreasing in the amount of tax credits.
That is dl
I
t
d I
= 1
1  0It
> 0 and dl
I
t
daIt
=    I
(1  0It )
2 < 0.
Analysing the indirect utility functions with respect to 
0I
t we may notice
that two e¤ects coexist: a tax effect, T

1   0It

, and a leisure effect,
  I log

1   0It

.
What is the e¤ect of an increase in the optimal tax credit on the wealth
of an individual? At a glance, one would be likely to answer that an increase
in tax credits increases the individuals utility because the e¤ective marginal
tax rate is reduced and the net-of-taxes labour income is increased. But leisure
e¤ect says that an increase in tax credits reduces the amount of leisure, and
eventually increases the utility. Therefore, the total e¤ect on the welfare of an
individual depends on which e¤ect prevails.
In the second stage of the game
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Proposition 6 the political equilibrium is a tie.
Proof. Candidates j = A;B solve the following problem:
max
fat 1jt ;atjt g
pjt
 
qAt ;q
B
t

s:t: jt = 0
amin  aIjt  amax
The set of Kuhn-Tucker Conditions may be written as follows:8<:
@At
@atAt
A =
@pAt
@atAt
@At
@at 1At
A =
@pAt
@at 1At
(17)
8<:
@Bt
@atBt
B =
@pBt
@atBt
@Bt
@at 1Bt
B =
@pBt
@at 1Bt
(18)
jt = 0 (19)
 aIjt   amin j1  0 j1

aIjt   amin

= 0 (20)
aIjt   amax  0 j2  0 j2

aIjt   amax

= 0 (21)
where A; B are the two Lagrange multipliers which represent the per capita
marginal gain in expected votes with respect to a marginal change in the policy
made by candidates. In equilibrium A must be equal to B ; namely, the per
capita marginal gain in expected votes should be equalized between the two
candidates. Suppose it is not; then, a candidate realizes that in changing her
policy there is the possibility to obtain more votes than her rival and thus to
win elections. As a consequence, there exists an incentive for her to increase
transfers towards the generation which assures a greater increase in the expected
number of votes; as long as this incentive persists an equilibrium cannot exist.
Conditions (17), (18) state that candidates choose tax credits up to the
level where the marginal political cost (MPC), which represents the reduction
in expected votes of raising an additional dollar, is equalized across cohorts.
Hence, the political optimal structure is one which minimizes total political
costs and clears the budget constraint. An example of political equilibrium is
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depicted in Figure 5.
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R
aI
R
a-I
aI*
a-I*
λ
λ
aI=1
R=0
|R|
|R|
λ/MPB |R|R=0
a)
b)
c)
Figure 5 - Tax structure in a political equilibrium
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Left-hand side graphs show revenues (vertical axis) as a function of tax cred-
its (horizontal axis). The shape of the function reminds us of the famous "La¤er
curve" or rate-revenue relationships. With respect to traditional La¤er curves,
these ones have a negative segment; this is not surprising in a pure redistribu-
tion model, because if one generation obtains a positive transfer the other one
must pay for it. Right-hand side graphs show the relation between Lagrange
multipliers (vertical axis) and revenues (horizontal axis). Lambdas measure the
intensity with which political tastes react to a change in full income by redu-
cing expected backing. Di¤erent preferences for leisure and di¤erent economic
and political reactions to taxation result in di¤erent tax rates. Finally, graph c
shows the political equilibrium. The marginal political benet (MPB) equates
the sum of single MPBs expressed per dollar of expenditure. The equilibrium
is represented by a point where the budget is cleared, Rtt + R
t 1
t = 0, and
the marginal political cost is equal to the marginal benet, MPC = MPB.
Nothing can be said about the concavity of pjt , due to the di¢ culties arising in
evaluating the sign of the value functions second-order derivative4 .
Otherwise, Figure 6 shows a situation which cannot be an equilibrium.
25
Emanuele Canegrati Essays on the Single-mindedness Theory
R
aI
R
a-I
aI,j*
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λ
λ
aI=1
R=0
|R|
|R|
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aI,-j*
a-I,-j*
Δλ-j
Δλ-j
Δλ-j
Δλ-j
Figure 6 - Non-optimal policies
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This time, the two candidates have chosen tax credits such that lambdas
are not equalized. With respect to a situation where policies are convergent
(solid line), candidate j (dashed line) has chosen a tax policy

aIjt ; a
 Ij
t

and
candidate  j (dotted line) a tax policy

aI jt ; a
 I j
t

. The circumscribed
area shows that in this situation an increase in lambda by candidate j, j , is
greater than an increase in lambda by candidate  j,  j ; that isj >  j .
But since we dened lambdas as the increase in probability of winning elections,
it is clear how such a situation cannot be an equilibrium because j would obtain
an increase in the probability of winning. As a consequence,  j would have an
incentive to mime js policy. Therefore, the only possible equilibrium must be
one where in moving away from a policy j =  j .
Corollary 7 In equilibrium b = 0.
Proof. By proposition 6 the electoral equilibrium is a tie; then the probability
of winning must be equal to 12 for every candidate. Since p
j
t = [
b + 12 ], then b
must be equal to zero.
In the rst stage candidates choose optimal policy vectors which are obtained
from the resolution of the maximization problem.
Proposition 8 A tie in elections may be achieved (i) either if policies converge
(ii) or if a policy chosen by one candidate favours one group and a policy chosen
by the other candidate favours the other group.
Proof. From Corollary 7 12s
P
I s
I [V I(qAt )   V I(qBt )] is equal to zero. This
may be achieved only in two ways. Either (i) when policies are convergent,
qAt = q
B
t , which entails the equalization of the indirect utility functions
V I(qBt ) = V
I(qAt ); or (ii) when policies are divergent, q
A
t 6= qBt , and in
this case the following condition must hold:
st
s
[V t(qAt )  V t(qBt )] +
st 1
s
[V t 1(qAt )  V t 1(qBt )] = 0
which may be also written as:
st
s

V t(qAt )  V t(qBt )

=
st 1
s

V t 1(qBt )  V t 1(qAt )

Notice that:
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1. if an equilibrium is achieved via a policy convergence, then it must be
true that pA;tt = p
A;t 1
t = p
B;t
t = p
B;t 1
t =
1
2 .
2. if an equilibrium is achieved via a policy divergence, one of the follow-
ing two statements must be true: (i) either pA;tt = 1; p
A;t 1
t = 0; p
B;t
t = 0;
pB;t 1t = 1, (ii) or p
A;t
t = 0; p
A;t 1
t = 1; p
B;t
t = 1; p
B;t 1
t = 0.
Proposition 9 if qAt = q
B
t = qt then p
j
t (qt;qt) =
1
2 .
Proof. Notice that if qAt = q
B
t , V
t 1(qAt ) = V
t 1(qBt ) and V
t(qAt ) = V
t(qBt )
and thus the probability of winning for the two candidates for generations I is
equal to 12 . Since every generation has size equal to
1
2 , it must be p
j
t (qt;qt) =
1
2
 
1
2

+ 12
 
1
2

= 12 .
The problem is now to evaluate whether the equilibrium of the model is
achieved via a convergence or a divergence of policies. I will provide a su¢ cient
(but not necessary) condition which assures that an equilibrium is achieved
via policy convergence. Instead, note that the classic Lindbeck and Weibulls
monotonicity condition for the policy convergence in probabilistic voting
models is not applicable and thus cannot be used in this setting. Appendix
1 demonstrates the non-applicability of this condition.
Proposition 10 In a constant-sum game qAt = q
B
t = q

t .
Proof. First of all, we have dened   as a constant-sum game, since pBt
 
qAt ;q
B
t

=
1  pAt
 
qAt ;q
B
t

. Suppose now that the pair (qAt ;q
B
t ) 2 QQ is the electoral
equilibrium of the game. Suppose also that qAt 6= qBt . We know by (9) that
pAt
 
qBt ;q
B
t

= 12 . Therefore, by the denition of Nash Equilibrium it must be
pAt
 
qAt ;q
B
t

> pAt
 
qBt ;q
B
t

=
1
2
(22)
By denition of constant-sum game we also know that pBt
 
qAt ;q
A
t

=
1  pAt
 
qAt ;q
A
t

= 12 and again by denition of Nash Equilibrium, it must be
pBt
 
qBt ;q
A
t

> pBt
 
qAt ;q
A
t

=
1
2
(23)
Since pBt
 
qBt ;q
A
t

= 1  pAt
 
qBt ;q
A
t

, this implies that pAt
 
qBt ;q
A
t

<
1
2 . By 22, this implies that p
A
t
 
qAt ;q
B
t

> 12 , a contradiction. Therefore,
qBt = q
B
t .
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Summarising, in this model the equilibrium is achievable via a convergence
of policies even if the Lindbeck and Weibull monotonicity condition is not ap-
plicable. The Nash equilibrium of the game is
qt ;q

t ;
1
2
;
1
2

The optimal tax credit is a function of the density of both groups, of the
nominal marginal tax rate, of the total endowment of time and of preferences
of groups for leisure5 . That is:
aIjt = a

s

l

 I ; 

; s

l

  I ; 

 ; T;  I ;   I

In Mathematical Appendix 2 I will provide a complete resolution to the
problem.
Analysing results we may see that this political economy framework sug-
gests that tax rates should be di¤erentiated. Indeed, if a traditional normative
approach suggests that a benevolent government should tax the poorest groups
less, this political economy outline suggests that in real world vote-seeker gov-
ernments tax groups according to their ability to threaten politicians in an
electoral competition.
An analytical solution to the maximization problem of the rst stage is
impossible to nd because it is a hard task to understand which shape the value
function has. Nevertheless, we know that since Q is a compact set and the value
function is continuous in

aImint ; a
Imax
t

the Weierstrass theorem ensures that
a maximum exists. Then, it only remains for us to understand whether the
optimum is an interior solution or stands at one (or both) endpoint(s) of the
interval.
If the maximum is an interior solution, it must come from the resolution of
the rst order conditions (see Appendix 2) which nds all the stationary points.
Otherwise,
Proposition 11 If the maximum is an endpoint solution, then the NE is
max
 
atminAt ; a
t 1maxA
t ; a
tminB
t ; a
t 1maxB
t

;
 
at 1minAt ; a
tmaxA
t ; a
t 1minB
t ; a
tmaxB
t
	
Proof. In order to balance the budget constraint, if the marginal tax rate
of a generation is greater than one, the marginal tax rate of other generation
must be lower than one; otherwise the sum of two positive tax revenues could
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never be equal to zero. Since aImin jt < 1 and a
Imax j
t > 1, solutions such as 
atminAt ; a
t 1minA
t ; a
tminB
t ; a
t 1minB
t

or
 
atmaxAt ; a
t 1maxA
t ; a
tmaxB
t ; a
t 1maxB
t

are not clearly achievable. Therefore, we must conclude that the only possible
solution is
max
 
atminAt ; a
t 1maxA
t ; a
tminB
t ; a
t 1maxB
t

;
 
at 1minAt ; a
tmaxA
t ; a
t 1minB
t ; a
tmaxB
t
	
6
This proposition has an important meaning. It says that, if an internal
solution is not achievable, candidates must favour a generation and penalize the
other generation as much as they can, by choosing the highest and the lowest
tax rates in the set of common strategies.
As I stated before, due to the complexity of the system of equations we
cannot rely on an analytical solution to the rst stage of the game. Therefore, I
introduce some conjectures about the equilibrium of the game and I verify them
performing numerical simulations (see Appendix 3).
Conjecture 12 Tax credits are higher for the older generations.
Proof. result obtained via numerical simulations.
Conjecture 13 The older generations o¤er either a very low level of labour
or retire at all, depending on the values which parameters assume, whilst the
younger generations o¤er a greater amount of labour.
Proof. result obtained via numerical simulations.
Conjecture 14 Tax revenues collected via labour taxation of the younger gen-
erations are positive, whilst those of the older generations are negative.
Proof. result obtained via numerical simulations.
Analysing results of numerical simulation we may conclude that a scal
system where self-interested governments maximize the probability of winning
induces the old to retire early. In order to facilitate early retirement, revenues
raised from the taxation of the old are negative and, on the contrary, revenues
raised from the taxation of the young are positive and equal to the amount of
transfers that the old receive. Thus, in this model there exists a net transfer of
resources from the younger to the older generation, suggesting that the former
carry the entire burden of social security systems, whilst the latter are net
beneciaries.
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A variant with altruism
The simple model described above is able to explain the very negative phe-
nomenon of early retirement. It depicts an economic environment where politi-
cians are captured by most strongly focused single-minded groups. As long as
candidates are self-interested and only aim to win elections, this political failure
magnies labour markets failures. Of course this cannot be optimal for society,
especially considering the e¤ects on inter-generational equity: older generations
are net beneciaries, whilst younger generations net payers. Is there any possib-
ility of mitigating this uneven situation? As long as the old are selsh and only
aim to maximise their welfare a solution which increases the youngs welfare is
hardly achievable. Otherwise, I suggest that altruism o¤ers a rationale against
early retirement. Altruism is seen as a change in preferences by the old which
this time pays attention to the youngs needs. This change in preferences should
lead to a more equitable equilibrium.
In this chapter I consider a model where the old workers internalise their
o¤springs wealth. A classical altruistic model considers that households can be
represented by a dynasty who perpetuates forever. As a consequence, the old
internalize the utility function of the young. Hence, the new utility function of
the old may be written as:
U t 1 = ct 1t +  
t 1 log lt 1t + U
t (24)
where  2 [0; 1] is a parameter which captures the degree of altruism of the
old for the young; the higher  the more the old assign a greater importance to
the youngs wealth. Under this new framework, we should expect that policies
chosen by the government become less burdensome on the young, since the old
are now prone to share the onus of the system.
Conjecture 15 with respect to the basic model, tax credits for the old (young)
are lower (higher) and inter-generational transfers from the young to the old are
reduced.
Proof. result obtained via numerical simulations.
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Conclusions
I introduced a very simple probabilistic voting model where the generation of the
old is more-single minded than the generation of the young; that is, the former
has greater preferences for leisure than the latter. This enables this group to
be more politically powerful in a political competition between two candidates
who have to choose e¤ective marginal tax rates on labour in order to maximise
the probability of winning elections. The equilibrium of the game is one where
the two candidates even out and policies are convergent; this could be achieved
via an internal or a corner solution, depending on the concavity/convexity of
the value function. Simulations show that the old generation obtains higher
tax credits, higher levels of leisure and positive inter-generational transfers.
Therefore, the young are worse-o¤ and they bear the burden of social security
systems. Altruism may reduce this uneven redistribution scheme, lightening the
excess pressure on younger generations. Inter-generational pacts could represent
a possible solution to the early retirement problem, forcing the old to internalize
the welfare of the young in order to make them share the entire burden of social
security systems.
Mathematical Appendix 1
Proposition 16 (Monotonicity condition) Assume (i) V it is concave in q
j
t (ii) for each
group and candidate
@p
j
t
@a
Ij
t
@
j
t
@a
Ij
t
is strictly monotonic. If (qAt ;q
B
t ) is a pure strategy electoral
equilibrium, then qAt = q
B
t .
Proof. From Proposition 6 we know that j and  j must be equal for every generation.
This entails that the ratio between the two Lagrange multipliers of di¤erent candidates must
be equal for every generation as well. I call this ratio I := 
jI
 jI . The problem is to
assess whether this condition may be achieved under a divergence or a convergence of policies.
To prove this, I start assuming that qjt 6= q jt . Since candidates must clear the balanced-
budget constraint, there must exist a generation which gets higher tax credits under candidate
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j (suppose it is t) and another generation which gets higher tax credits under candidate
 j (t   1). We have to assess whether the condition t = t 1 is achievable in such a
situation. If it is, then an equilibrium is achieved under divergent policies; otherwise, policies
are convergent. Notice that if both the numerator and the denominator are monotonic, the
ratio is monotonic. If so, it means that (i) either t > 1 > t 1 or (ii) t 1 < 1 < t;
therefore, an equilibrium cannot be achieved via divergent policies.
In this model, and more in general in models where the direct utility function is quasi-linear
in the consumption and leisure, the monotonicity condition cannot be applied to solve the
candidates problem. The failure of the monotonicity condition may have several implications.
First of all, the possibility that the equilibrium is not achievable via a convergence of policies.
Secondly, and more importantly, the convexity of V it means that a maximum does not exist,
since the value function is not concave.
(i) Convexity of Vt
Write the worker problem where the direct utility function is quasi-linear in consumption
and leisure:
max
fltg
Ut = ct +  log lt
subject to the budget constraint
ct = 

1  ajt

(T   lt); lt > 0
The optimal leisure is lt =
 
1 (1 ajt)
. Obtain the indirect utility function Vt =
T (1  

1  ajt

)   + log

 
1 (1 ajt)

= T (1  t)   +  log    logw  
 log

1  

1  ajt

. Dene the constant term A := T   1+ log , substitute and
obtain Vt = A 

1  ajt

T   log

1  

1  ajt

. Write the rst order condition
@Vt
@ajt
= T    
1   + ajt
= 0
Note that there exist only a stationary point, ajot = 1     T . Write the second order
condition
@2Vt
@

ajt
2 =  2
1   + ajt
2 > 0
That is, Vt is a convex function and a
jo
t := argmin (Vt).
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(ii) Non-monotonicity
Impose the ratio I = 
jI
 jI to be equal to one, subtract the denominator from the
numerator and verify whether the expression has a denite sign. Denoting zt = V
I(qjt )  
V I(q jt ) we get the following:
Az }| {0@ @@atjt   1s
@j
@atjt
 
@
@at jt
 
1
s

@j
@at jt
1AX
I
1
2
stzt+ (25)
+
Bz }| {
1
s
0@0@ @st@atjt
@j
@atjt
 
@st
@at jt
@j
@at jt
1A zt+
0@ @V tt@atjt
@j
@atjt
 
@V tt
@at jt
@j
@at jt
1A st
1A
for generation t, and
 
Cz }| {0@ @@at 1jt   1s
@j
@at 1jt
 
@
@at 1 jt
 
1
s

@j
@at 1 jt
1AX
I
1
2
st 1zt+ (26)
+
Dz }| {
1
s
0@0@ @st 1@at 1jt
@j
@at 1jt
 
@st 1
@at 1 jt
@j
@at 1 jt
1A ( zt)+
0@ @V t 1t@at 1jt
@j
@at 1jt
 
@V t 1t
@at 1 jt
@j
@at 1 jt
1A st 1
1A
for generation t  1.
By the meaning of Proposition 6 A and C are equal to zero. Thus we have to verify that
B and D are monotonic. Notice that as demonstrated before
@V tt
@atjt
is not monotonic and that
@j
@atjt
is not monotonic either.
sign(zt) changes according to the interval where tax credits nd. Denoting by ajVt=0+
and ajVt=0  points where the Vt intersects the axis
7 (respectively at the right and at the left
hand side) representing the tax credit we may easily see that 6 cases to study arise:
a j+t < a
j+
t < ajVt=0=) zt< 0
a j+t < ajVt=0 < a
j+
t
< ajot =) zt< 0
ajVt=0< a
 j+
t < a
j+
t < a
jo
t =) zt> 0
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ajVt=0< a
 j+
t < a
jo
t < a
j+
t < ajV (a j)<V (aj)=) zt> 0
ajVt=0+ < a
 j+
t < a
jo
t < ajV (ajt )<V (a jt )
< aj+t < ajVt=0  =) zt> 0
ajVt=0+ < a
 j+
t < a
jo
t < ajV (ajt )<V (a jt )
< ajVt=0  < a
j+=) zt> 0
We study the sign of expression (25) and (26). Since the sign (zt) is discontinuous,
@V jt
@aIjt
and
@jt
@aIjt
are not monotonic, the sign of the expression is not clear and thus we cannot
say a-priori whether the monotonicity condition holds. As a consequence the Lindbeck and
Weibulls monotonicy condition may not be exploited in this model to demonstrate that an
equilibrium is only achievable via a convergence of policies.
Mathematical Appendix 2
In this Appendix I provide a complete resolution to the candidatesproblem when the equilib-
rium is internal. The two candidates face exactly the same optimization problem, maximizing
the probability of winning.
maxn
a
tj
t ;a
t 1j
t
o pjt = 12 +
1
2s
tX
I=t 1
sI
h
V i

qjt

  V i

q jt
i
jt :=

2
tX
I=t 1

T   lIt

1  aIjt

= 0
amin  aIjt  amax
I write the Lagrangian function for candidate j:
Lj = 1
2
+
1
2s
tX
I=t 1
sI
h
V i

qjt

  V i

q jt
i
 j

jt

 j1

amin   aIjt

 j2

aIjt   amax

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Deriving the Lagrangian I obtain Kuhn-Tucker conditions:8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(1) @L
j
@at 1jt
:= @
2@at 1jt
 
1
s
P
I s
I
h
V i

qjt

  V i

q jt
i
+
+ 12s  @s
t 1
@lt 1t
 @lt 1t
@at 1jt

V t 1jt   V t 1 jt

+ s
t 1
2s

@V t 1t
@at 1jt

+j1   j2 = j

@jt
@a 1jt

(2) @L
j
@atjt
:= @
2@atjt
 
1
s
P
I s
I
h
V i

qjt

  V i

q jt
i
+
+ 12s  @s
t
@ltt
 @ltt
@atjt

V tjt   V t jt

+ s
t
2s

@V tt
@atjt

+j1   j2 = j

@jt
@atjt

(3) jt = 0
(4) a
min aIjt  j1 0 j1

aIjt   amin

= 0
(5) a
Ij
t  amax 0 j2 0 j2

aIjt   amax

= 0
By Proposition 10 we know that at an equilibrium qAt = q
B
t , such that rst order
conditions if the solution is internal may be simplied in the following way:88>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(1) @L
A
@at 1At
:= s
t 1
2s

@V t 1t
@at 1At
jqAt =qAt

= A

@At
@at 1At
jqAt =qAt

(2) @L
A
@atAt
:= s
t
2s

@V tt
@atAt
jqAt =qAt

= A

@At
@atAt
jqAt =qAt

(3) At = 0
(4) 
A
1 = 0 
A
1
 
aIAt   amin

= 0
(5) 
A
2 = 0 
A
2
 
aIAt   amax

= 0
(6) @L
B
@at 1Bt
:= s
t 1
2s

@V t 1t
@at 1Bt
jqBt =qBt

= B

@Bt
@at 1Bt
jqBt =qBt

(7) @L
B
@atBt
:= s
t
2s

@V tt
@atBt
jqBt =qBt

= B

@Bt
@atBt
jqBt =qBt

(8) Bt = 0
(9) 
B
1 = 0 
B
1
 
aIBt   amin

= 0
(10) 
B
2 = 0 
B
2
 
aIBt   amax

= 0
(11) 
A
= B = 
We then obtain the reaction functions:
rAt =

atAt = r
 
atBt ; a
t 1B
t ; s
 
l
 
 t 1; 

; s
 
l
 
 t; 

;  ; T;  t 1;  t

at 1At = r
 
atBt ; a
t 1B
t ; s
 
l
 
 t 1; 

; s
 
l
 
 t; 

;  ; T;  t 1;  t

rBt =

atBt = r
 
atAt ; a
t 1A
t ; s
 
l
 
 t 1; 

; s
 
l
 
 t; 

;  ; T;  t 1;  t

at 1Bt = r
 
atAt ; a
t 1A
t ; s
 
l
 
 t 1; 

; s
 
l
 
 t; 

;  ; T;  t 1;  t

Solving the system we obtain the optimal vector of policies from the set of intersection
points 1 :
at 1At = a(s
 
l
 
 t 1; 

; s
 
l
 
 t; 

;  ; T;  t 1;  t)
atAt = a(s
 
l
 
 t 1; 

; s
 
l
 
 t; 

;  ; T;  t 1;  t)
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at 1Bt = a(s
 
l
 
 t 1; 

; s
 
l
 
 t; 

;  ; T;  t 1;  t)
atBt = a(s
 
l
 
 t 1; 

; s
 
l
 
 t; 

;  ; T;  t 1;  t)
with at 1At = a
t 1B
t and a
tA
t = a
tB
t
With altruism the rst order conditions are modied as follows:8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(1) @L
A
@at 1At
:= s
t 1
2s

@V t 1t
@at 1At

= A

@At
@at 1At

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A
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t
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
@V tt
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
+s
t 1
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
@V tt
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
= A

@At
@atAt

(3) At = 0
(4) 
A
1 = 0 
A
1
 
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
= 0
(5) 
A
2 = 0 
A
2
 
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
= 0
(6) @L
B
@at 1Bt
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t 1
2s

@V t 1t
@at 1Bt

= B

@Bt
@at 1Bt

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B
@atBt
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t
2s

@V tt
@atBt

+s
t 1
2s

@V tt
@at 1Bt

= B
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(9) 
B
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B
1
 
aIBt   amin

= 0
(10) 
B
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B
2
 
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
= 0
(11) 
A
= B= 
which gives a new set of intersection points :
at 1At = a(s
 
l
 
 t 1; 

; s
 
l
 
 t; 

;  ; T;  t 1;  t; )
atAt = a(s
 
l
 
 t 1; 

; s
 
l
 
 t; 

;  ; T;  t 1;  t; )
at 1Bt = a(s
 
l
 
 t 1; 

; s
 
l
 
 t; 

;  ; T;  t 1;  t; )
atBt = a(s
 
l
 
 t 1; 

; s
 
l
 
 t; 

;  ; T;  t 1;  t; )
with at 1At = a
t 1B
t and a
tA
t = a
tB
t
Appendix 3 - Numerical simulations
Numerical simulations were performed in order to assess the validity of conjec-
tures 12-14, under the assumption that the maximum is an interior solution to
the maximization problem. They jointly suppose that the old generation, be-
cause more single-minded, obtains more favourable policies from governments.
That is, the old obtain higher tax credits (conjecture 12) and positive inter-
generational transfers (conjecture 14). Furthermore, the combination of higher
preferences for leisure and higher tax credits enables the old to reach higher
levels of leisure (conjecture 13). As a consequence the young are worse o¤, be-
cause they obtain lower tax credits and have to endure the entire cost of social
security systems9 . I assume that optimal values are always acceptable, that is
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amaxt is su¢ ciently high to be always greater than a
Ij
t . Solutions show that
only one stationary point exists.
To perform simulations a suitable density function is required. As suggested
by Profeta (2002) I will use one with a constant positive elasticity "
sI = (lI)"
with " = 1 for computational purposes. Table 1 shows results. The nominal
marginal tax rate,  , was set equal to 1 and the total endowment of time, T ,
equal to 0:9. Simulations were performed using di¤erent values of preferences of
workers for leisure, under the condition that the parameter of the old is higher
the that of the young. Tax credits are always higher for the old but the di¤erence
between tax credits of the two generations reduces with respect to a reduction in
the di¤erence between preferences. Leisure is always higher for the old and the
amount of leisure increases both for the young and for the old from situation 1
to situation 9. Tax revenues are always positive for the generation of the young
and negative for the generation of the old, meaning that the young bear the
entire burden of social security systems; otherwise, the old get a transfer (i.e. a
pension). Notice that the inter-generational redistribution e¤ect is higher the
higher is the di¤erence between preference for leisure amongst cohorts. Finally,
notice that, even though the sum of preferences for leisure of the old and the
young is equal to one, the total level of leisure is not constant. The worst
situation for the aggregate level of employment is achieved in situation 9, whilst
the reverse is true for situation 1.
 t 1  t  T at 1 at lt 1 lt l T t 1 T t
1 0:95 0:05 1 0:9 2:144 0:261 0:442 0:19 0:632  0:261 0:261
2 0:9 0:1 1 0:9 1:915 0:385 0:469 0:259 0:728  0:196 0:196
3 0:85 0:15 1 0:9 1:739 0:484 0:488 0:309 0:797  0:152 0:152
4 0:8 0:2 1 0:9 1:592 0:571 0:502 0:35 0:852  0:117 0:117
5 0:75 0:25 1 0:9 1:465 0:649 0:511 0:384 0:895  0:09 0:09
6 0:7 0:3 1 0:9 1:352 0:722 0:517 0:415 0:932  0:067 0:067
7 0:65 0:35 1 0:9 1:25 0:791 0:519 0:442 0:961  0:047 0:047
8 0:6 0:4 1 0:9 1:159 0:859 0:517 0:465 0:982  0:03 0:03
9 0:55 0:45 1 0:9 1:076 0:928 0:51 0:484 0:994  0:014 0:014
Table 1 - Numerical simulation (basic model)
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Notice that the result which states that the old enjoy lower e¤ective marginal
tax rates than the young contradicts previous results obtained by probabilistic
voting models applied to social security systems. In Profeta, the old are taxed
more heavily than the young (Proposition 3.1, p. 345); the same result is
achieved by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (Proposition 8, p.31).
Table 2 shows results of simulations performed with the altruistic model
in order to check the validity of conjecture 15. The altruistic parameter was
set equal to 0.3. With respect to results obtained with the basic model notice
that the old (young) obtain lower (higher) tax credits and that there are less
redistributive e¤ects since transfers from the young to the old are reduced.
Furthermore, notice that in situation 9 the young obtain a positive transfer,
although this is rather small. Leisure increases for the old, meaning that the
higher e¤ective marginal tax rate increases the incentive to quit the labour force,
whilst leisure of the young reduces. Aggregate leisure reduces as well, except
for situations 8, 9 where this is slightly higher than the previous situation.
 t 1  t  T  at 1 at lt 1 lt l T t 1 T t
1 0:95 0:05 1 0:9 0:3 2:104 0:342 0:451 0:145 0:596  0:247 0:247
2 0:9 0:1 1 0:9 0:3 1:845 0:503 0:487 0:198 0:685  0:174 0:174
3 0:85 0:15 1 0:9 0:3 1:645 0:625 0:516 0:239 0:755  0:123 0:123
4 0:8 0:2 1 0:9 0:3 1:479 0:723 0:540 0:276 0:816  0:086 0:086
5 0:75 0:25 1 0:9 0:3 1:338 0:804 0:56 0:31 0:87  0:057 0:057
6 0:7 0:3 1 0:9 0:3 1:217 0:873 0:575 0:343 0:918  0:035 0:035
7 0:65 0:35 1 0:9 0:3 1:111 0:932 0:584 0:375 0:959  0:017 0:017
8 0:6 0:4 1 0:9 0:3 1:019 0:987 0:588 0:405 0:993  0:003 0:003
9 0:55 0:45 1 0:9 0:3 0:939 1:040 0:585 0:432 1:017 0:009  0:009
Table 2 - Numerical simulation (altruistic model)
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A Contribution to the Positive
Theory of Indirect Taxation
Introduction
Taxation has been a much-discussed topic in the economic literature. From
previous contributions we know that maximum e¢ ciency is achieved via lump-
sum taxes, because they nullify the excess burden of taxation. Nevertheless,
such taxation is not desirable because it is considered unjust. Thus, in order
to achieve equity goals, benevolent governments must accept that taxpayers
distort their economic choices in order to escape the burden of taxation. As a
consequence market failures arise, such as a reduction in the labour supply.
In democratic societies, allocation choices for the public sector are made
through voting, and through the actions of elected representatives. Economic
outcomes must be evaluated in a broader context, one that allows for the possib-
ility of setting tax rates at a candidates discretion, together with the collective
nature of existing political institutions that must be relied on to take decisions
on scal issues.
Depending on whether the political decision-making mechanism is considered
by the analysis or not, the literature on taxation is divided in two main streams
of research: the normative and the positive approach.
The normative approach seeks e¢ ciency-oriented solutions considering the
existence of a benevolent social-planner who avoids any concern regarding col-
lective action. A tenet achieved by this analysis states that a tax system is
e¢ cient if it minimizes the total excess burden of raising a given amount of
revenue. A typical application of this approach is the inverse elasticity rule
associated with Ramsey (1927) who analysed an economy with sales taxes im-
posed on di¤erent commodities. This work concludes by a¢ rming that, in order
to minimise the excess burden, higher tax rates should be levied on commodities
which have a relatively inelastic demand in the range of the demand function
with respect to commodities whose demands are more elastic, so as to raise a
given total revenue while avoiding, as far as possible, the excess burdens asso-
ciated with the substitution away from commodities whose after-tax price has
risen. Furthermore, a version of Ramseys rule modied by Diamond (1975)
envisions a planner who takes distributional goals into account, derived from a
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welfare function where weights are attached to the welfare of di¤erent individu-
als. In order to maximise social welfare the planner equalizes distributionally
weighted marginal excess burdens per dollar raised across available tax bases.
Otherwise, the positive approach studies collective choice processes and their
inuence on political and economic outcomes. Works belonging to this second
strand not only focus on market failures but also on political failures. Two recent
works (Polo, 1998; Svensson, 1997) focus on the role of political competition,
where candidates propose policy platforms in order to maximise the probability
of winning elections (or the number of votes), under conditions of uncertainty
about voters political preferences. Since individuals aim to maximise their
utility inuenced by public policies, they react positively to an increase in the
amount of public goods and negatively to the payment of taxes and to welfare
losses caused by taxation. The maximisation of the probability of winning is
achievable if politicians design an equilibrium tax structure which equalises the
change in opposition per marginal tax dollar raised across groups.
It is essential to understand equilibrium outcomes produced by well-functioning
political processes, and to examine how such outcomes change when imperfec-
tions become part of the collective action. This implies that we need a model of
collective choice as our starting point that allows us to study and demonstrate
the existence and stability of political equilibria and to examine the nature of
specic equilibrium policies or outcomes. Probabilistic voting Theory is able
to accomplish this goal, since the resulting Nash equilibria amongst parties are
Pareto-optimal. (Hettich and Winer 1999, Chapter 4.) However, the need to
take this basic analytical step is not tied to the use of a particular framework;
rather, it arises from the fundamental nature of normative analysis itself. Im-
perfections in private markets have their counterparts in failures of the political
process. As a consequence, we must focus on the operation of the collective
decision mechanism in order to identify those features that cause it to oper-
ate imperfectly. Not only must we begin by modelling a political process that
leads to an optimal allocation of resources, but it is also necessary to determine
tailored tax policies that will be part of the political equilibrium. Once this has
been accomplished, we can then extend the examination to specic imperfec-
tions of collective decision-making and trace out their implications for structure
of the tax policies. Few authors writing on taxation have concerned themselves
with this research programme but unless it is carried out, economists cannot
accomplish an analysis of tax policy failures that has the same force as does the
well-known work on private market imperfections.
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Finally, when we also introduce equity goals into the analysis we must deal
with welfare state programmes which transfer resources amongst groups. A
question naturally arises: to what extent do voterspreferences inuence these
programmes? A standard model of redistributive taxation may be found in
Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1981); if we suppose
that both individual productivity and the availability of leisure di¤er, it can
be demonstrated that political candidates commit to the policy preferred by
the median voter. In equilibrium, taxes are higher the greater the distance
between median and mean income, a specic measure of income inequality.
Nevertheless, in these models the single-peakedness condition, which is necessary
for an equilibrium to exist, is very likely to fail, as the authors demonstrated.
In this paper I will analyse how self-interested governments set their taxation
policies in a probabilistic voting model. Candidates are pure voter-seekers and
aim to maximise the probability of winning elections. Society is divided into
groups who assign di¤erent weights to consumption of goods, based on their pref-
erences; that is, they have di¤erent levels of single-mindedness. Results show
how in equilibrium candidates must satisfy the most powerful groups, which
do not necessarily represent the median voter, or the middle class, but may be
located at extreme positions on the income scale. The introduction of a prob-
abilistic voting model characterized by single-minded groups changes the classic
result of median voter models because it is no longer the position on the income
scale which drives the choice of candidates but rather the ability of groups to fo-
cus on issues they prefer. This ability enables them to achieve a strong political
power which candidates cannot help going along with, because they would lose
the elections otherwise. Escaping the more single-minded groups is impossible
for politicians, as long as they are prisoners of their own self-interest. In this
vicious circle, the function of taxation is reduced to one of merely protecting
private interests. Results of this model represent the antithesis of classic norm-
ative models. Taxation loses its pro-active role as a mechanism to redistribute
resources from the rich to the poor or to supply public goods and becomes
only a way to win elections, no matter if this means protecting even the richest
components of society.
Results of this model would also provide a possible explanation for the exist-
ence of indirect taxation. This is an old issue addressed by Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976) who demonstrated that the optimal direct-cum-indirect tax problem puts
all commodity taxes to zero and raises everything through income tax. More
recent works by Laroque (2005) and Kaplow (2006) demonstrated that Atkin-
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son and Stiglitzs result is even stronger because there appears to be no role
for taxes on commodities even in the presence of a non-optimally designed tax
structure. Then, why are Governments so reluctant to abolish indirect taxation?
If we consider that direct taxation is progressive in practice whilst indirect tax-
ation is mildly regressive10 it might be perfectly possible to see the interest of
powerful interest groups in preventing a substantial shift from indirect to direct
taxation. If more single-minded groups are found amongst the richest compon-
ent of society and are not favourable to increase the weight of direct taxation
with respect to indirect taxation, Governments could not undertake this reform.
As a consequence income distribution is less egalitarian.
A model of indirect taxation
I consider a society divided into H groups, indexed by h = 1; :::;H. Groups
have size fh and their members are exactly alike. Two political candidates,
j = D;R, run for an election. Both candidates have an ideological label (for
example, Democrats and Republicans) which is exogenously given. Voterswel-
fare depends on two components; the rst is deterministic and it is represented
by the consumption of goods, whilst the second is stochastic and derives from
the personal attributes of candidates.
Each individual in group h derives his consumption from n goods xhi , indexed
by i = 1; :::; n. Consumption is a function of the tax policy chosen by candidates
and it is perfectly observable. The deterministic component of welfare may be
written in a logarithmic fashion,
nP
i=1
 hi log x
h
i , where  
h
i represents the weight
(importance) that group h attaches to good i.
The stochastic component is denoted by DR 

h + &

, where the indicator
function
DR =
(
1 if R wins
0 if D wins
The random variable & Q 0 reects candidate Rs popularity amongst voters
and it is realized between the announcement of policies and elections. It is not
idiosyncratic and it is uniformly distributed as
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&  U

 1
2
;
1
2

with mean zero. Otherwise, h Q 0 represents an idiosyncratic random variable
which measures voters preferences for D. It is not perfectly observable by
candidates and it is uniformly distributed as
h  U

  1
2sh
;
1
2sh

again with mean zero and density sh.
Therefore, a representative individual in group h maximizes the following
utility function:
Uh =
nX
i=1
 hi log x
h
i +D
R 

h + &

(27)
under the following budget constraint
nX
i=1
qji x
h
i =M
h (28)
whereMh is the income of any individual in group h. I denote by qji = pi+t
j
i the
consumption price of good i, by pi the xed production price11 and by t
j
i the unit
excise tax levied by candidate j on good i. Hence,  !x = [x1; :::; xn] 2 X  Rn
denotes the vector of consumption,
 !
qj =
h
qj1; :::; q
j
n
i
2 Qj  Rn the vector of
consumption prices,  !p = [p1; :::; pn] 2 P  Rn the vector of production prices
and
 !
tj =
h
tj1; :::; t
j
n
i
2 T j  Rn the vector of tax rates.
I introduce two important denitions:
Denition 17 group A is said to be more single-minded than group B with
respect to good i if the weight assigned by A to i is greater than the weight
assigned by B. That is, if  Ai >  
B
i .
This denition states that groups, in attaching weights to goods, are less or
more willing to substitute a good with another12 , depending on the preferences
they have for every good. As a consequence, there exist some goods whose
consumption is more claimed by groups, because its reduction would a¤ect their
welfare in a more tangible way.
Denition 18 group A is said to be more politically powerful than group B if
its density is higher than Bs. That is if sA > sB.
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In this case the political power of a group must be intended as the ability of
inuencing candidateschoices, when they have to take decisions over a policy.
In traditional probabilistic voting models this power is expressed by a density
function which captures the distribution of the constituency.
The demand for goods
Individuals maximize 27 subject to 28. The Lagrangian function for a repres-
entative individual in group h is
Lh =
nX
i=1
 hi log x
h
i +D
R 

h + &

+ h
 
Mh  
nX
i=1
qji x
h
i
!
The set of rst order conditions is
0BBBBB@
@L1
@x11
: : : @L
H
@xH1
...
. . .
@L1
@x1n
@LH
@xHn
@L1
@1
@LH
@H
1CCCCCA =
0BBBBBBB@
 11
x11
= 1qj1 : : :
 H1
xH1
= Hqj1
...
. . .
...
 1n
x1n
= 1qjn
 Hn
xHn
= Hqjn
nP
i=1
qji x
1
i =M
1
nP
i=1
qji x
H
i =M
H
1CCCCCCCA
The resolution of rst order conditions yields the Marshallian demand func-
tions xhi =
 hiM
h
qji
and the indirect utility functions
V

x

qji ;M
h

=
nX
i=1
 hi log
 hiM
h
qji
+DR 

h + &

Political Competition
I consider now the problem of candidates. What distinguishes this contribution
from previous taxation models in Political Economy is the existence of a
new setting where probabilistic voting and single-mindedness theory
fuse together. In the classic literature governments had always been con-
sidered as benevolent planners, who aimed to maximise a Social Welfare Func-
tion whose characteristics depended on the preferences of society for equity,
perfectly mirrored by policy-makers preferences. Weights attached to the util-
ity of di¤erent agents were higher for the poor and lower for the rich.
Instead, in this model politicians are considered as voter-seekers who aim
to maximise the probability of winning elections by choosing an optimal policy
45
Emanuele Canegrati Essays on the Single-mindedness Theory
vector
 !
tj . Each voter in group h votes for R if and only if Rs policy provides
him with a greater utility than that provided by D. That is a generic voter 
votes for D if and only if:
V h
 !
tR

+ ;h + &  V h
 !
tD

8 (29)
where V h
 !
tj

represents the indirect utility function which group h derives
under the vector of policies chosen by candidate j. Within each group there is a
fraction of swing voters, denoted by b, represented by those individuals who are
indi¤erent between D or R. For these voters equation 29 holds with equality:
b;h = V h
 !
tD

  V h
 !
tR

  & (30)
Otherwise, voter  votes for D if ;h < b;h and for R if ;h > b;h. Swing
voters are pivotal, since even a small change in the policy vector makes them
no longer indi¤erent to candidates and it forces them to vote for one of two.
The probability of winning elections for candidate j is given by
pj
 !
tj ;
 !
t j

=
1
2
+
d
s
HX
h=1
fhsh
h
V
 !
tj

  V
 !
t j
i
(31)
where V
 !
tj

:= V

pi + t
j
i ;M
h

and s :=
P
h
shfh.
Axiom 19 the density function of a group is twice di¤erentiable and monoton-
ically increasing in the level of consumption of goods. That is sh = s(xh1 ; :::; x
h
n),
with @s
h
@xhi
> 0.
This axiom brings something new with respect to the traditional probabil-
istic voting models, where the density function was always treated as a constant.
The idea to make the density function depend on the consumption of goods is
new and deserve to be explained. The classic literature on probabilistic voting
models (Persson and Tabellini (2000), Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), and Cough-
lin (1992)) has always assumed that preferences of voters for political candidates
have a distribution where the density function is a constant. Instead, in this
model, the density function is increasing in the level of consumption which
is in turn a¤ected by the vector of policies. Candidates realize that, should
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they change a policy, the welfare of groups would change and their political
power, captured by the density function, accordingly. Hence, a nexus is cre-
ated amongst governmentspolicies, votersconsumption and political power of
groups which eventually a¤ects electionsoutcome.
Furthermore, as suggested by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), I assume that
Remark 20 there exists a balanced-budget constraintX
h
fh
X
i
tjix

qji ;M
h

= 0 (32)
which coerces the government to redistribute via transfers all the tax revenues
collected.
This assumption allows us to treat the model as purely redistributive,
which has the advantage of clearly showing the redistributive e¤ects, neglecting
any concern about the existence of public expenditure. In turn, equation 32
says that all the revenues collected via taxation are used to redistribute wealth
amongst groups. As a consequence, if some groups are better o¤ by the achieve-
ment of a net transfer, some others must necessarily be worse o¤ because they
have to bear the entire payment of these transfers.
Finally, notice how this political game is a two-person, constant-sum and
symmetric game where a pair of policies is an equilibrium pair if and only if
it is a saddle point for
  =
 
TD; TR; pD; 1  pD
The equilibrium
To solve the problem I write the Lagrangian function for candidate D (the same
holds for candidate R):
LD = 1
2
+
d
s
X
h
fhsh

V
 !
tD

  V
 !
tR

+ D
 X
h
fh
X
i
tDi x
 
qDi ;M
h
!
(33)
The set of rst order conditions is:
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8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
@LD
@qD1
= @
@qD1
 
1
s

d
P
h
fhsh
h
V
 !
tD

  V
 !
tR
i
+ ds
P
h
fh @s
h
@qD1
h
V
 !
tD

  V
 !
tR
i
+
+ds
P
h
@V h
@qD1
fhsh + D
P
o
tDo
P
h
fh
@xho
@qDo
+ xho

= 0 o 6= i
...
@LD
@qDn
= @
@qDn
 
1
s

d
P
h
fhsh
h
V
 !
tD

  V
 !
tR
i
+ ds
P
h
fh @s
h
@qDn
h
V
 !
tD

  V
 !
tR
i
+
+ds
P
h
@V h
@qDn
fhsh + D
P
o
tDo
P
h
fh
@xho
@qDo
+ xho

= 0
@LD
@D
=
X
h
fh
P
i
tDi x
 
qDi ;M
h

= 0
In this game, the existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed by the concavity
of the utility functions. This proof was used for voting models by Hinich et al.
(1973). An easy proof is also provided for a special case of redistributive models
by Coughlin (1985).
Proposition 21 In a constant-sum game an equilibrium is achieved via a con-
vergence of policy; that is:
 !
tD =
 !
tR.
Proof. First of all, we have dened   as a constant-sum game, since pR
 !
tD;
 !
tR

=
1 pD
 !
tD;
 !
tR

. Suppose now that the pair
 !
tD;
 !
tR

2 TT is an equilibrium
of the game. Suppose also that
 !
tD 6=  !tR. We know from Proposition 6 that
pD
 !
tR;
 !
tR

= 12 . Therefore, by the denition of a Nash Equilibrium it must be
pD
 !
tD;
 !
tR

> pD
 !
tR;
 !
tR

=
1
2
(34)
By the denition of a constant-sum game we also know that pR
 !
tD;
 !
tD

=
1  pD
 !
tD;
 !
tD

= 12 and again by the denition of a Nash Equilibrium, it must
be
pR
 !
tR;
 !
tD

> pR
 !
tD;
 !
tD

=
1
2
(35)
Since pR
 !
tR;
 !
tD

= 1   pD
 !
tR;
 !
tD

, this implies that pD
 !
tR;
 !
tD

< 12 .
By 34, this implies that pD
 !
tR;
 !
tD

> 12 , a contradiction. Therefore,
 !
tD =
 !
tR.
Corollary 22 In equilibrium, V
 !
tD

= V
 !
tR

.
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Proof. By the meaning of Proposition 6,
 !
tD =
 !
tR. Therefore, V
 !
tD

=
V
 !
tR

.
Exploiting Corollary 7, we may re-write the rst order conditions in the
following manner:
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
@LD
@qD1
= ds
P
h
@V h
@qD1
fhsh + D
P
o
tDo
P
h
fh
@xho
@qDo
+ xho

= 0 o 6= i
...
@LD
@qDn
= ds
P
h
@V h
@qDn
fhsh + D
P
o
tDo
P
h
fh
@xho
@qDo
+ xho

= 0
@LD
@D
=
X
h
fh
P
i
tDi x
 
qDi ;M
h

= 0
From Roys Identity we know that @V
h
@qDi
=  hxhi where h is the marginal
utility of income. Applying Slutzky decomposition we obtain the Slutzky
matrix
Dqjx
 
qj ;Mh

= Dqjh
 
qj ; Uh
 DMhx  qj ;Mhx  qj ;Mh>
An element of the matrix is @x
h
i
@qDi
=
@(xhi )
c
@qDi
  @xhi
@Mh
xhi , where
@(xhi )
c
@qDi
is the change
in the Hicksian demand with a change in price, representing the substitution
e¤ect, and @x
h
i
@Mh
xhi is the income e¤ect. Under the hypothesis of normal goods,
@xhi
@qDi
< 0, for every i. Substituting these two expressions in the set of rst order
conditions we obtain:
@LD
@qDi
=  
X
h
 
hfhsh
d
s
+ Dfh
X
o
tDo
@xho
@Mh
!
xhi +
+D
 X
o
tDo
X
h
fhhoi + x
h
o
!
= 0 (36)
Expression
h;D := hfhsh
d
s
+ Dfh
X
o
tDo
@xho
@Mh
denotes the marginal probability of winning of D for group h. It measures
the weight that D attaches to a group as a function of its political power,
represented by two parameters: density and size. A suitable interpretation
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for this expression is the following: Governments transfers are a function of
the weight that candidates attach to groups, which depends on the e¤ect that a
change in the utility of the group, due to a change in the policy vector, has on the
probability of winning elections at the margin. Hence, groups are assigned with a
weight which is higher the more powerful the group. Furthermore, hoi :=
@(xhi )
c
@qDo
represents the e¤ect of a variation in price of good o on the compensated demand
of good i for group h. Equation 36 may be re-written as follows:
@LD
@qDi
=  
X
h
hxhi + 
D
 X
o
tDo
X
h
fhhoi + x
h
o
!
= 0 (37)
Dividing both sides by D and xhi and re-arrange terms we nally obtain:
 
P
o
tDo
P
h
fhhoi
xhi
=  x
ch
i
xhi
=
D   hi
D
(38)
8i
h;Di :=
P
h
hxhi
xhi
represents what in literature is known as the ditributive
characteristic of good i for group h and for candidate D.  xchi
xhi
measures the
approximate proportional variation in the compensated aggregate demand of
good i.
Proposition 23 The distributive characteristic is higher the higher is the amount
of good consumed by groups which receive a higher weight by candidates, that is
the more single-minded.
Proof. the distributive characteristic of good i for group h and for candidate
D is obtained by multiplying the marginal probability of winning of candidate j
for group h by the consumption of a good by group h with respect to the total
consumption of good i. Notice that h;Di is increasing in 
h;D, being @
h;D
i
@h;D
= 1.
We also know that h;D increases with respect to an increase in the groups
density
@h
@sh
= hfh
d
s
0BBB@1 
<1z }| {
fhsh
s
1CCCA > 0
By Axiom 19 we know that the density function is monotonically increasing in
the consumption of goods. Finally, the rst order derivative of the Marshallian
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functions is increasing in the level of single-mindedness, since @x
h
i
@ hi
= M
h
qji
> 0.
More single-minded groups provide the candidates with a higher marginal
probability of winning, which translates the consumption of goods in higher level
of the distributive characteristic. Therefore, we have found a precise linkage
between single-mindedness and distributive characteristic represented by the
following transmission mechanism:
single mindedness (") =) consumption of good (") =)
density function (") =) distributive characteristic (")
Proposition 24 The optimal tax structure induces a lower reduction in the
consumption of those goods which are the most preferred by more single-minded
groups.
Proof. a reduction in the consumption is captured by the left-hand side of
38, which is negative. This expression is lower the lower is the right-hand side,
which is lower the smaller the di¤erence between j and h;j . By proposition
23 we know that the distributive characteristic is higher the higher the single-
mindedness of a group and hence the right-hand side reduces as well.
To what extent do the taxation of goods obtained in this Political Economy
framework di¤er from the classic taxation à la Ramsey? To answer, we must
compare the many-person Ramseys rule (Diamond, 1975) with equation 38.
In the former optimal tax rates induce a lower reduction in the consumption
of those goods which are more consumed by the poor, because they gain a
higher weight by society. Instead, in 38, the weight attached by the Govern-
ment does not only depend on individualsincome but also on groupspolitical
power. That is, the more powerful groups obtain a higher political considera-
tion by candidates. As a consequence, candidates do not take equity goals into
account as in the classic Ramsey rule, and this attitude represents the real polit-
ical failure of the model. The di¤erence between the traditional Ramsey rule
 
P
o
to
P
h
hoi
xhi
=
 hi
 and 38 can be calculated taking the di¤erence of the two ex-
pressions. This di¤erence, equal to h
 
@W
@V h
  fhsh ds

+ j
 
1  fhP
o
tjo
@xho
@Mh
,
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is higher the lower fh and sh; this means that the less single-minded groups
receive a lower weight by candidates, whilst under Ramsey the social weight
assigned by the Government depended on the e¤ect which an increase in the
utility of group h has on the social welfare at the margin, @W
@V h
. This weight is
generally higher for the poorest as long as the Social Welfare Function is strictly
concave. Notice that 38 does not say that candidates totally neglect the welfare
of the poor because h;j is higher the higher is the marginal utility of income,
h, which is higher for the poorest13 . Notice also that the classic Ramsey rule
and 38 coincide if @W
@V h
= fhsh ds ; that is, if the importance attributed by so-
ciety to the increase in the welfare of group h is exactly equal to the political
importance attributed by candidates to the same group. In this case, and only in
this case, the normative and the positive approaches achieve the same results.
Nevertheless, a tenet taken from the theory of optimal taxation still holds: in
equilibrium, tax rates chosen by candidates are di¤erentiated, even though the
redistribution does not take place between the rich and the poor but between
the strongest and the weakest groups of society. The following table compares
results obtained under the classic Ramsey rule and 38.
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Endogenous public expenditure
I analyse now an extension of the previous model considering a Government
which must choose both the tax rates and the provision of a public good. The
introduction of public goods in probabilistic voting models with single-minded
groups raises two fundamental questions:
1. to what extent is the optimal provision of public goods inuenced by
distortionary taxation?
2. to what extent is the traditional Samuelson rule modied when the Gov-
ernment is not benevolent but aims to maximise the probability of winning
elections?
The problem of the individual may be re-written in the following log-linear
fashion:
max
fxhi g
nX
i=1
 hi log(x
h
i ) + '
h logGj +DR 

h + &

s:t:
nX
i=1
qji x
h
i =M
h
where Gj denotes the per-capita level of provision of a public good chosen
by candidates and 'h the idiosyncratic preference of group h for the provision
of the public good, or in other words, the mindedness of the group for the
amount of the public good. The production of this good is entirely nanced
by taxes levied on the tax-payers. Thus, individualschoices are inuenced by
the amount of the public good. On the one hand, G reduces the individuals
disposable income, since the higher G the higher the taxes which individuals
must pay to balance the budget. In turn, public expenditure crowds out private
consumption. On the other hand, the arising substitution e¤ect depends on the
degree of complementarity or substitutability between private and public goods;
the e¤ect of a change in the amount of public good on private goods is higher
the higher is the degree of complementarity between private and public goods.
Solving the individual maximization problem we obtain the Marshallian
functions xhi =
 hiM
h
qji
and the Indirect Utility Function
U
 
xhi ; G
j

= V

x

qji ;M
h

; Gj

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The Governments budget constraint is:
C
 
Gj
X
h
fh =
X
h
fh
X
i
tjix

qji ;M
h

where C
 
Gj

denotes the per-capita cost function of the public good. I assume
that C
 
Gj

is a twice di¤erentiable function, with CGj :=
@C(Gj)
@Gj > 0 and
CGjGj :=
@2C(Gj)
@2Gj > 0; that is, the production of the public good has marginal
decreasing costs. Furthermore, CGj measures the Marginal Rate of Transform-
ation (MRT) and in order to emphasise this fact I will dene CGj :=MRT j .
Secondly, I solve the candidates problem, which is the same as before, mod-
ied only by the presence of the public good. I will denote the new candidate
policy vector by j =
h
tj1; :::; t
j
n; G
j
i
2 j  Rn+1 and I write the Lagrangian
function:
Lj = 1
2
+
d
s
X
h
fhsh

V
 
j
  V   j+
+j
 X
h
fh
X
i
tjix

qji ;M
h

  C  GjX
h
fh
!
(39)
First, notice that 38 does not change even in the presence of public expendit-
ure which nances public goods.
Proposition 25 the marginal rate of transformation is equal to the sum of
idiosyncratic preferences for the public good of groups weighted by their size and
density.
Proof. The rst order conditions for 39 are:
@Lj
@qj1
=
d
s
X
h
@V h
@qj1
fhsh + j
 X
o
tjo
X
h
fh
@xho
@qj1
+ xho
!
= 0
...
@Lj
@qjn
=
d
s
X
h
@V h
@qjn
fhsh + j
 X
o
tjo
X
h
fh
@xho
@qjn
+ xho
!
= 0 (40)
@Lj
@Gj
=
d
s
X
h
@V h
@Gj
fhsh   j
 
MRT j
X
h
fh
!
= 0 (41)
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Since in equation 41 @V
h
@Gj =
'h
Gj we obtain a nal version of the equation which
refers to the choice of public good:
d
P
h
'hfhsh
sGj
X
h
fh
= j
 
MRT j

(42)
Suppose now, without loss of generality, that C
 
Gj

=
 
Gj
2
, withMRT j =
2Gj . Equation 42 becomes
d
P
h
'hfhsh
sGj
X
h
fh
= 2jGj (43)
which, solved with respect to Gj yields:
Gj =
0BB@d
P
h
'hfhsh
2sj
X
h
fh
1CCA
1
2
(44)
This expression clearly shows how the provision of public good depends on the
mindedness of groups, that is on the idiosyncratic parameter 'h.
In this expression j represents the marginal cost of public funds, dened
as the social cost of spending one extra dollar on any given public good and it
measures the distortionary e¤ect of taxation.
Proposition 26 The provision of public good is strictly increasing in the single-
mindedness of the group, weighted by its density and size and decreasing in the
marginal cost of public fund.
Proof. Performing some comparative statics we can see that
@Gj
@'h
=
1
2
0BB@d
P
h
'hfhsh
2sj
X
h
fh
1CCA
  12
dfhsh
2sj
X
h
fh
> 0
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@Gj
@sh
=
1
2
0BB@d
P
h
'hfhsh
2sj
X
h
fh
1CCA
  12
dfh'h
2sj
X
h
fh
> 0
@Gj
@fh
=
1
2
0BB@d
P
h
'hfhsh
2sj
X
h
fh
1CCA
  12
d
2sj
'hsh
X
h
fh  P
h
'hfhsh X
h
fh
!2 > 0
@Gj
@j
=  1
2
0BB@d
P
h
'hfhsh
2sj
X
h
fh
1CCA
  12
dfhsh
2s (j)
2
X
h
fh
< 0
Otherwise, the Ramsey rule does not change with respect to the previous
case and the reason is simple. If the Ramsey rule detects the most e¢ cient way
to nance a certain level of expenditure, for every level of expenditure, all the
more so it must detect the most e¢ cient way to nance the level of expenditure
when this is chosen in an optimal way to nance G. Of course tax rates di¤er,
depending on the level of G, since higher level of G entails higher level of tax
revenues, but the optimal tax rate structure does not change with respect to
the previous case.
Concluding, the Single-mindedness Theory states again that, in order to win
elections, candidates must content more single-minded groups who are the real
winners of the political game. In this case the provision of public good is higher
the higher the presence of more single-minded groups which ask for it. With
respect to the classic theory and Samuelson rule, a model with single-minded
groups tells us that the provision of public goods is not only ine¢ cient because
of the presence of distortionary taxation, but also because of the political failure
which society falls into, due to the presence of powerful interest groups.
Conclusions
In this paper I analysed how voter-seeking candidates decide indirect taxation
policies in a Probabilistic Voting model. Results show that candidates are cap-
tured by the most powerful (single-minded) groups, which not necessarily co-
incide with the median voter, but may represent even the richest components
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of society. These results are at odds with the classic results achieved by using
the median voter theorem, because it is no longer the median position on the
income scale which drives the equilibrium policy, but the ability of groups to
focus on their preferred issues instead.
Secondly, this model provides a possible explanation to the existence of in-
direct taxation, since we perfectly know that the optimal direct-cum-indirect
tax problem puts all commodity taxes to zero and raises everything through in-
come tax (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976). Instead, in the model I suggested there
is more than one interest by powerful single-minded groups to prevent a sub-
stantial shift from indirect to direct taxation. Since indirect taxation is mostly
regressive whilst direct taxation mostly progressive, richest single-minded groups
would stand up for this shift. The direct-cum-indirect tax problem can be per-
fectly studied using Probabilistic Voting and Single-mindedness theory and I
hope this could be done in future contributions.
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A Contribution to the Positive
Theory of Direct Taxation
Introduction
All modern democracies impose direct taxes on income in order to achieve re-
distribution goals. A common belief taken from the optimal theory of taxation
a¢ rms that a better income distribution may be achieved via a system where
income tax paid as a fraction of before-tax income increases somewhat with
income. Nevertheless, even though statutory schedules are revised from time to
time, the stylised facts show that in Britain and America "from the 1970s to
the 1990s inequality rose in both countries" and "redistribution toward the poor
tends to happen least in those times and polities where it would seem most justi-
ed by the usual goal of welfare policy" (Lindert (2000)). Other evidence which
shows an increasing level of inequality within industrialized countries was found
by Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000). Finally, a comprehensive study made by
the United Nations (WIDER 2000) demonstrated that a recent increase in in-
equality has taken place in several countries such as Australia, United Kingdom,
United States, Chile, Peru, Bangladesh, China, Philippines and Poland. As a
result, it seems that redistribution and equity goals are far from being reached
even in more industrialised countries.
It is interesting to investigate the possible causes of this failure and this paper
suggests that an explanation can be found in the analysis of the political process.
In particular, I suggest that the level of inequality in income distribution is due
to the existence of voter-seeking candidates who maximise the probability of win-
ning elections instead of the social welfare function as in the theory of optimal
taxation. This is of course not a completely new attempt. Some economists
who tried to nd a political economy explanation to redistribution issues were
concerned with the schedule that emerges in a political equilibrium, with the
prior question as to whether an equilibrium exists (Boadway and Keen, 2000).
First works using the Median Voter Theorem failed to achieve this goal, because
of the impossibility of nding a Condorcet winner. Since single-peakedness of
preferences on tax rates is a su¢ cient condition to nd a median voter equi-
librium, the conditions for the existence of single-peaked preferences must be
examined. Itsumi (1974) demonstrated that the non-single-peakedness of utility
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curves is more likely to arise when the dispersion of ability is larger and the pref-
erence for leisure is greater and it happens to individuals just below the average
ability class. Romer (1975) demonstrated that single-peakedness condition is
achievable only in a situation where unemployment does not exist. If this is not
the case the size of the work force changes as the tax rate changes; and so the
behaviour of all of the interesting variables becomes crucially dependent on the
entire skill distribution. As a result, the hypothesis of single-peakedness for all
individuals is no longer guaranteed. Nevertheless, Roberts (1977) demonstrated
that a Condorcet winner exists even if the single-peakedness condition is not
satised; it is su¢ cient that preferences satisfy the hierarchical adherence con-
dition, that is that there exists an ordering of individuals such that the pre-tax
income is monotonically increasing irrespective of the tax schedule. More re-
cently, Gans and Smart (1996) demonstrated that the existence of a Condorcet
winner is guaranteed by the Mirrlees-Spence single-crossing condition. Never-
theless, all approaches using the Median Voter Theorem fail once we assume
that voters vote over multi-dimensional issues. Furthermore, the hierarchical
adherence condition seems to be particularly restrictive, since it does not allow
for the possibility that an individual may dislike a small increase in the marginal
tax rate if this increase causes a large reduction in his labour supply but may
prefer further increases if his labour supply function entails a small decrease of
labour under that rate.
Instead, probabilistic voting models support the existence of multi-dimensional
policies and thus they are more suitable in explaining political equilibria. Cough-
lin (1986), Lindbeck and Weibull (1987,1993) studied a problem of redistribu-
tion using probabilistic voting with lump-sum transfers. An interesting result
achieved by these models states that the lower the loyalty of a voter for a party,
the more generous the transfer he gets. In political economy literature these
less loyal individuals are called swing voters in order to denote their proclivity
to swing from one party to another as a consequence of a small change in policy.
Unfortunately, as explained by Canegrati (2006), lump-sum taxation is never
used in practise, while the distribution of income takes always place via income
taxation.
In this paper I use the Probabilistic Voting Theory in order to explain why, in
the real world, the use of direct taxation may not necessarily lead to an increase
in equity. Exploiting the framework suggested by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980),
but moving from the hypothesis that political candidates are not benevolent
but simple voter-seekers, I will demonstrate that, in order to win elections,
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a candidate must favour the most powerful or "single-minded" groups. That
is, those groups which, due to their idiosyncratic preference for leisure, are
more able to focalise on leisure have a stronger political power and are more
inuencing in determine the outcome of policies. Should these single-minded
components be located amongst the richest individuals of society, we would
achieve an equilibrium where direct taxation is no longer an instrument to reduce
inequality, but a tool which increases it, favouring the most powerful group.
A model of direct taxation
I consider a society divided in H groups, indexed by h = 1; :::;H. Groups have
size fh, and their members are perfectly identical. Two political candidates,
j = D;R, run for an election. Both candidates have an ideological label (for
example, Democrats and Republicans), exogenously given. Voterswelfare de-
pends on two components; the rst is deterministic and it is represented by
consumption, whilst the second is stochastic and derives from personal attrib-
utes of candidates.
I assume that each individual in group h derives his consumption from only
one good. The stochastic component is captured by expression DR 

h + &

,
where the indicator function
DR =
(
1 if R wins
0 if D wins
Term & Q 0 reects candidate Rs popularity amongst the electorate and it is
realized between the announcement of policies and elections. It is not idiosyn-
cratic and it is uniformly distributed
&  U

 1
2
;
1
2

with mean zero. Otherwise, term h Q 0 represents an idiosyncratic compon-
ent which measures voterspreferences for candidate R. It cannot be perfectly
observed by candidates and it is uniformly distributed
h  U

  1
2sh
;
1
2sh

again with mean zero and density sh.
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Hence, each individual in group h has the following utility function
Uh = U

ch; lh; h

+DR 

h + &

(45)
where ch denotes consumption, lh labour and  h is a parameter which cap-
tures the preference of groups for leisure. The utility function is increasing in
consumption and decreasing in labour. The labour income is given by Ih = wlh
where w denotes the real wage, equal for every group. Income is taxed ac-
cording to a linear taxation T (Ih) =  Xjh + tjIh, Xjh > 0 represents a xed
subsidy and tj is the marginal tax rate on labour. In the absence of savings,
consumption of individuals may be written as
ch = Xjh +
 
1  tjwlh (46)
I introduce now three useful denition14
Denition 27 (Single-mindedness) group A is said to be more single-minded
than group B with respect to leisure if the weight assigned by A is greater than
the weight assigned by B. That is, if  A >  B.
Denition 28 (Political power) group A is said to be more politically power-
ful than group B if its density is higher than Bs. That is if sA > sB.
Denition 29 the density function of a group is monotonically increasing in
the amount of leisure. That is sh = s(lh), with @s
h
@lh
> 0.
Substituting 46 in 45, we may write the following maximisation problem:
max
flhg
U

Xjh +
 
1  tjwlh; lh; h+DR  h + &
whose resolution yields the optimal choice for leisure lh = l
 
Xjh;
 
1  tjw
and the Indirect Utility Function
V

Xjh;
 
1  tjw; h = (47)
= U

Xjh +
 
1  tjwlh  Xjh;  1  tjw ; lh  Xjh;  1  tjw ; h
Candidates maximize the probability of winning elections under the balanced-
budget constraint
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X
h
fh
 
tjwlh  Xjh = 0
They realize that the choice on tax rates modies individuals choice on
the amount of labour to supply. Di¤erentiating 47 with respect to Xjh and tj
we obtain @V
h
@Xjh
= h and @V
h
@tj =  hwlh, where h represents the marginal
utility of income for group h. Candidates must choose an optimal policy vector
j =

tj ; Xj1; :::; XjH
 2 j  RH+1.
The Lagrangian function for candidate j is
Lj = 1
2
+
d
s
X
h
fhsh

V
 
j
  V   j+ j  X
h
fh
 
tjwlh  Xjh! (48)
Referring to Proposition 6 and Corollary 7 we may write rst order condi-
tions in the following fashion8>>>>><>>>>>:
@Lj
@Xjh
= ds
P
h
shfhh + j
P
h

tjw @l
h
@Xjh
  n

= 0
@Lj
@tj =  ds
P
h
shfhhwlh + j
P
h

tjw @l
h
@tj  
P
h
wlh

= 0
@Lj
@j =
P
h
fh
 
tjwlh  Xjh = 0
Dividing @L
j
@Xjh
by j we obtain
@Lj
@Xjh
=
d
js
X
h
shfhh +
X
h

 jw
@lh
@Xjh
  n

= 0
Di¤erentiating lh with respect to tj we obtain @l
h
@tj =  @l
h
@w . Applying the
Slutzky decomposition we obtain @l
h
@w =
@lhc
@w +
@lh
@Xjh
lh, where @l
hc
@w > 0 rep-
resents the compensative variation of labour supply. Substituting in @L
j
@tj , we
obtain
@Lj
@tj
=  d
s
X
h
shfhhwlh+j
(X
h
 
tjw

 

@lhc
@w
+
@lh
@Xjh
lh

+
X
h
wlh
!)
= 0
(49)
and rearranging terms
@Lj
@tj
=  
X
h

d
s
shfhh + jtjw
@lh
@Xjh

wlh+ (50)
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+j
tj
1  tj
X
h
lhw

   1  tj@lhc
@w
1
lh

+ j
X
h
wlh = 0
Let us dene jh := w
 
1  tj @lhc@w 1lh as the compensated elasticity of
labour price for group h and re-write 50 as
@Lj
@tj
=  
X
h

d
s
shfhh + jtjw
@lh
@Xjh

wlh j t
j
1  tj
X
h
lhwjh+j
X
h
wlh = 0
(51)
Furthermore, let us impose 'h := dss
hfhh + jtjw @l
h
@Xjh
, Ih = wlh and substi-
tute again in 51 we obtain
@Lj
@tj
=  
X
h
'hIh   j t
j
1  tj
X
h
Ihjh + j
X
h
Ih = 0 (52)
Re-arranging terms we obtain the following expression:
tj
1  tj =
P
h
Ih  P
h
'hIhP
h
Ihjh
(53)
where ' :=
P
h
'h
n . Finally we obtain
tj
1  tj =
nI' P
h
'hIhP
h
Ihjh
=  cov
 
'h; Ih
P
h
Ihjh
(54)
where I represents the average income. The covariance on the right hand
side of 54 is made by terms 'h and Ih. 'h represents the candidate marginal
probability of income in group h and it is composed by two terms
1. dss
hfhh which measures by how much an increase in the utility of a group
a¤ects the probability of winning elections at the margin and represents
the weight attached to a change in individuals income by candidates. This
weight is greater for more single-minded groups if the function expressing
the probability of winning elections is strictly concave. Notice that h is
greater for the poorest individuals, because marginal utility of income is
decreasing with respect to income. Nevertheless, the poor do not get more
favourable taxation than the rich if their political power is not su¢ cient
to capture politicians;
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2. the e¤ect of an extra-dollar on revenues, weighted by  which translates
a change in revenues in the probability of winning.
Let us now analyse 54 starting from the left-hand side. Notice that
@
@tj

tj
1  tj

=
1
(1  tj)2 > 0
As a consequence, the tax rate is higher the higher is the right-hand side.
Proposition 30 the tax rate is lower the higher is the political power of the
social group.
Proof. notice that expression t
j
1 tj is lower the higher is '
h. The political
power of a group is captured by dss
hfh, since the higher the size and the density
of a group, the higher the power of its inuence as a consequence of a variation
in the redistribution policy chosen by the Government.
A model with income heterogeneity
Suppose now that the segmentation of society in groups is made according to
two dimensions: preferences for leisure and wages. That is, individuals di¤er
also for their levels of income, not only preference for leisure. Then, I cluster
the constituency into H K groups, where H represents the number of groups
obtained by clustering the population with respect to preference for leisure and
K the number of groups obtained by clustering with respect to labour income.
Thus, each individual belongs to a cluster fh; kg, where h = 1; :::;H indexes
groups according to the preference of individuals for leisure and k = 1; :::;K
indexes groups according individualsincome. The deterministic component of
utility of an individual h; k is written as:
Uh;k = U

ch;k; lh;k; h

(55)
and the consumption
ch;k = Xjh;k +
 
1  tjwklh;k (56)
The stochastic component is captured by expression DR 

h + k + &

,
which this time encompasses another idiosyncratic variable, k. The two idio-
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syncratic variables are uniformly distributed on intervals
  1
2sh
; 1
2sh

and
  1
2sk
; 1
2sk

,
respectively. Variable h captures political preferences of voters according to
their preferences for leisure, whilst variable k captures the political preferences
of voters according to their labour income. For example, a voter in the cluster
fh; kg may prefer candidate D to candidate R for the rst dimension, because
the former chooses a policy which better reects his needs for leisure, but in the
same breath may prefer candidate R to candidate D for the second dimension
because it chooses a policy which strongly protects his income.
The new maximisation problem may be written as
max
flh;kg
Uh;k

Xjh;k +
 
1  tjwklh;k; lh;k; h+DR  h + k + &
Candidates maximise the following Lagrangian function
Lj = 1
2
+
d
s1s2
X
h
X
k
fh;kshsk

V
 
j
  V   j+ (57)
+j
 X
h
X
k
fh;k
 
tjwk
 
1  lh;k Xjh;k!
where s1 :=
P
h
shfh and s2 :=
P
k
skfk.
First order conditions are
8>>>>><>>>>>:
@Lj
@Xjh;k
= ds1s2
P
h
P
k
shfh;kh;k + j
P
h
P
k

tjwk @l
h;k
@Xjh;k
  n

= 0
@Lj
@tj =   ds1s2
P
h
P
k
shfh;kh;kwklh;k + j
P
h
P
k

tjwk @l
h;k
@tj  
P
h
P
k
wklh;k

= 0
@Lj
@j =
P
h
P
k
fh;k
 
tjwklh;k  Xjh;k = 0
Again exploiting the Roy identity and the Slutzky decomposition we can
re-write the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to the tax rate as follows
@Lj
@tj
=   d
s1s2
X
h
X
k
shskfh;khwklh;k+ (58)
+j
(X
h
X
k
 
tjwk

 

@lh;kc
@wk
+
@lh;k
@Xjh;k
lh;k

+
X
h
X
k
wklh;k
!)
= 0
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and re-arranging terms we obtain
@Lj
@tj =  
P
h
P
k

d
s1s2 s
hskfh;khwklh;k + jtjwk @l
h;k
@Xjh;k

wklh;k+
+j t
j
1 tj
P
h
P
k
wklh;k
h
   1  tj @lh;kc
@wk
 1
lh;k
i
+ j
P
h
P
k
wklh;k = 0
Let us dene 'h;k := ds1s2 s
hskfh;kh + jtjwk @l
h;k
@Xjh;k
and substitute we
obtain:
tj
1  tj =
P
h
P
k
Ih;k  P
h
P
k
'h;kIh;kP
h
P
k
Ih;kjh;k
(59)
And dening ' :=
P
h
P
k
'h;k
n we nally obtain
tj
1  tj =
nI' P
h
P
k
'h;kIh;kP
h
P
k
Ih;kjh;k
=  cov
 
'h;k; Ih;k
P
h
P
k
Ih;kjh;k
(60)
This time, the mindedness of individuals is two-dimensional and thus, the
political power of groups depends on the combination of the two mindedness.
Notice that density functions enter 'h;k in a multiplicative way, meaning that a
weak-minded group on a dimension may reinforce its total mindedness thanks
to being strong-minded on the other dimension. Nevertheless, the main achieve-
ment of the Single-mindedness Theory still holds; the tax rate will be lower the
higher is the political power of the group, since t
j
1 tj is lower the higher '
h;k.
This allows us to a¢ rm that results of the theory, which a¢ rms that more
single-minded groups are the most favoured groups by a taxation policy, are
robust even in a multi-dimensional space.
Measuring income inequality at a microeconomic
level
We now have all the elements to measure how groupswelfare is a¤ected by the
decisions taken by self-interested candidates who choose their taxation policy
in order to maximise the probability of winning elections. The goal of this
section is twofold: measuring the di¤erence in the level of inequality amongst
age groups and analysing the relation between this inequality and the structure
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of taxations systems. To the best of my knowledge this is the rst attempt to
measure the cohort-specic inequality and the rst time that the Gini index is
disaggregated at a microeconomic level in order to capture in a more precise way
the di¤erences in inequality amongst social groups. In other words, I suggest
that the Gini index measured at a macroeconomic level to capture the general
inequality levels of countries, is the result of many Gini indexes calculated at
a microeconomic level. Calculating Gini indexes at a microeconomic levels
allows us to evaluate more precisely the impact of the Governments policies
on groupswelfare, something which cannot be made by using the Gini index
calculated at a country level.
The question addressed is: which are the age groups which are a­ icted by
the highest degree of inequalitity? In order to answer this question we must
remember that inequality measurement is always an attempt to give meaning
to comparisons of income distributions in terms of criteria which may be derived
from ethical principles, appealing mathematical constructs or simple intuition
(Cowell, 2000). As a consequence, before measuring the level of inequality in
practise it is necessary to dene the concepts, the ranking criteria and the indices
necessary to achieve our goal.
Distributional and Ranking concepts
I will denote by z the space of all univariate probability distributions with
support   <;x 2  represents a particular value of income and F 2 z one
of the possible income distribution. So F (x  ex) represents the proportion
of population with income less than ex. Furthermore dene x := inf () and
denote by z (%)  z a subset with given mean % : z 7! < given by
% (F ) :=
Z
xdF (x) (61)
and f : 0 7! < as a density function, supposed that F is continuous over
some intervals 0  . Furthermore, in order to compare distributions, I as-
sume the existence of a complete and transitive binary relation <Ion z, called
inequality ordering and represented by I : F 7! <, if the ordering is continu-
ous.15
In order to compare distributions we also need some ranking criteria over z.
I use the notation <T to indicate the ranking induced by a comparison principle
T . Three possible situations arise:
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Denition 31 For all F;G 2 z :
(a) (strict dominance) G T F , G <T F ^ F= <T G:
(b) (equivalence) G T F , G <T F ^ F <T G:
(c) (non-comparability) G ?T F , G= <T F ^ F= <T G:
Suppose now to focus on the concept of social-welfare function, expressed in
the following additively separable form:
W (F ) =
Z
u (x) dF (x) (62)
where u : z 7! < is an evaluation function. Denote by W^1 the subclass
of SWFs where u is increasing and by W^2 the subclass of W^1 where u is also
concave. Furthermore, dene the set of age years A where a is a given age in
A. Finally, introduce the following
Denition 32 For all F 2 z, a 2 A and for all 0  q  1, the quantile
functional for a given age year is dened by
Q (F ; (q; a)) = inf fxjF (x)  q; ag = xqa (63)
This denition enables us to state the theorem of rst-order distributional
dominance
Theorem 33 G <Q F , W (G) W (F ) 8

W 2 W^1

Otherwise, if we consider this other
Denition 34 For all F 2 z, a 2 A and for all 0  q  1, the cumulative
income functional for a given age year is dened by
C (F ; (q; a)) :=
Z Q(F ;(q;a))
x
xdF (x) (64)
16
which leads us to the theorem of second-order distributional dominance
Theorem 35 8F;G 2 z (%) : G <C F , W (G) W (F ) 8

W 2 W^2

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Suppose now that a distribution depends on the e¤ects of a policy p 2 P ,
where P is the space of all the possible policies. Without loss of generality, I
suppose that P =

p1; p2
	
. Suppose also that distribution F is obtained under
policy p1 and distribution G is obtained under policy p2. We may denote by
F = F
 
p1; a

and G = G
 
p2; a

the distribution obtained under the two policies
for a given age group a.
We want to dene a comparison criterion for judging policies and their e¤ects
on the distribution of age groups.
Theorem 36 (First-order distributional dominance) For all p1; p2 2 P , a 2 A :
p1 <Q p2 , W
 
F
 
p1; a
 W  G  p2; a 8W 2 W^1
Theorem 37 (Second-order distributional dominance) For all p1; p2 2 P , a 2
A; F;G 2 z (%) : p1 <C p2 , W
 
F
 
p1; a
 W  G  p2; a 8W 2 W^2
These two theorems simply state that a policy q1 is preferred to policy q2 if
and only if the welfare obtained under the distribution it generates
is higher than the welfare obtained under the distribution generated
by the other policy for every age group. Notice that this condition must
hold for every age group; that means that we should see an improvement in wel-
fare of all cohorts.
Decomposition indices
The Generalised Entropy measure is the more suitable index to analyse inequal-
ity within and between groups because of its decomposability. It may be written
as
GE () =
within group inequalityz }| {Z
h
fh
xh
x

Ih () +
between group inequalityz }| {
Ibet () (65)
where
Ibet () =
1
 (  1)
Z
h
fh
xh
x

  1

(66)
The  in 66 is a parameter that characterises di¤erent members of the GE
class: a high positive value of  yields an index that is very sensitive to income
transfers at the top of the distribution. In particular, GE (0) represents the
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mean logarithmic deviation, GE (1) the Theil index, and GE (2) the half of
square of the coe¢ cient of variation.
Another useful indicator to measure the inequality between groups is rep-
resented by Gini:
G = 1 +
1
N
 

2
N2x
 Z
h
(N   h+ 1)xh

(67)
where N =
R
wh; wh = f
hN . When data are unweighted, wh = 1 and
N = H. Individuals are ranked in ascending order of h.
Empirical evidence from the Luxemburg Income
Study
Dataset
The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) is a panel database including 30 coun-
tries and made by 5 waves of data from 1979  2002. The source of data is
represented by country specic household income surveys. For example, indi-
vidual data from the United States is taken from the Current Population Sur-
vey. Datasets are identied by a code made by two letters denoting a country
and two numbers which identify the wave of data. For instance, US00 iden-
ties the wave 2000 for the United States. I used data of 17 countries (here
with the relative LIS codes): Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Canada (CA), Czech
Republic (CZ), Switzerland (CH), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE),
Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland
(IE), Israel (IL), Italy (IT), Luxemburg (LU), Mexico (MX), Netherlands (NL),
Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Romania (RO), Russia (RU), Slovak Republic (SK),
Slovenia (SI), Sweden (SE), Taiwan (TW), United Kingdom (UK) and United
States (US).
The dataset includes data at an individual or household level, on demo-
graphics, expenditure, income, labor market outcomes and tax variables.
Inequality indexes were calculated using the denition of disposable income,
calculated as follows:
disposable income = compensation of employees + gross self-employment
income + realised property income + occupational pensions17 + other
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cash income18 + social insurance cash transfers19 + universal cash transfers20 +
social assistance21 - direct taxes - social security contributions
This choice is natural because the disposable income allows us to assess the
impact of taxation on individualswelfare and thus to evaluate the degree of
inequality as a result of the candidateschoice.
Cohort-specic inequality
In order to assess the level of inequality amongst cohorts I used the Jenkins
Stata routine ineqdec0 which estimates a range of inequality and related in-
dices (Generalized Entropy of class a, Atkinson class A(e), the Gini coe¢ cient
and the percentile ratios), plus decompositions of a subset of these indices by
population subgroups. Calculations do not exclude values less than or equal
to zero. Appendix 1 reports an example of results for the Generalized Entropy
index of class 2 and the Gini index calculated for Austria22 . Here I will briey
provide a description of data analysing the evolution of the indexes over time
for every country.
1. Austria. It is characterised by a low level of inequality, with the average
Gini index equal to 0.29 in 2000, lower then the levels reached in previous
years. The maximum value of the Gini index was reached in 1995 (0.33)
and since than it is decreased. The country has always been characterised
for higher levels of inequality amongst the older cohorts, especially for
individuals aged over 50.
2. Belgium. The country is characterised by a low level of inequality, with
the Gini indexes constantly lower than 0.3. Nevertheless, the index worsen
from 0.26 reached in 1985 to 0.286 in 2000. Nevertheless, in 2000 the
situation had a more equitable distribution amongst cohorts, whilst before
the inequality was more concentrated amongst elder cohorts.
3. Canada. Canada has characterised by a medium level of inequality, with
the Gini index which remained all in all steady over time. The higher
levels of the Gini index is concentrated amongst the younger cohorts and
the individuals aged over 45, even though these di¤erences with respect
to the average are not particularly high.
4. Switzerland. The inequality in Switzerland has been soundly reduced since
1982, when the Gini index was equal to 0.35, much higher than the same
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value calculated in 2000 (0.264). Wealth is well distributed amongst co-
horts and we almost never observe values above 0.4. A slight increase in
inequality levels is observable amongst people between 60 and 70, but still
these values are not particularly high.
5. Czech Republic. The country is characterised by a low level of inequality
and a very fair distribution of wealth amongst cohorts. The very low level
of the variance (0.001) states that the di¤erence from a cohort to another
is minimal and we never observe values of the Gini index above 0.4.
6. Germany. The level of inequality is low, even though we observe a slight
increase in the Gini index from 1984 to 2000. The distribution of wealth is
very fair, and even amongst the younger and older components of society
we do not observe radical changes with respect to the average.
7. Denmark. Denmark is characterised by a very low level of inequality,
with an exception represented by 1995 when the Gini index was equal
to 0.361. Nevertheless, we observe that amongst younger cohorts the
inequality increases.
8. Spain. The country is characterised by a medium level of inequality and
the situation remained all in all steady over years. The inequality increases
when we consider people aged 60 and this situation has worsen in 2000.
9. Finland. The level of inequality is low, even though the situation has
worsen since 1995. The wealth is well distributed amongst cohorts, with
a slight increase in the values of the Gini index for individuals in their
fties.
10. Hungary. Like others former communist countries, the situation in Hun-
gary in characterised by a general low level of inequality which has re-
mained steady over the 1990s and by a well distribution of wealth amongst
di¤erent cohorts, with values of the Gini index which are almost never
higher than 0.4. In particular this feature has improved since the begin-
ning of the 1990s.
11. Greece. We do not have data in order to make a comparison, but still the
situation of Greece is characterised by a medium level of inequality, with
a general increase in the level of inequality amongst the younger and the
elder cohorts.
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12. Ireland. Ireland is characterised by a medium level of inequality. The situ-
ation has slightly improved since the end of the 1980s. The wealth is well
distributed amongst cohorts, with higher levels of inequality observable
amongst the elder components of society.
13. Israel. Inequality in Israel is particularly worsen since the end of the 1970s,
with the Gini index which increased from 0.29 to 0.36. Nevertheless, if
we analyse the redistribution of wealth amongst cohorts we may record
an improvement during the recent years, where we do not observe great
di¤erences amongst cohorts, even though the level of the Gini index are
slightly higher for elder cohorts.
14. Italy. Italy is characterised by a medium level of inequality. The situation
is worsen over years and the Gini index has increased from 0.315 in 1986 to
0.356 in 2000. The country is characterised by the harmful phenomenon
of the increase in the inequality amongst younger cohorts which, on aver-
age, has doubled or tripled (depending on the cohort analysed) in 2000.
Di¤erences are observable also amongst elder cohorts, even tough not in
the same manner as for the younger.
15. Luxemburg. The country is characterised by a very low level of inequality,
which has remained steady over time. The wealth is very well distributed
amongst cohorts and the variance is amongst the lowest we observed.
16. Mexico. Mexico has one of the worse values of the Gini index. Over years
the indicator has always been higher than 0.4, with values even higher than
0.5 in 1990s. The situation does not seem to be improved and we record
very high level of the Gini index, sometimes higher than 0.6, especially
amongst elder cohorts.
17. The Netherlands. The country is characterised by a very low level of in-
equality and the Gini index has improved from the 1980s, with a signicant
improvement in 2000. The distributions of wealth amongst cohorts is very
good, especially recently, and we do not observe any worsening in the Gini
index amongst elder components of society.
18. Norway. Norway has a medium level of inequality, which is signicantly
improved since the end of the 1970s when the Gini index was equal to 0.46,
even though the situation is worsening in recent years. As other Scand-
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inavian countries, also Norway has a very fair redistribution of wealth
amongst cohorts and this situation has been preserved over years.
19. Poland. Poland is characterised by a low level of inequality and the Gini
index has improved recently with respect to the previous years. Like other
former communist countries, wealth is well distributed amongst cohorts,
since the variance is very low (0.001).
20. Romania. The country is characterised by a medium level of inequality
and by a well distribution of wealth amongst cohorts.
21. Russia. The situation in Russia is particularly negative, especially if we
consider that the country has one of the worst value for the Gini index
(0.42 in 2000). It has also a bad distribution of wealth amongst cohorts,
with a variance which is ten times the variance that we observe in Scand-
inavian countries. Unlike the other countries, Russia is characterised by
having high Gini index concentrated amongst middle generations, whilst
the values of the index are lower amongst the elder components of society.
22. Sweden. Like the other Scandinavian countries, also Sweden has relatively
low levels of inequality which has remained steady over time and a very
good distribution of wealth amongst cohorts, with values of the Gini index
which are slightly higher for younger cohorts.
23. Slovak Republic. The country is characterised by a low level of inequality
and a very good distribution of wealth amongst generations. In particular,
observe that the level of variance (0.0009) is the lowest observed in our
dataset.
24. Slovenia. Although we do not have many observations we may say that the
country is characterised by low levels of inequality and a good distribution
of wealth amongst cohorts.
25. Taiwan. The country is characterised by a medium level of inequality,
even though the situation is worsened over the recent years. The country
has always been characterised by higher levels of inequality amongst elder
cohorts, especially for individuals aged 60.
26. United Kingdom. The country is characterised by a medium level of in-
equality, even though the situation has steadily worsened since the end of
the 1960s. The distribution of wealth amongst cohorts is all in all good,
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but especially over the last year we observe a worsening in the Gini index
amongst individuals aged 50.
27. United States. The country is characterised by a medium level of in-
equality and by a worsening in the level of distribution, even though the
phenomenon has not reached the magnitude achieved by the United King-
dom. The system is fair and we do not observe particular spike in the
distribution of wealth amongst cohorts.
Empirical Framework
In order to evaluate if and how the cohort-specic inequality depends on the
structure of taxation system I run a regression using the Gini index calculated
by using the Jenkinsroutine for every age group as dependent variable. The
regressors are both variables which capture the characteristics of the taxation
system and some control variables, such as the GDP growth rate, unemploy-
ment rate and consumer price index (CPI). Regressions were made only for 17
countries (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain,
Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Mexico, Norway, Sweden,
United States) because of the absence of data for the other countries, for year
2000. The specication of the model is the following
gini = 0 + 1ttw + 2tmpit+ 3nptdi+ 4gdp99+ (68)
+5ur99 + 6cpi99 + 6+g
61X
g=1
dg + "t
where
gini=Gini index (2000)
ttw is a variable indicating the total tax wedge which may be one of the
following:
ttw67 = Total tax wedge as a 67% of Average Wage; marginal personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income
ttw100 = Total tax wedge as a 100% of Average Wage; marginal personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income
ttw133 = Total tax wedge as a 133% of Average Wage; marginal personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income
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ttw167 = Total tax wedge as a 167% of Average Wage; marginal personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income
attw67 = Total tax wedge as a 67% of Average Wage; average personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income
attw100 = Total tax wedge as a 100% of Average Wage; average personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income
attw133 = Total tax wedge as a 133% of Average Wage; average personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income
attw167 = Total tax wedge as a 167% of Average Wage; average personal
income tax and social security contribution rates on gross labour income
tmpit = Top marginal personal income tax rates for employee (combined)
nptdi = Net personal Tax; overall statutory tax rates on dividend income
gdp99 = GDP Growth Rate 1999
ur99 = Unemployment rate 1999
cpi99 = Consumer price index 1999
dg = dummy for age group g
The marginal and average tax rates "all-in" for employees includes personal
income tax and employee social security contributions and less cash benets,
for a single individual without children at di¤erent income levels. Marginal tax
rates measure how much of the extra wage income an individual worker keeps
after taxes, whilst average tax rates measure how much total net income after
tax changes if one decides to join (or exit from) the labour market (OECD,
2004).
The taxation of personal capital income varies substantially amongst OECD
countries because some of them tax all personal capital income at a at rate and
wage and pensions at progressive rates (Dual-income tax); in other countries the
taxation is progressive and the capital is taxed at more or less the same rates as
labour (comprehensive income tax systems); nally in some countries we observe
a semi-dual income taxation of capital income, since some capital is taxed at
lower rates than wage income. Due to these di¤erences, the OECD has chosen
to use the taxation of dividends as a proxy for the taxation of capital, in order
to allow for comparability. Appendix 2 reports the results of regressions and
relative graphics of coe¢ cients betas.
The total tax wedge and overall statutory tax rates on dividend income are
always statistically signicant at 1 per cent of the signicant interval, meaning
that these two variables have a great explanatory power for the cohort-specic
inequality. More controversial is the evidence about the top marginal personal
78
Emanuele Canegrati Essays on the Single-mindedness Theory
income tax rates for employee; this variable is signicant at 5 per cent of the
condence interval only when we use the total tax wedge as a 133 and 167 per
cent of the average wage with marginal personal income tax and as a 167 per
cent of the average wage with average personal income tax.
As for the age groups dummies, we can observe that, most of the times, they
are statistically signicant at 1 per cent of the condence interval for young
cohorts; otherwise, they are never signicant for old cohorts (especially for in-
dividuals aged 50 or more).
Therefore, overall results shows the existence of a strong relation between the
taxation system and the inequality amongst age-groups, especially for younger
individuals.
Concluding remarks
In this paper I analysed a probabilistic voting model of direct taxation where
self-interested governments set their policies in order to maximise the probability
of winning elections. Society is divided into groups who have di¤erent prefer-
ences for the consumption of leisure. The use of a probabilistic voting model
characterized by the presence of single-minded groups changes the classic results
of median voter models because it is no longer the level of income which drives
the equilibrium policies but the ability of groups to focus on leisure, instead.
This ability enables them to achieve a strong political power which candidates
cannot help going along with, because they would lose the elections otherwise.
I also show the robustness of the single-mindedness theory in a two-dimensional
setting, where individuals di¤er also for their levels of income, not only pref-
erence for leisure. Results from the Luxemburg Income Study corroborate the
theoretical results and show how goals in terms of cohort-specic inequality are
still very far from being reached in the real world.
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Appendix 1
AUSTRIA
age gen2_AT81 gen2_AT87 gen2_AT94 gen2_AT95 gen2_AT97 gen2_AT00
19 0.27523 0.04553 0.22233 0.40876 0.20567 0
20 0.21493 0.08294 0.38405 0.47644 0.10894 0.02608
21 0.20278 0.13421 0.22409 0.39933 0.18989 0.12403
22 0.16485 0.14668 0.12977 0.26077 0.14164 0.26366
23 0.20968 0.13639 0.16412 0.35486 0.18645 0.16583
24 0.183 0.12371 0.16439 0.21554 0.12458 0.06911
25 0.12369 0.0986 0.12998 0.27466 0.14559 0.08143
26 0.13922 0.10477 0.1369 0.16417 0.10172 0.13755
27 0.13348 0.08437 0.27687 0.2169 0.07776 0.09473
28 0.12026 0.09914 0.12282 0.15547 0.11324 0.08929
29 0.11832 0.12484 0.12105 0.17941 0.16818 0.09229
30 0.10514 0.07123 0.12206 0.14645 0.07855 0.0828
31 0.12493 0.07577 0.13736 0.12271 0.13538 0.12616
32 0.12843 0.09248 0.11921 0.12224 0.14661 0.12119
33 0.12578 0.06034 0.09069 0.12836 0.06415 0.25269
34 0.11477 0.07832 0.13371 0.12119 0.05808 0.09634
35 0.11387 0.06752 0.07042 0.12258 0.18114 0.19637
36 0.10709 0.06045 0.36603 0.18879 0.07509 0.09409
37 0.10542 0.0819 0.11164 0.14147 0.08084 0.07739
38 0.12518 0.08893 0.16063 0.10928 0.06272 0.23582
39 0.1198 0.12965 0.28495 0.12378 0.22948 0.09471
40 0.11621 0.0734 0.19278 0.1259 0.09638 0.06439
41 0.11476 0.10087 0.09561 0.13351 0.12711 0.06265
42 0.14295 0.1029 0.11324 0.13888 0.3054 0.1261
43 0.11068 0.10255 0.10202 0.1121 0.13436 0.13967
44 0.1123 0.11499 0.29329 0.15698 0.09731 0.09694
45 0.14254 0.12846 0.13047 0.13542 0.25254 0.08503
46 0.14773 0.1432 0.09814 0.1402 0.10193 0.09825
47 0.15354 0.1382 0.3126 0.15642 0.17973 0.14639
48 0.14812 0.14279 0.14581 0.16197 0.12727 0.13686
49 0.1721 0.13782 0.11283 0.15114 0.12356 0.11355
50 0.16461 0.15592 0.19426 0.16682 0.20683 0.3045
51 0.17518 0.17292 0.18427 0.16892 0.14611 0.08092
52 0.17536 0.19792 0.13339 0.19878 0.15831 0.12516
53 0.14163 0.18818 0.2575 0.17703 0.14604 0.16831
54 0.17207 0.15597 0.317 0.17525 0.1299 0.26289
55 0.1933 0.19222 0.26579 0.20559 0.17101 0.07751
56 0.17301 0.15026 0.16685 0.20935 0.18652 0.15374
57 0.21078 0.23471 0.29849 0.18397 0.16035 0.19093
58 0.17809 0.14317 0.20851 0.19244 0.29088 0.1275
59 0.24858 0.19516 0.16402 0.19507 0.18774 0.16268
60 0.23237 0.1913 0.14822 0.22121 0.18515 0.2102
61 0.35633 0.27229 0.17028 0.18902 0.12613 0.36048
62 0.29752 0.20967 0.17248 0.23411 0.13744 0.225
63 0.25695 0.25638 0.39155 0.2236 0.16006 0.17547
64 0.2984 0.25927 0.14831 0.22759 0.18302 0.12149
65 0.30494 0.25167 0.24476 0.22662 0.20914 0.24762
66 0.2042 0.19542 0.1497 0.18072 0.15705 0.30201
67 0.34052 0.20299 0.1706 0.22394 0.182 0.28207
68 0.22707 0.16918 0.19639 0.20563 0.33885 0.17858
69 0.29017 0.18181 0.14626 0.21686 0.14935 0.1487980
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70 0.16389 0.20754 0.2764 0.24003 0.13561 0.25692
71 0.21415 0.21932 0.18063 0.23711 0.20396 0.26261
72 0.23721 0.27098 0.18201 0.24913 0.2422 0.22027
73 0.24773 0.21071 0.24251 0.24612 0.25004 0.11828
74 0.33316 0.25256 0.30121 0.25233 0.13601 0.21595
75 0.08446 0.22245 0.16496 0.23895 0.23343 0.14067
76 0.31632 0.16431 0.25675 0.20827 0.34988 0.23612
77 0.25462 0.21869 0.30179 0.25463 0.27684 0.15107
78 0.2384 0.2024 0.0738 0.17864 0.26674 0.28586
79 0.32036 0.27349 0.30181 0.18722 0.18339 0.53275
80 0.29263 0.41491 0.23909 0.25137 0.18485 0.33009
81 0.18971 0.25238 0.3126 0.20594 0.20055 0.20875
82 0.34148 0.15121 0.64463 0.29873 0.34728 0.23852
83 0.30446 0.14992 0.14279 0.1739 0.22801 0.1129
84 0.18058 0.20339 0.26669 0.26928 0.13868 0.18779
85 0.26799 0.14716 0.81539 0.25191 0.26707 0.22778
mean 0.194701642 0.15986239 0.2104709 0.2031606 0.1713091 0.18750269
var 0.005348056 0.00467133 0.01461624 0.00489227 0.00465142 0.03411195
Generalised Entropy index of class 2 Austria
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AUSTRIA
age gini_AT81 gini_AT87 gini_AT94 gini_AT95 gini_AT97 gini_AT00
19 0.39331 0.165 0.32396 0.49366 0.34815 0
20 0.33342 0.21484 0.48782 0.53148 0.24158 0.12464
21 0.34635 0.2482 0.32848 0.49308 0.33878 0.26498
22 0.3138 0.30051 0.2892 0.39798 0.28853 0.38474
23 0.34377 0.2801 0.28641 0.4439 0.34479 0.31939
24 0.33223 0.2734 0.31163 0.36834 0.2854 0.20894
25 0.27054 0.25413 0.29086 0.36606 0.29696 0.22803
26 0.28121 0.2506 0.29161 0.3172 0.25754 0.29544
27 0.28693 0.23084 0.39289 0.33255 0.21966 0.24874
28 0.27475 0.24968 0.27362 0.29819 0.25888 0.2313
29 0.27253 0.22118 0.27959 0.32533 0.30598 0.23743
30 0.25192 0.21639 0.26879 0.28727 0.22515 0.23132
31 0.27494 0.22042 0.28066 0.27357 0.26008 0.26603
32 0.26382 0.23589 0.27455 0.27653 0.24352 0.25903
33 0.26459 0.19244 0.24022 0.27098 0.20338 0.32614
34 0.26383 0.21469 0.26214 0.26944 0.18455 0.2442
35 0.26658 0.20652 0.21277 0.27218 0.31182 0.29127
36 0.25672 0.19381 0.32719 0.30489 0.21418 0.22432
37 0.25394 0.22468 0.26349 0.27316 0.22032 0.21517
38 0.27302 0.22602 0.3012 0.25282 0.20128 0.32656
39 0.26937 0.2648 0.31238 0.26487 0.30128 0.24025
40 0.26547 0.21428 0.25922 0.27347 0.24307 0.19358
41 0.26022 0.24372 0.2396 0.27913 0.27366 0.19388
42 0.28717 0.25204 0.25477 0.28579 0.28737 0.26779
43 0.25601 0.23317 0.22375 0.26781 0.27716 0.29304
44 0.26522 0.26394 0.37591 0.31539 0.23653 0.24844
45 0.29626 0.28116 0.28151 0.29439 0.30746 0.23509
46 0.29664 0.28307 0.24653 0.29133 0.24389 0.23056
47 0.29704 0.28863 0.37568 0.30984 0.30803 0.26479
48 0.30311 0.29325 0.27717 0.30879 0.2858 0.27147
49 0.31757 0.29232 0.27142 0.30706 0.28039 0.26043
50 0.31804 0.31016 0.33211 0.31875 0.32616 0.3463
51 0.32003 0.31846 0.32179 0.32209 0.29315 0.21885
52 0.31062 0.33522 0.28635 0.34522 0.30501 0.28289
53 0.28966 0.33477 0.36788 0.32576 0.29033 0.29552
54 0.32434 0.30437 0.37261 0.32349 0.27981 0.34564
55 0.34286 0.32361 0.37072 0.34425 0.32273 0.22011
56 0.33244 0.30134 0.32016 0.34463 0.31008 0.31161
57 0.34206 0.3577 0.34199 0.33644 0.30323 0.32773
58 0.32809 0.30237 0.33627 0.33439 0.38825 0.28035
59 0.35688 0.33072 0.31582 0.34097 0.32636 0.31101
60 0.35154 0.32342 0.30133 0.34344 0.33323 0.33324
61 0.40119 0.34792 0.31025 0.327 0.28138 0.38135
62 0.40636 0.33541 0.32669 0.35504 0.2833 0.34629
63 0.37624 0.35783 0.38393 0.34128 0.27253 0.31462
64 0.38643 0.32938 0.29589 0.35342 0.31883 0.2694
65 0.34965 0.34863 0.3467 0.34904 0.34311 0.37096
66 0.32376 0.33048 0.2918 0.31964 0.29739 0.35958
67 0.39054 0.33276 0.30745 0.34469 0.31361 0.33097
68 0.34391 0.31334 0.33929 0.33509 0.40072 0.31957
69 0.37072 0.32545 0.27846 0.34646 0.30326 0.4507
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70 0.29057 0.33147 0.35869 0.3553 0.28895 0.36374
71 0.31555 0.34256 0.31918 0.33555 0.34597 0.37462
72 0.34093 0.33963 0.33223 0.33968 0.35403 0.34496
73 0.34316 0.33162 0.35085 0.3432 0.34818 0.26466
74 0.3715 0.33968 0.38 0.3564 0.29269 0.33997
75 0.22339 0.33832 0.28789 0.33898 0.33405 0.30024
76 0.36109 0.29289 0.38212 0.33695 0.39371 0.34608
77 0.32062 0.32974 0.36341 0.3438 0.34286 0.29808
78 0.33052 0.30874 0.21323 0.33045 0.35599 0.35192
79 0.36176 0.33943 0.38749 0.31905 0.33698 0.46303
80 0.3174 0.34514 0.30635 0.34904 0.31509 0.37855
81 0.28384 0.33127 0.37685 0.34072 0.30976 0.31737
82 0.39251 0.26995 0.42346 0.35192 0.43507 0.37498
83 0.34346 0.26694 0.29686 0.30181 0.31937 0.23866
84 0.30677 0.30612 0.34138 0.32218 0.28217 0.306
85 0.33595 0.27948 0.45054 0.30442 0.3346 0.35994
mean 0.315472537 0.2863588 0.316761791 0.330851045 0.298165821 0.290544478
var 0.001848617 0.0023986 0.002868845 0.002566864 0.002360967 0.005210053
Gini index Austria
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Appendix 2
Gini index Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
ttw67 -0.26158 0.017453 -14.99 0(***) -0.29583 -0.22733
tmpit -0.03427 0.027968 -1.23 0.221 -0.08915 0.020615
nptdi -0.0014 0.000153 -9.14 0(***) -0.0017 -0.0011
gdpgr99 -0.00127 0.001235 -1.03 0.302 -0.0037 0.001148
ur99 0.004558 0.000538 8.47 0(***) 0.003501 0.005614
cpi99 0.003593 0.000571 6.29 0(***) 0.002472 0.004713
g1 -0.04796 0.044034 -1.09 0.276 -0.13437 0.038448
g2 -0.01879 0.032442 -0.58 0.563 -0.08246 0.044869
g3 0.002495 0.026636 0.09 0.925 -0.04977 0.054765
g4 -0.01684 0.02337 -0.72 0.471 -0.0627 0.02902
g5 -0.01278 0.023486 -0.54 0.587 -0.05887 0.03331
g6 -0.03823 0.022421 -1.71 0.088(*) -0.08223 0.005766
g7 -0.03082 0.022227 -1.39 0.166 -0.07444 0.012794
g8 -0.05092 0.020377 -2.5 0.013(**) -0.09091 -0.01094
g9 -0.04708 0.019986 -2.36 0.019(**) -0.0863 -0.00786
g10 -0.06087 0.019446 -3.13 0.002(***) -0.09903 -0.02271
g11 -0.0572 0.021709 -2.63 0.009(***) -0.0998 -0.0146
g12 -0.04536 0.020593 -2.2 0.028(**) -0.08577 -0.00495
g13 -0.05675 0.019982 -2.84 0.005(***) -0.09597 -0.01754
g14 -0.04373 0.022909 -1.91 0.057(*) -0.08868 0.001227
g15 -0.05049 0.020255 -2.49 0.013(**) -0.09024 -0.01074
g16 -0.03276 0.022496 -1.46 0.146 -0.0769 0.011389
g17 -0.03842 0.020263 -1.9 0.058(*) -0.07818 0.001342
g18 -0.04039 0.020145 -2.01 0.045(**) -0.07992 -0.00086
g19 -0.05085 0.021489 -2.37 0.018(**) -0.09302 -0.00868
g20 -0.04138 0.021431 -1.93 0.054(*) -0.08344 0.000677
g21 -0.04254 0.019101 -2.23 0.026(**) -0.08002 -0.00506
g22 -0.0427 0.020468 -2.09 0.037(**) -0.08287 -0.00254
g23 -0.04093 0.020344 -2.01 0.044(**) -0.08086 -0.00101
g24 -0.04215 0.021371 -1.97 0.049(**) -0.08409 -0.00021
g25 -0.0363 0.020695 -1.75 0.08(*) -0.07691 0.004308
g26 -0.04259 0.020543 -2.07 0.038(**) -0.08291 -0.00228
g27 -0.03686 0.021344 -1.73 0.084(**) -0.07874 0.005026
g28 -0.02599 0.021631 -1.2 0.23 -0.06843 0.016462
g29 -0.02117 0.021254 -1 0.319 -0.06288 0.020536
g30 -0.01459 0.0213 -0.69 0.493 -0.05639 0.027208
g31 -0.01491 0.020186 -0.74 0.46 -0.05452 0.024705
g32 -0.01456 0.020957 -0.69 0.487 -0.05569 0.026565
g33 -0.0216 0.021233 -1.02 0.309 -0.06327 0.020066
g34 -0.00826 0.019735 -0.42 0.676 -0.04699 0.030469
g35 -0.01953 0.020283 -0.96 0.336 -0.05933 0.020276
g36 0.015429 0.031929 0.48 0.629 -0.04723 0.078086
g37 -0.00274 0.021461 -0.13 0.898 -0.04485 0.039376
g38 0.01969 0.021875 0.9 0.368 -0.02324 0.062617
g39 0.041252 0.023599 1.75 0.081(*) -0.00506 0.087563
g40 0.013112 0.02005 0.65 0.513 -0.02623 0.052457
g41 0.023191 0.020628 1.12 0.261 -0.01729 0.06367
g42 0.020414 0.02242 0.91 0.363 -0.02358 0.06441
g43 0.015101 0.021085 0.72 0.474 -0.02628 0.056478
g44 0.028168 0.019497 1.44 0.149 -0.01009 0.066427
g45 0.01119 0.02246 0.5 0.618 -0.03288 0.055265
g46 0.024157 0.0225 1.07 0.283 -0.02 0.06831
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g47 0.00951 0.020796 0.46 0.648 -0.0313 0.05032
g48 0.007551 0.021572 0.35 0.726 -0.03478 0.049883
g49 -0.00595 0.023663 -0.25 0.801 -0.05239 0.040482
g50 0.000394 0.023093 0.02 0.986 -0.04492 0.04571
g51 -0.01166 0.024581 -0.47 0.635 -0.0599 0.036578
g52 0.007726 0.022344 0.35 0.73 -0.03612 0.051572
g53 -0.00681 0.022707 -0.3 0.764 -0.05137 0.037745
g54 0.001128 0.022218 0.05 0.96 -0.04247 0.044729
g55 -0.00276 0.023866 -0.12 0.908 -0.04959 0.044079
g56 -0.0037 0.021853 -0.17 0.866 -0.04658 0.039183
g57 -0.01108 0.024447 -0.45 0.65 -0.05906 0.036892
g58 -0.01288 0.020855 -0.62 0.537 -0.05381 0.028046
g59 0.002195 0.024229 0.09 0.928 -0.04535 0.04974
g60 -0.00992 0.021595 -0.46 0.646 -0.05229 0.032461
g61 0.007792 0.029873 0.26 0.794 -0.05083 0.066414
cons 0.468766 0.024516 19.12 0(***) 0.420657 0.516875
Number of obs 1054
R-squared 0.4484
OLS Regression ttw67; (***) signicant at 1% C.I.; (**) signicant at 5% C.I.; (*)
signicant at 10% C.I.
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Gini index Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
ttw100 -0.24639 0.016318 -15.1 0(***) -0.27841 -0.21436
tmpit -0.02015 0.028762 -0.7 0.484 -0.07659 0.036295
nptdi -0.00136 0.000151 -9.02 0(***) -0.00166 -0.00106
gdpgr99 0.003968 0.001269 3.13 0.002(***) 0.001478 0.006457
ur99 0.003176 0.00054 5.88 0(***) 0.002117 0.004235
cpi99 0.003563 0.000567 6.28 0(***) 0.00245 0.004676
g1 -0.04796 0.044788 -1.07 0.284 -0.13585 0.039929
g2 -0.01879 0.033175 -0.57 0.571 -0.0839 0.046307
g3 0.002495 0.027212 0.09 0.927 -0.0509 0.055895
g4 -0.01684 0.023517 -0.72 0.474 -0.06299 0.02931
g5 -0.01278 0.024025 -0.53 0.595 -0.05992 0.034369
g6 -0.03823 0.022532 -1.7 0.09(*) -0.08245 0.005984
g7 -0.03082 0.02291 -1.35 0.179 -0.07578 0.014135
g8 -0.05092 0.02085 -2.44 0.015(**) -0.09184 -0.01001
g9 -0.04708 0.020652 -2.28 0.023(**) -0.0876 -0.00655
g10 -0.06087 0.020019 -3.04 0.002(***) -0.10015 -0.02158
g11 -0.0572 0.021831 -2.62 0.009(***) -0.10004 -0.01436
g12 -0.04536 0.021517 -2.11 0.035(**) -0.08758 -0.00313
g13 -0.05675 0.020206 -2.81 0.005(***) -0.0964 -0.0171
g14 -0.04373 0.02368 -1.85 0.065(*) -0.0902 0.00274
g15 -0.05049 0.020643 -2.45 0.015(**) -0.091 -0.00998
g16 -0.03276 0.02299 -1.42 0.155 -0.07787 0.012358
g17 -0.03842 0.020944 -1.83 0.067(*) -0.07952 0.00268
g18 -0.04039 0.02139 -1.89 0.059(*) -0.08237 0.001585
g19 -0.05085 0.022314 -2.28 0.023(**) -0.09464 -0.00706
g20 -0.04138 0.021515 -1.92 0.055(*) -0.0836 0.000842
g21 -0.04254 0.019674 -2.16 0.031(**) -0.08115 -0.00393
g22 -0.0427 0.020978 -2.04 0.042(**) -0.08387 -0.00154
g23 -0.04093 0.020789 -1.97 0.049(**) -0.08173 -0.00014
g24 -0.04215 0.021902 -1.92 0.055(*) -0.08513 0.000829
g25 -0.0363 0.021874 -1.66 0.097(*) -0.07923 0.006621
g26 -0.04259 0.021254 -2 0.045(**) -0.0843 -0.00089
g27 -0.03686 0.022275 -1.65 0.098(*) -0.08057 0.006852
g28 -0.02599 0.02293 -1.13 0.257 -0.07098 0.01901
g29 -0.02117 0.022379 -0.95 0.344 -0.06509 0.022744
g30 -0.01459 0.02246 -0.65 0.516 -0.05867 0.029484
g31 -0.01491 0.020868 -0.71 0.475 -0.05586 0.026042
g32 -0.01456 0.021726 -0.67 0.503 -0.0572 0.028075
g33 -0.0216 0.022239 -0.97 0.332 -0.06524 0.022039
g34 -0.00826 0.020788 -0.4 0.691 -0.04905 0.032536
g35 -0.01953 0.020734 -0.94 0.347 -0.06022 0.02116
g36 0.015429 0.032236 0.48 0.632 -0.04783 0.078689
g37 -0.00274 0.022781 -0.12 0.904 -0.04744 0.041967
g38 0.01969 0.022392 0.88 0.379 -0.02425 0.063631
g39 0.041252 0.024176 1.71 0.088(*) -0.00619 0.088694
g40 0.013112 0.020815 0.63 0.529 -0.02773 0.053959
g41 0.023191 0.020788 1.12 0.265 -0.0176 0.063985
g42 0.020414 0.02307 0.88 0.376 -0.02486 0.065686
g43 0.015101 0.021472 0.7 0.482 -0.02704 0.057236
g44 0.028168 0.020094 1.4 0.161 -0.01126 0.0676
g45 0.01119 0.022519 0.5 0.619 -0.033 0.05538
g46 0.024157 0.023924 1.01 0.313 -0.02279 0.071104
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g47 0.00951 0.021409 0.44 0.657 -0.0325 0.051521
g48 0.007551 0.021926 0.34 0.731 -0.03548 0.050579
g49 -0.00595 0.024293 -0.25 0.806 -0.05363 0.041718
g50 0.000394 0.024138 0.02 0.987 -0.04697 0.047762
g51 -0.01166 0.025142 -0.46 0.643 -0.061 0.037678
g52 0.007726 0.022616 0.34 0.733 -0.03665 0.052107
g53 -0.00681 0.023343 -0.29 0.77 -0.05262 0.038993
g54 0.001128 0.022979 0.05 0.961 -0.04397 0.046222
g55 -0.00276 0.024664 -0.11 0.911 -0.05116 0.045646
g56 -0.0037 0.022248 -0.17 0.868 -0.04736 0.039959
g57 -0.01108 0.025256 -0.44 0.661 -0.06064 0.03848
g58 -0.01288 0.021683 -0.59 0.553 -0.05543 0.029669
g59 0.002195 0.025012 0.09 0.93 -0.04689 0.051277
g60 -0.00992 0.022064 -0.45 0.653 -0.05322 0.033382
g61 0.007792 0.02988 0.26 0.794 -0.05084 0.066427
cons 0.459757 0.024464 18.79 0(***) 0.41175 0.507764
Number of obs 1054
R-squared 0.4263
OLS Regression ttw100; (***) signicant at 1% C.I.; (**) signicant at 5% C.I.; (*)
signicant at 10% C.I.
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Gini index Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
ttw133 -0.24076 0.016967 -14.19 0(***) -0.27406 -0.20747
tmpit -0.0557 0.028137 -1.98 0.048(**) -0.11091 -0.00049
nptdi -0.00123 0.000152 -8.08 0(***) -0.00153 -0.00093
gdpgr99 0.003717 0.001212 3.07 0.002(***) 0.001338 0.006096
ur99 0.003761 0.000538 6.99 0(***) 0.002705 0.004817
cpi99 0.003329 0.000564 5.91 0(***) 0.002223 0.004436
g1 -0.04796 0.044732 -1.07 0.284 -0.13574 0.039818
g2 -0.01879 0.033071 -0.57 0.57 -0.08369 0.046102
g3 0.002495 0.02708 0.09 0.927 -0.05065 0.055637
g4 -0.01684 0.023416 -0.72 0.472 -0.06279 0.02911
g5 -0.01278 0.02354 -0.54 0.587 -0.05897 0.033416
g6 -0.03823 0.022497 -1.7 0.09(*) -0.08238 0.005916
g7 -0.03082 0.022752 -1.35 0.176 -0.07547 0.013825
g8 -0.05092 0.020532 -2.48 0.013(**) -0.09122 -0.01063
g9 -0.04708 0.020332 -2.32 0.021(**) -0.08697 -0.00718
g10 -0.06087 0.019983 -3.05 0.002(***) -0.10008 -0.02165
g11 -0.0572 0.02156 -2.65 0.008(***) -0.09951 -0.01489
g12 -0.04536 0.021093 -2.15 0.032(**) -0.08675 -0.00397
g13 -0.05675 0.020013 -2.84 0.005(***) -0.09603 -0.01748
g14 -0.04373 0.023231 -1.88 0.06(*) -0.08932 0.00186
g15 -0.05049 0.020468 -2.47 0.014(**) -0.09066 -0.01032
g16 -0.03276 0.022986 -1.43 0.154 -0.07786 0.012351
g17 -0.03842 0.020777 -1.85 0.065(*) -0.07919 0.002352
g18 -0.04039 0.021073 -1.92 0.056(*) -0.08175 0.000963
g19 -0.05085 0.02198 -2.31 0.021(**) -0.09398 -0.00772
g20 -0.04138 0.021363 -1.94 0.053(*) -0.0833 0.000543
g21 -0.04254 0.019571 -2.17 0.03(**) -0.08094 -0.00413
g22 -0.0427 0.021053 -2.03 0.043(**) -0.08402 -0.00139
g23 -0.04093 0.020659 -1.98 0.048(**) -0.08147 -0.0004
g24 -0.04215 0.021493 -1.96 0.05(**) -0.08433 2.73E-05
g25 -0.0363 0.02135 -1.7 0.089(*) -0.0782 0.005593
g26 -0.04259 0.020918 -2.04 0.042(**) -0.08364 -0.00154
g27 -0.03686 0.021777 -1.69 0.091(*) -0.07959 0.005875
g28 -0.02599 0.022451 -1.16 0.247 -0.07004 0.01807
g29 -0.02117 0.021984 -0.96 0.336 -0.06431 0.021968
g30 -0.01459 0.022015 -0.66 0.508 -0.05779 0.028611
g31 -0.01491 0.020526 -0.73 0.468 -0.05519 0.025371
g32 -0.01456 0.021314 -0.68 0.495 -0.05639 0.027266
g33 -0.0216 0.021758 -0.99 0.321 -0.0643 0.021097
g34 -0.00826 0.020108 -0.41 0.681 -0.04772 0.031202
g35 -0.01953 0.020378 -0.96 0.338 -0.05952 0.020462
g36 0.015429 0.032251 0.48 0.632 -0.04786 0.078718
g37 -0.00274 0.022061 -0.12 0.901 -0.04603 0.040553
g38 0.01969 0.022041 0.89 0.372 -0.02356 0.062943
g39 0.041252 0.023821 1.73 0.084(*) -0.00549 0.087997
g40 0.013112 0.020521 0.64 0.523 -0.02716 0.053383
g41 0.023191 0.020629 1.12 0.261 -0.01729 0.063673
g42 0.020414 0.022522 0.91 0.365 -0.02378 0.06461
g43 0.015101 0.021306 0.71 0.479 -0.02671 0.056912
g44 0.028168 0.019706 1.43 0.153 -0.0105 0.066838
g45 0.01119 0.022041 0.51 0.612 -0.03206 0.054442
g46 0.024157 0.023343 1.03 0.301 -0.02165 0.069964
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g47 0.00951 0.021193 0.45 0.654 -0.03208 0.051098
g48 0.007551 0.021858 0.35 0.73 -0.03534 0.050444
g49 -0.00595 0.023976 -0.25 0.804 -0.053 0.041096
g50 0.000394 0.023819 0.02 0.987 -0.04635 0.047135
g51 -0.01166 0.024868 -0.47 0.639 -0.06046 0.03714
g52 0.007726 0.022862 0.34 0.735 -0.03714 0.052589
g53 -0.00681 0.023273 -0.29 0.77 -0.05248 0.038855
g54 0.001128 0.022698 0.05 0.96 -0.04341 0.045671
g55 -0.00276 0.024504 -0.11 0.91 -0.05084 0.045332
g56 -0.0037 0.02214 -0.17 0.867 -0.04715 0.039747
g57 -0.01108 0.025077 -0.44 0.659 -0.06029 0.038128
g58 -0.01288 0.021454 -0.6 0.548 -0.05498 0.029222
g59 0.002195 0.024748 0.09 0.929 -0.04637 0.05076
g60 -0.00992 0.022106 -0.45 0.654 -0.0533 0.033464
g61 0.007792 0.029765 0.26 0.794 -0.05062 0.066202
cons 0.474443 0.024745 19.17 0(***) 0.425884 0.523003
Number of obs 1054
R-squared 0.4296
OLS Regression ttw133; (***) signicant at 1% C.I.; (**) signicant at 5% C.I.; (*)
signicant at 10% C.I.
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Gini index Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
ttw133 -0.24076 0.016967 -14.19 0(***) -0.27406 -0.20747
tmpit -0.0557 0.028137 -1.98 0.048(**) -0.11091 -0.00049
nptdi -0.00123 0.000152 -8.08 0(***) -0.00153 -0.00093
gdpgr99 0.003717 0.001212 3.07 0.002(***) 0.001338 0.006096
ur99 0.003761 0.000538 6.99 0(***) 0.002705 0.004817
cpi99 0.003329 0.000564 5.91 0(***) 0.002223 0.004436
g1 -0.04796 0.044732 -1.07 0.284 -0.13574 0.039818
g2 -0.01879 0.033071 -0.57 0.57 -0.08369 0.046102
g3 0.002495 0.02708 0.09 0.927 -0.05065 0.055637
g4 -0.01684 0.023416 -0.72 0.472 -0.06279 0.02911
g5 -0.01278 0.02354 -0.54 0.587 -0.05897 0.033416
g6 -0.03823 0.022497 -1.7 0.09(*) -0.08238 0.005916
g7 -0.03082 0.022752 -1.35 0.176 -0.07547 0.013825
g8 -0.05092 0.020532 -2.48 0.013(**) -0.09122 -0.01063
g9 -0.04708 0.020332 -2.32 0.021(**) -0.08697 -0.00718
g10 -0.06087 0.019983 -3.05 0.002(***) -0.10008 -0.02165
g11 -0.0572 0.02156 -2.65 0.008(***) -0.09951 -0.01489
g12 -0.04536 0.021093 -2.15 0.032(**) -0.08675 -0.00397
g13 -0.05675 0.020013 -2.84 0.005(***) -0.09603 -0.01748
g14 -0.04373 0.023231 -1.88 0.06(*) -0.08932 0.00186
g15 -0.05049 0.020468 -2.47 0.014(**) -0.09066 -0.01032
g16 -0.03276 0.022986 -1.43 0.154 -0.07786 0.012351
g17 -0.03842 0.020777 -1.85 0.065(*) -0.07919 0.002352
g18 -0.04039 0.021073 -1.92 0.056(*) -0.08175 0.000963
g19 -0.05085 0.02198 -2.31 0.021(**) -0.09398 -0.00772
g20 -0.04138 0.021363 -1.94 0.053(*) -0.0833 0.000543
g21 -0.04254 0.019571 -2.17 0.03(*) -0.08094 -0.00413
g22 -0.0427 0.021053 -2.03 0.043(**) -0.08402 -0.00139
g23 -0.04093 0.020659 -1.98 0.048(**) -0.08147 -0.0004
g24 -0.04215 0.021493 -1.96 0.05(**) -0.08433 2.73E-05
g25 -0.0363 0.02135 -1.7 0.089(*) -0.0782 0.005593
g26 -0.04259 0.020918 -2.04 0.042(**) -0.08364 -0.00154
g27 -0.03686 0.021777 -1.69 0.091(**) -0.07959 0.005875
g28 -0.02599 0.022451 -1.16 0.247 -0.07004 0.01807
g29 -0.02117 0.021984 -0.96 0.336 -0.06431 0.021968
g30 -0.01459 0.022015 -0.66 0.508 -0.05779 0.028611
g31 -0.01491 0.020526 -0.73 0.468 -0.05519 0.025371
g32 -0.01456 0.021314 -0.68 0.495 -0.05639 0.027266
g33 -0.0216 0.021758 -0.99 0.321 -0.0643 0.021097
g34 -0.00826 0.020108 -0.41 0.681 -0.04772 0.031202
g35 -0.01953 0.020378 -0.96 0.338 -0.05952 0.020462
g36 0.015429 0.032251 0.48 0.632 -0.04786 0.078718
g37 -0.00274 0.022061 -0.12 0.901 -0.04603 0.040553
g38 0.01969 0.022041 0.89 0.372 -0.02356 0.062943
g39 0.041252 0.023821 1.73 0.084(*) -0.00549 0.087997
g40 0.013112 0.020521 0.64 0.523 -0.02716 0.053383
g41 0.023191 0.020629 1.12 0.261 -0.01729 0.063673
g42 0.020414 0.022522 0.91 0.365 -0.02378 0.06461
g43 0.015101 0.021306 0.71 0.479 -0.02671 0.056912
g44 0.028168 0.019706 1.43 0.153 -0.0105 0.066838
g45 0.01119 0.022041 0.51 0.612 -0.03206 0.054442
g46 0.024157 0.023343 1.03 0.301 -0.02165 0.069964
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g47 0.00951 0.021193 0.45 0.654 -0.03208 0.051098
g48 0.007551 0.021858 0.35 0.73 -0.03534 0.050444
g49 -0.00595 0.023976 -0.25 0.804 -0.053 0.041096
g50 0.000394 0.023819 0.02 0.987 -0.04635 0.047135
g51 -0.01166 0.024868 -0.47 0.639 -0.06046 0.03714
g52 0.007726 0.022862 0.34 0.735 -0.03714 0.052589
g53 -0.00681 0.023273 -0.29 0.77 -0.05248 0.038855
g54 0.001128 0.022698 0.05 0.96 -0.04341 0.045671
g55 -0.00276 0.024504 -0.11 0.91 -0.05084 0.045332
g56 -0.0037 0.02214 -0.17 0.867 -0.04715 0.039747
g57 -0.01108 0.025077 -0.44 0.659 -0.06029 0.038128
g58 -0.01288 0.021454 -0.6 0.548 -0.05498 0.029222
g59 0.002195 0.024748 0.09 0.929 -0.04637 0.05076
g60 -0.00992 0.022106 -0.45 0.654 -0.0533 0.033464
g61 0.007792 0.029765 0.26 0.794 -0.05062 0.066202
cons 0.474443 0.024745 19.17 0(***) 0.425884 0.523003
Number of obs 1054
R-squared 0.4720
OLS Regression ttw167; (***) signicant at 1% C.I.; (**) signicant at 5% C.I.; (*)
signicant at 10% C.I.
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Gini index Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
attw67 -0.33975 0.021997 -15.45 0(***) -0.38292 -0.29659
tmpit -0.00283 0.02861 -0.1 0.921 -0.05897 0.053314
nptdi -0.00131 0.000155 -8.46 0(***) -0.00161 -0.00101
gdpgr99 -0.0046 0.001317 -3.49 0.001(***) -0.00718 -0.00201
ur99 0.003453 0.000542 6.37 0(***) 0.00239 0.004516
cpi99 0.003837 0.00057 6.73 0(***) 0.002718 0.004956
g1 -0.04796 0.044461 -1.08 0.281 -0.13521 0.039287
g2 -0.01879 0.032597 -0.58 0.564 -0.08276 0.045173
g3 0.002495 0.026656 0.09 0.925 -0.04981 0.054804
g4 -0.01684 0.02327 -0.72 0.469 -0.0625 0.028825
g5 -0.01278 0.023091 -0.55 0.58 -0.05809 0.032536
g6 -0.03823 0.022245 -1.72 0.086(*) -0.08188 0.00542
g7 -0.03082 0.022014 -1.4 0.162 -0.07402 0.012377
g8 -0.05092 0.020069 -2.54 0.011(**) -0.09031 -0.01154
g9 -0.04708 0.019582 -2.4 0.016(**) -0.0855 -0.00865
g10 -0.06087 0.019174 -3.17 0.002(***) -0.09849 -0.02324
g11 -0.0572 0.02099 -2.73 0.007(***) -0.09839 -0.01601
g12 -0.04536 0.020073 -2.26 0.024(**) -0.08475 -0.00597
g13 -0.05675 0.019501 -2.91 0.004(***) -0.09502 -0.01848
g14 -0.04373 0.022428 -1.95 0.051(*) -0.08774 0.000284
g15 -0.05049 0.019737 -2.56 0.011(**) -0.08922 -0.01176
g16 -0.03276 0.021802 -1.5 0.133 -0.07554 0.010027
g17 -0.03842 0.019801 -1.94 0.053(**) -0.07728 0.000436
g18 -0.04039 0.019686 -2.05 0.04(**) -0.07902 -0.00176
g19 -0.05085 0.021155 -2.4 0.016(**) -0.09236 -0.00933
g20 -0.04138 0.020873 -1.98 0.048(**) -0.08234 -0.00042
g21 -0.04254 0.018703 -2.27 0.023(**) -0.07924 -0.00584
g22 -0.0427 0.020158 -2.12 0.034(**) -0.08226 -0.00315
g23 -0.04093 0.019876 -2.06 0.04(**) -0.07994 -0.00193
g24 -0.04215 0.020871 -2.02 0.044(**) -0.08311 -0.00119
g25 -0.0363 0.020188 -1.8 0.072(*) -0.07592 0.003313
g26 -0.04259 0.020099 -2.12 0.034(**) -0.08203 -0.00315
g27 -0.03686 0.020786 -1.77 0.076(*) -0.07765 0.00393
g28 -0.02599 0.021225 -1.22 0.221 -0.06764 0.015664
g29 -0.02117 0.020576 -1.03 0.304 -0.06155 0.019205
g30 -0.01459 0.020696 -0.71 0.481 -0.0552 0.026022
g31 -0.01491 0.019596 -0.76 0.447 -0.05336 0.023548
g32 -0.01456 0.020567 -0.71 0.479 -0.05492 0.025799
g33 -0.0216 0.020914 -1.03 0.302 -0.06264 0.019439
g34 -0.00826 0.019174 -0.43 0.667 -0.04588 0.029368
g35 -0.01953 0.019721 -0.99 0.322 -0.05823 0.019172
g36 0.015429 0.031347 0.49 0.623 -0.04608 0.076944
g37 -0.00274 0.020927 -0.13 0.896 -0.0438 0.038328
g38 0.01969 0.02119 0.93 0.353 -0.02189 0.061273
g39 0.041252 0.023859 1.73 0.084(*) -0.00557 0.088071
g40 0.013112 0.019524 0.67 0.502 -0.0252 0.051425
g41 0.023191 0.020156 1.15 0.25 -0.01636 0.062746
g42 0.020414 0.021693 0.94 0.347 -0.02216 0.062983
g43 0.015101 0.02053 0.74 0.462 -0.02519 0.055388
g44 0.028168 0.018913 1.49 0.137 -0.00895 0.065283
g45 0.01119 0.021769 0.51 0.607 -0.03153 0.053908
g46 0.024157 0.021954 1.1 0.271 -0.01893 0.067239
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g47 0.00951 0.020503 0.46 0.643 -0.03073 0.049745
g48 0.007551 0.021203 0.36 0.722 -0.03406 0.049159
g49 -0.00595 0.022976 -0.26 0.796 -0.05104 0.039133
g50 0.000394 0.022603 0.02 0.986 -0.04396 0.04475
g51 -0.01166 0.024223 -0.48 0.63 -0.05919 0.035874
g52 0.007726 0.021904 0.35 0.724 -0.03526 0.050709
g53 -0.00681 0.021965 -0.31 0.756 -0.04992 0.036289
g54 0.001128 0.02162 0.05 0.958 -0.0413 0.043555
g55 -0.00276 0.023419 -0.12 0.906 -0.04871 0.043202
g56 -0.0037 0.021246 -0.17 0.862 -0.04539 0.037992
g57 -0.01108 0.023983 -0.46 0.644 -0.05815 0.035982
g58 -0.01288 0.020314 -0.63 0.526 -0.05274 0.026984
g59 0.002195 0.02367 0.09 0.926 -0.04425 0.048644
g60 -0.00992 0.021266 -0.47 0.641 -0.05165 0.031814
g61 0.007792 0.029251 0.27 0.79 -0.04961 0.065193
cons 0.475867 0.024318 19.57 0(***) 0.428146 0.523587
Number of obs 1054
R-squared 0.4533
OLS Regression attw67; (***) signicant at 1% C.I.; (**) signicant at 5% C.I.; (*)
signicant at 10% C.I.
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Gini index Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
attw100 -0.34485 0.022688 -15.2 0(***) -0.38937 -0.30033
tmpit 0.014947 0.028642 0.52 0.602 -0.04126 0.071154
nptdi -0.00131 0.000155 -8.42 0(***) -0.00161 -0.001
gdpgr99 -0.00193 0.001267 -1.52 0.128 -0.00442 0.000555
ur99 0.00372 0.000535 6.96 0(***) 0.002671 0.004769
cpi99 0.004089 0.000573 7.13 0(***) 0.002963 0.005214
g1 -0.04796 0.044191 -1.09 0.278 -0.13468 0.038756
g2 -0.01879 0.032621 -0.58 0.565 -0.08281 0.045219
g3 0.002495 0.0271 0.09 0.927 -0.05069 0.055676
g4 -0.01684 0.023707 -0.71 0.478 -0.06336 0.029682
g5 -0.01278 0.023705 -0.54 0.59 -0.0593 0.033741
g6 -0.03823 0.022499 -1.7 0.09(*) -0.08238 0.00592
g7 -0.03082 0.022495 -1.37 0.171 -0.07497 0.013321
g8 -0.05092 0.020605 -2.47 0.014(**) -0.09136 -0.01049
g9 -0.04708 0.020164 -2.33 0.02(**) -0.08664 -0.00751
g10 -0.06087 0.019644 -3.1 0.002(***) -0.09942 -0.02232
g11 -0.0572 0.021682 -2.64 0.008(***) -0.09975 -0.01465
g12 -0.04536 0.020721 -2.19 0.029(**) -0.08602 -0.0047
g13 -0.05675 0.020009 -2.84 0.005(***) -0.09602 -0.01749
g14 -0.04373 0.022888 -1.91 0.056(*) -0.08864 0.001187
g15 -0.05049 0.020492 -2.46 0.014(**) -0.0907 -0.01028
g16 -0.03276 0.022484 -1.46 0.145 -0.07688 0.011365
g17 -0.03842 0.020474 -1.88 0.061(*) -0.0786 0.001757
g18 -0.04039 0.020275 -1.99 0.047(**) -0.08018 -0.0006
g19 -0.05085 0.021623 -2.35 0.019(**) -0.09328 -0.00842
g20 -0.04138 0.02161 -1.91 0.056(*) -0.08379 0.001027
g21 -0.04254 0.019241 -2.21 0.027(**) -0.0803 -0.00478
g22 -0.0427 0.020584 -2.07 0.038(**) -0.0831 -0.00231
g23 -0.04093 0.020357 -2.01 0.045(**) -0.08088 -0.00099
g24 -0.04215 0.02152 -1.96 0.05(**) -0.08438 0.00008
g25 -0.0363 0.020967 -1.73 0.084(*) -0.07745 0.004842
g26 -0.04259 0.020742 -2.05 0.04(**) -0.0833 -0.00189
g27 -0.03686 0.02139 -1.72 0.085(*) -0.07883 0.005117
g28 -0.02599 0.021809 -1.19 0.234 -0.06878 0.016811
g29 -0.02117 0.021439 -0.99 0.324 -0.06324 0.020899
g30 -0.01459 0.021451 -0.68 0.497 -0.05669 0.027505
g31 -0.01491 0.02026 -0.74 0.462 -0.05467 0.024851
g32 -0.01456 0.021159 -0.69 0.492 -0.05608 0.026962
g33 -0.0216 0.021422 -1.01 0.314 -0.06364 0.020437
g34 -0.00826 0.019858 -0.42 0.678 -0.04723 0.030711
g35 -0.01953 0.020532 -0.95 0.342 -0.05982 0.020764
g36 0.015429 0.032262 0.48 0.633 -0.04788 0.078739
g37 -0.00274 0.021543 -0.13 0.899 -0.04501 0.039536
g38 0.01969 0.022019 0.89 0.371 -0.02352 0.062899
g39 0.041252 0.024146 1.71 0.088(*) -0.00613 0.088636
g40 0.013112 0.020173 0.65 0.516 -0.02647 0.052698
g41 0.023191 0.020678 1.12 0.262 -0.01739 0.06377
g42 0.020414 0.02241 0.91 0.363 -0.02356 0.06439
g43 0.015101 0.021149 0.71 0.475 -0.0264 0.056603
g44 0.028168 0.019627 1.44 0.152 -0.01035 0.066684
g45 0.01119 0.022371 0.5 0.617 -0.03271 0.055091
g46 0.024157 0.022637 1.07 0.286 -0.02027 0.06858
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g47 0.00951 0.021106 0.45 0.652 -0.03191 0.050929
g48 0.007551 0.021734 0.35 0.728 -0.0351 0.050201
g49 -0.00595 0.023751 -0.25 0.802 -0.05256 0.040653
g50 0.000394 0.023316 0.02 0.987 -0.04536 0.046148
g51 -0.01166 0.024911 -0.47 0.64 -0.06055 0.037225
g52 0.007726 0.022604 0.34 0.733 -0.03663 0.052083
g53 -0.00681 0.022866 -0.3 0.766 -0.05169 0.038058
g54 0.001128 0.022415 0.05 0.96 -0.04286 0.045115
g55 -0.00276 0.024023 -0.11 0.909 -0.0499 0.044386
g56 -0.0037 0.022017 -0.17 0.867 -0.04691 0.039504
g57 -0.01108 0.024406 -0.45 0.65 -0.05898 0.03681
g58 -0.01288 0.021254 -0.61 0.545 -0.05459 0.028829
g59 0.002195 0.024319 0.09 0.928 -0.04553 0.049917
g60 -0.00992 0.021813 -0.45 0.649 -0.05272 0.03289
g61 0.007792 0.030088 0.26 0.796 -0.05125 0.066835
cons 0.47152 0.024669 19.11 0(***) 0.423109 0.51993
Number of obs 1054
R-squared 0.4543
OLS Regression attw100; (***) signicant at 1% C.I.; (**) signicant at 5% C.I.; (*)
signicant at 10% C.I.
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Gini index Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
attw133 -0.35432 0.022434 -15.79 0(***) -0.39835 -0.3103
tmpit 0.034216 0.028787 1.19 0.235 -0.02227 0.090706
nptdi -0.00129 0.000153 -8.46 0(***) -0.00159 -0.00099
gdpgr99 -0.00059 0.001235 -0.48 0.634 -0.00301 0.001835
ur99 0.00376 0.000524 7.18 0(***) 0.002732 0.004787
cpi99 0.004163 0.000572 7.28 0(***) 0.00304 0.005285
g1 -0.04796 0.043972 -1.09 0.276 -0.13425 0.038326
g2 -0.01879 0.032457 -0.58 0.563 -0.08249 0.044898
g3 0.002495 0.027163 0.09 0.927 -0.05081 0.055798
g4 -0.01684 0.023726 -0.71 0.478 -0.0634 0.029718
g5 -0.01278 0.023749 -0.54 0.591 -0.05938 0.033826
g6 -0.03823 0.022429 -1.7 0.089(*) -0.08224 0.005781
g7 -0.03082 0.022673 -1.36 0.174 -0.07532 0.01367
g8 -0.05092 0.020563 -2.48 0.013(**) -0.09128 -0.01057
g9 -0.04708 0.020189 -2.33 0.02(**) -0.08669 -0.00746
g10 -0.06087 0.019611 -3.1 0.002(***) -0.09935 -0.02238
g11 -0.0572 0.02162 -2.65 0.008(***) -0.09963 -0.01477
g12 -0.04536 0.020721 -2.19 0.029(**) -0.08602 -0.00469
g13 -0.05675 0.020011 -2.84 0.005(***) -0.09602 -0.01748
g14 -0.04373 0.022815 -1.92 0.056(*) -0.0885 0.001044
g15 -0.05049 0.020528 -2.46 0.014(**) -0.09077 -0.01021
g16 -0.03276 0.022514 -1.45 0.146 -0.07694 0.011423
g17 -0.03842 0.020482 -1.88 0.061(*) -0.07861 0.001774
g18 -0.04039 0.020355 -1.98 0.047(**) -0.08034 -0.00045
g19 -0.05085 0.021573 -2.36 0.019(**) -0.09318 -0.00851
g20 -0.04138 0.021688 -1.91 0.057(*) -0.08394 0.001181
g21 -0.04254 0.019253 -2.21 0.027(**) -0.08032 -0.00476
g22 -0.0427 0.020581 -2.07 0.038(**) -0.08309 -0.00232
g23 -0.04093 0.020208 -2.03 0.043(**) -0.08059 -0.00128
g24 -0.04215 0.021399 -1.97 0.049(**) -0.08414 -0.00016
g25 -0.0363 0.021146 -1.72 0.086(*) -0.0778 0.005193
g26 -0.04259 0.020682 -2.06 0.04(**) -0.08318 -0.00201
g27 -0.03686 0.021292 -1.73 0.084(*) -0.07864 0.004925
g28 -0.02599 0.021794 -1.19 0.233 -0.06875 0.016781
g29 -0.02117 0.021534 -0.98 0.326 -0.06343 0.021085
g30 -0.01459 0.021461 -0.68 0.497 -0.05671 0.027524
g31 -0.01491 0.020225 -0.74 0.461 -0.0546 0.024781
g32 -0.01456 0.021109 -0.69 0.49 -0.05598 0.026863
g33 -0.0216 0.021282 -1.01 0.31 -0.06337 0.020163
g34 -0.00826 0.019828 -0.42 0.677 -0.04717 0.030652
g35 -0.01953 0.020487 -0.95 0.341 -0.05973 0.020676
g36 0.015429 0.032493 0.47 0.635 -0.04833 0.079192
g37 -0.00274 0.021391 -0.13 0.898 -0.04471 0.039238
g38 0.01969 0.022095 0.89 0.373 -0.02367 0.063048
g39 0.041252 0.02414 1.71 0.088 -0.00612 0.088624
g40 0.013112 0.020114 0.65 0.515 -0.02636 0.052584
g41 0.023191 0.020501 1.13 0.258 -0.01704 0.063422
g42 0.020414 0.022393 0.91 0.362 -0.02353 0.064357
g43 0.015101 0.021084 0.72 0.474 -0.02627 0.056475
g44 0.028168 0.019686 1.43 0.153 -0.01046 0.0668
g45 0.01119 0.022171 0.5 0.614 -0.03232 0.054698
g46 0.024157 0.022634 1.07 0.286 -0.02026 0.068573
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g47 0.00951 0.021172 0.45 0.653 -0.03204 0.051057
g48 0.007551 0.021795 0.35 0.729 -0.03522 0.050321
g49 -0.00595 0.023764 -0.25 0.802 -0.05259 0.04068
g50 0.000394 0.0234 0.02 0.987 -0.04553 0.046312
g51 -0.01166 0.025006 -0.47 0.641 -0.06073 0.037412
g52 0.007726 0.022763 0.34 0.734 -0.03694 0.052396
g53 -0.00681 0.022985 -0.3 0.767 -0.05192 0.038291
g54 0.001128 0.022423 0.05 0.96 -0.04287 0.04513
g55 -0.00276 0.023984 -0.11 0.909 -0.04982 0.04431
g56 -0.0037 0.022083 -0.17 0.867 -0.04704 0.039634
g57 -0.01108 0.024273 -0.46 0.648 -0.05872 0.036551
g58 -0.01288 0.021411 -0.6 0.548 -0.0549 0.029137
g59 0.002195 0.024411 0.09 0.928 -0.04571 0.050098
g60 -0.00992 0.021768 -0.46 0.649 -0.05263 0.032801
g61 0.007792 0.030132 0.26 0.796 -0.05134 0.066922
cons 0.471559 0.024513 19.24 0(***) 0.423456 0.519663
Number of obs 1054
R-squared 0.4651
OLS Regression attw133; (***) signicant at 1% C.I.; (**) signicant at 5% C.I.; (*)
signicant at 10% C.I.
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Gini index Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval
attw167 -0.36892 0.022812 -16.17 0(***) -0.41369 -0.32416
tmpit 0.052806 0.02888 1.83 0.068(**) -0.00387 0.10948
nptdi -0.00134 0.00015 -8.91 0(***) -0.00163 -0.00104
gdpgr99 -0.00033 0.001202 -0.27 0.784 -0.00269 0.002028
ur99 0.003747 0.000519 7.21 0(***) 0.002728 0.004766
cpi99 0.004263 0.000571 7.47 0(***) 0.003144 0.005383
g1 -0.04796 0.043982 -1.09 0.276 -0.13427 0.038347
g2 -0.01879 0.032367 -0.58 0.562 -0.08231 0.044721
g3 0.002495 0.02702 0.09 0.926 -0.05053 0.055519
g4 -0.01684 0.023625 -0.71 0.476 -0.0632 0.029521
g5 -0.01278 0.023555 -0.54 0.588 -0.059 0.033447
g6 -0.03823 0.022232 -1.72 0.086(*) -0.08186 0.005395
g7 -0.03082 0.022547 -1.37 0.172 -0.07507 0.013421
g8 -0.05092 0.020344 -2.5 0.012(**) -0.09085 -0.011
g9 -0.04708 0.019977 -2.36 0.019(**) -0.08628 -0.00787
g10 -0.06087 0.019483 -3.12 0.002(***) -0.0991 -0.02264
g11 -0.0572 0.021386 -2.67 0.008(***) -0.09917 -0.01523
g12 -0.04536 0.020473 -2.22 0.027(**) -0.08553 -0.00518
g13 -0.05675 0.01981 -2.86 0.004(***) -0.09563 -0.01788
g14 -0.04373 0.022584 -1.94 0.053(*) -0.08805 0.000589
g15 -0.05049 0.020323 -2.48 0.013(**) -0.09037 -0.01061
g16 -0.03276 0.022393 -1.46 0.144 -0.0767 0.011186
g17 -0.03842 0.020317 -1.89 0.059(*) -0.07829 0.00145
g18 -0.04039 0.020251 -1.99 0.046(**) -0.08013 -0.00065
g19 -0.05085 0.021374 -2.38 0.018(**) -0.09279 -0.0089
g20 -0.04138 0.021522 -1.92 0.055(*) -0.08361 0.000855
g21 -0.04254 0.019131 -2.22 0.026(**) -0.08008 -0.005
g22 -0.0427 0.02047 -2.09 0.037(**) -0.08287 -0.00254
g23 -0.04093 0.02001 -2.05 0.041(**) -0.0802 -0.00167
g24 -0.04215 0.021158 -1.99 0.047(**) -0.08367 -0.00063
g25 -0.0363 0.020942 -1.73 0.083(*) -0.0774 0.004793
g26 -0.04259 0.020418 -2.09 0.037(**) -0.08266 -0.00253
g27 -0.03686 0.02104 -1.75 0.08(*) -0.07815 0.004429
g28 -0.02599 0.021534 -1.21 0.228 -0.06824 0.01627
g29 -0.02117 0.021284 -0.99 0.32 -0.06294 0.020595
g30 -0.01459 0.021243 -0.69 0.492 -0.05628 0.027095
g31 -0.01491 0.019971 -0.75 0.456 -0.0541 0.024283
g32 -0.01456 0.02085 -0.7 0.485 -0.05548 0.026355
g33 -0.0216 0.021113 -1.02 0.307 -0.06303 0.019831
g34 -0.00826 0.01954 -0.42 0.673 -0.0466 0.030087
g35 -0.01953 0.020254 -0.96 0.335 -0.05927 0.020219
g36 0.015429 0.032518 0.47 0.635 -0.04838 0.079242
g37 -0.00274 0.021085 -0.13 0.897 -0.04411 0.038638
g38 0.01969 0.021919 0.9 0.369 -0.02332 0.062704
g39 0.041252 0.024076 1.71 0.087(*) -0.00599 0.088497
g40 0.013112 0.019938 0.66 0.511 -0.02601 0.052238
g41 0.023191 0.020221 1.15 0.252 -0.01649 0.062872
g42 0.020414 0.022073 0.92 0.355 -0.0229 0.063729
g43 0.015101 0.020816 0.73 0.468 -0.02575 0.055949
g44 0.028168 0.019459 1.45 0.148 -0.01002 0.066353
g45 0.01119 0.02174 0.51 0.607 -0.03147 0.053853
g46 0.024157 0.022284 1.08 0.279 -0.01957 0.067885
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g47 0.00951 0.020968 0.45 0.65 -0.03164 0.050657
g48 0.007551 0.02156 0.35 0.726 -0.03476 0.049861
g49 -0.00595 0.023372 -0.25 0.799 -0.05182 0.039909
g50 0.000394 0.023146 0.02 0.986 -0.04503 0.045815
g51 -0.01166 0.02473 -0.47 0.637 -0.06019 0.03687
g52 0.007726 0.022615 0.34 0.733 -0.03665 0.052105
g53 -0.00681 0.02277 -0.3 0.765 -0.0515 0.037868
g54 0.001128 0.02218 0.05 0.959 -0.0424 0.044653
g55 -0.00276 0.023738 -0.12 0.908 -0.04934 0.043827
g56 -0.0037 0.021789 -0.17 0.865 -0.04646 0.039057
g57 -0.01108 0.023965 -0.46 0.644 -0.05811 0.035945
g58 -0.01288 0.021161 -0.61 0.543 -0.0544 0.028645
g59 0.002195 0.024108 0.09 0.927 -0.04511 0.049504
g60 -0.00992 0.021563 -0.46 0.646 -0.05223 0.032399
g61 0.007792 0.029858 0.26 0.794 -0.0508 0.066385
cons 0.476033 0.024325 19.57 0(***) 0.428298 0.523768
Number of obs 1054
R-squared 0.4720
OLS Regression attw167; (***) signicant at 1% C.I.; (**) signicant at 5% C.I.; (*)
signicant at 10% C.I.
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Do political preferences depend
on age? Evidence from British
general elections 2005
Any man who is under 30, and is not a liberal, has no heart;
and any man who is over 30, and is not a conservative, has
no brains.
(Whiston Churchill, attributed)
Introduction
Uncertainty has always been one of the most di¢ cult variables to model and
measure in the Voting Theory. In studying the political process we realise
that uncertainty is bi-directional: on the one hand there exists uncertainty of
voters towards political candidates, meaning that they are not perfectly able to
evaluate whether policies implemented by politicians are good or bad; on the
other hand there is uncertainty amongst politicians towards voterspreferred
issues, meaning that they are not able perfectly to observe electorates preference
for a given policy.
Nowadays we have very advanced theoretical tools to study uncertainty in
elections. Perhaps, the most useful is the Probabilistic Voting Theory [see En-
elow and Hinich (1984), Coughlin (1992)]. A branch of this science suggests
that voters preferences may be represented in a multidimensional space and
synthesized by Ideal Points. It assumes also that a candidates goal is minim-
ising the distance between these Ideal Points and a chosen policy, whose results
is equivalent to maximising the probability of winning elections. Nevertheless,
from a methodological perspective, the most di¢ cult problem to solve is related
to measurement aspects. This topic is e¤ectively studied in Alvarez (1997). He
identies two distinct levels for measuring uncertainty: the rst is represen-
ted by aggregate measurements, which analyse aggregated variations in voters
perceptions towards candidate policy positions and the second by individual
measeurements, which in turn may be divided into inferential and direct meas-
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urement. The following scheme reports a complete taxonomy of measurement
systems to detect political uncertainty.
1. Aggregate
2. Individual
(a) Inferential
(b) Direct
i. Direct Survey Question
ii. Direct Operationalization
The Direct Survey Question is an appoach based on asking respondents
directly about the certainty of their political perceptions, whilst the Direct Op-
erationalization is based on measuring the variation in voters perception of
candidate issue positions, relative to the positions of the candidates towards
these issues.
Unfortunately, the numerous results achieved by the Voting Theory are not
equally supported by robust empirical evidence. For instance we lack deep
evidence on whether a signicant di¤erence of judgement amongst the electorate
with respect to some characteristics of individuduals exists.
Literature on voting behaviour has divided between two strands: one which
considers vote choices as the product of a personal calculus and depends on
individualspersonal characteristics, attitudes and interests and another which
considers vote choices as a social calculus focusing on the role played by in-
terpersonal communication and intermediaries such as media and organizations
(see Beck et al. (2002)).
In this paper I will not consider social factors, even though it would be inter-
esting to analyse the role played by the bias of political communications due to
perception and exposure to messages sent by politicians and intermediaries23 .
Otherwise, I will present fresh empirical evidence upon political preferences of
British voters and upon the judgements they give to the Governments job on
specic policies (i.e. taxation) to assess whether di¤erent generations (the old
and the young) have di¤erent political tendencies. The linkage between age
and political tastes has already been studied in empirical studies on voting.
There are many works which witness that this relationship is strongly signi-
cant. Miller et al. (1998) discovered that the older Russians participated in
the Russian 1996 presidential elections at a higher rate than the average citizen
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and that voters aged 60+ preferred the Communist Gennadii Zyuganov, whilst
people under that age preferred the pro-reform democratic party led by Boris
Yeltsin. Rose and Mishler (1998) used survey data from 1995 in Hungary, Po-
land, Romania and Slovenia to demonstrate that older people are more likely
to have positive support, a function of lifetime learning, and more educated
people, who are disproportionately young, are also more likely to be positive
supporters. Pammet and DeBardeleben (1996) used a multivariate analysis to
demonstrate that age is important in predicting political/election interest in
Russia and Ukraine, in that older voters prove to be more interested in politics.
Ruding et al. (1996), in an attempt to build a precise prole of the British
Green Party voter, discovered that the main socio-demographic correlates of
voting are youth and education. Other studies which found statistically signi-
cant relations between age on political tastes may be found in Nadeau et al.
(2002), Tranter (2003), Dorussen and Taylor (2001), Jackson and Carsey (2007).
To measure the attitude of the British electorate towards specic issues I
will rely on Direct Survey Questions, since they do not su¤er from problems
which frequently a¤ect inferential measures related to econometric analysis, in
particular reliance on the vagaries of di¤erent estimation methods. In fact,
Direct Survey Questions ask respondents to locate either themselves or political
candidates on scales related to one or more issue. The British Election Study
2005 (BES) is particularly suitable to achieve this goal, due to its broad coverage
of issues, to the large sample dimension and to the reliability of answers provided
by respondents.
Political Parties in the United Kingdom
Over the last two centuries the United Kingdom has had a prevailingly two-party
system. Before the mid-19th century British politics was dominated by the
Whigs and the Tories, where the former, more keen on reform, were associated
with the newly emerging industrial classes, and the latter were associated with
the conservative and landed gentry and the Church. After 1834 the Tories
changed their name and evolved into the Conservative Party, and the Whigs
evolved into the Liberal Party. These two parties dominated the political scene
until the 1920s, when the Liberal Party was replaced as the main left-wing party
by the emerging Labour Party, who represented an alliance between the Trade
Unions and various socialist societies. The Liberals later merged with the Social
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Democratic Party, which was founded in 1981, because they had very similar
views and became the Liberal Democrats which are now a sizeable third party
whose electoral results have improved in recent years.
Nowadays, the UKs "rst-past-the-post" electoral system leaves small parties
disadvantaged on a national scale. It can, however, allow parties with concen-
trations of supporters to ourish. These parties include two national parties,
Plaid Cymru, the Party of Wales (founded in 1925), and the Scottish National
Party (founded in 1934). Northern Ireland parties include the Ulster Union-
ists, formed in the early part of the 20th century, the Democratic Unionists,
founded in 1971 by a group that broke away from the Ulster Unionists, the
Social Democratic and Labour Party, founded in 1970, and Sinn Féin. In Scot-
land, Wales and Northern Ireland these parties have indeed won seats on the
"rst-past-the-post" system.
In recent years, proportional representation-based voting systems have been
adopted for elections to the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for
Wales, the Northern Ireland Assembly, the London Assembly and the UKs
seats in the European Parliament. In these bodies, minor parties have also had
some success.
Traditionally political parties have been private organisations with no o¢ cial
recognition by the state. The Registration of Political Parties Act 1998 changed
that by creating a register of parties. The Electoral Commissions register of
political parties lists the details of parties registered to ght elections with their
name in the United Kingdom. Under current electoral law only registered party
names can be used on ballot papers by those wishing to ght elections. As of
12 January 2007 it shows the number of registered political parties as below.
185 parties have their name registered for use only in England
1 party has its name registered for use in England and Scotland.
6 parties have their name registered for use in England and Wales.
144 parties have their name registered for use in England, Scotland and
Wales.
17 parties have their name registered for use only in Scotland.
10 parties have their name registered for use in Wales only
In Northern Ireland, 58 parties are on the register, including the Conservative
Party which ghts elections in the province.
Three parties dominate politics in the House of Commons. They all oper-
ate throughout Great Britain (only the Conservative Party runs candidates in
Northern Ireland). Most of the British Members of the European Parliament,
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the Scottish Parliament, and the National Assembly for Wales represent one of
these parties:
Labour Party, centre-right to left-wing (traditionally left-wing but now more
centre-right), Co-operative Party (all Co-operative Party MPs are also Labour
MPs as part of a long-standing electoral agreement), Conservative Party, cent-
rist to right (traditionally centre-right), and Liberal Democrats, centrist to
centre-left.
Tables 3-4 show the composition of the House of Commons and the House
of Lords.
Affiliation Members
Labour Party 352
Conservative Party 196
Liberal Democrats 63
Democratic Unionist Party 9
Scottish National Party 6
Sinn Féin 5
Plaid Cymru 3
Social Democratic and Labour Party 3
Independents 1
Independent Labour 1
Ulster Unionist Party 1
RESPECT The Unity Coalition 1
Health Concern 1
Speaker and Deputies 4
Total 646
Table 3: Composition of the House of Commons
Affiliation Life peers Hereditary peers Lords spiritual Total
Labour 208 4 0 212
Conservative 159 47 0 206
Liberal Democrats 73 5 0 78
UKIP 1 1 0 2
Green 1 0 0 1
Cross-benchers 168 33 0 201
Non-affiliated 9 2 0 11
Lords Spiritual 0 0 26 26
Total 620 92 26 737
Table 4: Composition of the House of Lords
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British Election Study (2005): characteristics and
dimension of the sample
According to Sanders et al. (2007) the 2005 BES is based on two parallel panel
surveys. The main study is a two-wave face-to-face national probability panel
survey, with the rst wave conducted between February and March 2005 and
the second wave conducted between May and July 2005, starting right after the
May 5th general election. The face-to-face study is complemented by a three-
wave internet panel survey. The pre-election wave questionnaires in both the
face and internet surveys are identical, insofar as this was possible given that
di¤erent modes were involved.
In-Person Surveys: the 2005 BES in-person pre-election baseline survey was
conducted before the election campaign o¢ cially began. The survey was de-
signed to yield a representative sample of non-institutionalizedadults aged 18
and older living in Great Britain (people living in Northern Ireland and Scots
living north of the Caledonian canal were excluded). A clustered multi-stage
design was employed. First, 128 constituencies were sampled (77 in England, 29
in Scotland and 22 in Wales). Constituencies were sampled using three strati-
cation criteria: (i) electoral marginality in the 2001 general election, (ii) region
in England/Scotland and percent Welsh speakers in Wales, and (iii) population
density. Within each constituency selected, two wards were randomly chosen,
and within each ward household addresses were selected with equal probability
from the national postcode address le. For households with multiple occupants,
one person (the potential respondent) was selected at random using a modied
Kish grid.
The N for the pre-election campaign survey was, 3589, with a response rate
of 60.5%. Beginning immediately after the election, all of the pre-election re-
spondents were asked to do a second in-person interview. The resulting pre-post
panel N was 2959 (panel retention rate = 82.4%). To provide a representative
national post-election sample, the panel was supplemented by a top-upsample
(N = 1202) chosen using the methods described above. All of the post-election
top-up respondents were interviewed in-person. The unweighted post-election
sample N thus was 4161 and, altogether, 4791 respondents participated in one
or both of the in-person interviews.
The in-person survey data were weighted using a combination of factors
designed to correct for unequal selection probabilities arising from deliberate
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oversampling in Scotland and Wales, deliberate oversampling of marginal con-
stituencies, variation in the number of households at selected addresses, and
variation in the number of people living in selected households. In addition, a
set of post-stratication or calibrationweights for age and gender were em-
ployed.
Internet Surveys: Similar to the in-person pre-election survey, the rst wave
of the internet survey was conducted just before the election campaign formally
began. Potential internet respondents were selected from YouGovs master panel
which included 89,000 people at the time the study was conducted.8 People join
the YouGov master panel in one of three ways: (i) by visiting the YouGov web-
site (www.YouGov.com) and registering; (ii) by being recruited by one of several
professional third-party recruiters (e.g., Win4Now) employed by YouGov; (iii)
through ad-hoc alliances between YouGov and partners such as media outlets
interested in conducting specic survey research projects. Respondents in such
surveys can be invited to join the YouGov master panel.
Potential respondents for the BES pre-election baseline internet survey were
randomly selected from subsections of the master panel dened in terms of
demographics (age, gender), media consumption (newspaper readership) and a
political criterion (reported vote in the preceding (2001) general election). The
total (unweighted) N for the YouGov pre-campaign survey was 7793. During the
election campaign 6068 of these respondents participated in a rolling campaign
panel survey designed to track the dynamics of public opinion as the campaign
unfolded. Immediately after the election, 5910 of the pre-campaign respondents
participated in a post-election survey. The response rate for the initial pre-
campaign survey was 52.0%, and panel retention rates were 77.9% (campaign
survey), and 75.8% (post-election survey).
After the three waves of the internet survey were completed, post-stratication
weights for the data were developed using demographic criteria (gender, age
within gender, region and social class), as well as newspaper readership and
vote in the 2001 general election. Similar to the in-person surveys, informa-
tion from the 2001 UK census was used to develop the demographic weighting
factors for the internet surveys. Data from the National Readership Survey
(an annual random probability in-person survey with 34,000 respondents) were
used to construct the newspaper readership weighting factor, and the past vote
weighting factor was developed based on the results of a large in-house analysis
of false-memory e¤ects.
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Econometric framework
This paper aims to assess whether di¤erences in political preferences amongst
constituencies depend on age24 . In particular, I want to evaluate whether there
exists a signicant relationship between the positioning of voters on a political
scale and their age. Furthermore, I want to examine the existence of a connec-
tion between age and political judgement given by voters on the Governments
work and the manner in which it handles political issues, such as economy and
taxation. The idea that social groups may have di¤erent political preferences
about some issues is taken by the Single-mindedness Theory (see Canegrati
(2006)) which states that a di¤erence in individualspreferences generates dif-
ferent distributions and, since some groups are more compact than others around
some issues, they are more able to inuence the political competition outcome.
For instance, let us assume that workers choose their labour supply taking into
account both their preferences and marginal tax rates on labour chosen by the
government, and that candidates choose tax rates to maximise the probability
of winning elections. Then, equilibrium policies are driven by social groups
power which is statistically captured by the distribution function of the elector-
ate. Should this assumption be correct we expect to nd variable age, used as
a regressor, statistically signicant in an econometric model where preferences
or judgements of voters are used as dependent variables.
The goal of the econometric analysis is then verifying the existence of a
di¤erence in distributions of voters with respect to their age.
First, I will verify the existence of this di¤erence by performing a Kernel
Density Estimation (see Parzen (1962)) which enables to extrapolate the data
to the entire population given some data about a sample. Furthermore, I will
exploit the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to inquire whether the distribution of the
old di¤ers from that of the young, under the null hypothesis of equality in
distributions.
Secondly, in order to assess whether age shapes political preferences of in-
dividuals, I will perform some regressions under di¤erent speciciations of the
model.
The rst specication is:
y1i = +
3
i=1xi + "i (69)
where y1i represents the positioning of a voter on the left-right political scale
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and xi are regressors which summarize some basic characteristics of the indi-
vidual, such as region, age and gender. Nevertheless, since we might not exclude
that other variables may inuence the positioning on the political scale, a second
specication is introduced:
y2i = +
3
i=1xi +
7
i=1si + "i (70)
where some new regressors, si, are added, which denote social and econom-
ical characteristics of the voter, such as level of education, marital and employ-
ment status, type of job, size of community where the individual lives, ethnicity
and membership in a religious group.
The third specication is:
y3i = +
2
i=1xi +
3
i=1si +
4
i=1ai + "i (71)
I introduced four new regressors, ai, which represent the level of involvement
of the voter in political actions, such as the attempt to persuade other voters to
vote for a candidate, the degree of participation in political meetings or protests
and other variables such as the level of satisfaction about democracy in Great
Britain.
Finally, in a fourth specication:
y4i = +
2
i=1xi +
3
i=1si +
2
i=1ai +
7
i=1ji + "i (72)
I add seven regressors which represent the judgement of a voter on the polit-
ical situation in the United Kingdom. There is both a general judgement over
the job made by Blairs government and more specic judgements on how the
cabinet handled some issues such as crime, asylum seekers, National Health
Service, terrorism, economy and taxation.
Regressions were performed using Ordered LOGIT and PROBIT. The choice
on these models naturally arose by considering that independent variables are
treated as ordinal, since a political scale has a natural ordering (left to right),
even though distances between adjacent levels are not quantiable. In these
models an uderlying score has been estimated as a linear function of the re-
gressors and a set of cut points. The probability of observing an outcome equal
to o corresponds to the probability that the estimated linear function and an
error term lies within an interval delimited by the estimated cut points. For
instance, the probability that a responder i nds himself/herself at the fourth
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level of the left-right scale is equal to:
Pr(leveli = o) = Pr(ho 1 < 1x1i + :::+ hxhi + vi  hi)
where vi is assumed to be distributed according to a LOGIT (PROBIT)
distribution
(
= 11=exp( ho+
P
hxh)
  11=exp( ho 1+P hxh) ; in the case of LOGIT
= (ho  
P
hxh)  (ho 1  
P
hxh); in the case of PROBIT
where () is the standard normal cdf.
Estimations outcomes consists both in a set of h coe¢ cients and in a set of
O   1 cut points, with O equal to the number of possible outcomes.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 5 summarizes descriptive statistics. Appendix 1 reports the questions of
the survey used for the analysis with the relative answers, expressed in percent-
age. Questions 1-10 refer to the basic characteristics of the respondent, such as
region, age, gender, marital status, socio-economical status, employment status,
size of the community, ethnicity and a¢ liation to a religion. Questions 11-21
refer to political preferences. In particular questions 11-12 refer to the level of
political activism of the individual. Question 11 shows that the great majority
of respondents have never tried to talk to people in order to persuade them
to vote for a particular candidate (55.16 per cent) and that only 5.83 per cent
have, whilst other responders answered that rarely (19.58 per cent) or occa-
sionally (18.59 per cent) have. Furthermore question 12 shows that 74.8 per
cent of individuals have never tried to directly show their support for a political
candidate by attending a meeting, and only 5.38 per cent answered that they
did it frequently. According to the joint reading of these two questions, it seems
that the percentage of political activists may be quantied at around 5 per cent,
whilst the percentage of totally inactive may be quantied between 55 and 75
per cent. Question 13 shows the percentage of respondents who took part in a
protest. The percentage of individuals who answered "yes" (11.4) is distinctly
lower than those who answered "no" (87,12), again conrming the existence of
a political inertia amongst the electorate. Question 14 shows the level of sat-
isfaction for the degree of democracy in the United Kingdom. It emerges that
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the percentage of those who answered "very" (5.71) or "fairly" (44.68) satised
is almost equal to that of those who answered "not very" (29.68) or "not at
all" satised (17.02). Questions 15-21 refer to the judgement made by respond-
ents on the Governments job. In particular, question 15 asks to express an
overall judgement on the most important issues: answers show that the great
majority of individuals have a negative opinion about how the Government has
operated, 32,68 per cent believe that the Government has made a bad job and
27.42 per cent believe that the Government has made a very bad job. Only
21.44 per cent believe that the job has been good and 6.16 per cent that the
job has been very good. Questions 16-21 refer to more specic topics such as
crime, asylum seekers, the NHS, terrorism, the economy and taxation. Here,
judgements seem to be worse for security issues and slightly better for economic
issues. In particular the judgement on how government has handled crime and
asylum seekers is particularly negative, whilst it gets better for the management
of the NHS and terrorism. As for economic issues, the general judgement on
how the Government has managed the economy is rmly positive: only 6.58
per cent expressed a very bad judgement and 14.22 per cent a fairly bad one,
whilst 36.35 per cent expressed a fairly good judgment and 14.37 per cent a very
good one, even though this judgement gets worse once individuals were asked
to express an opinion about the taxation issue; there, 19.27 per cent expressed
a very bad opinion and 22.7 per cent a fairly bad one, against 25.53 per cent
who expressed a fairly good opinion and 3.78 per cent who expressed a very
good opinion. Finally, question 22 asked individuals to place themselves on a
eleven-level left-right political scale. The lowest level (0) corresponds to the
extreme left position, whilst the highest level (11) corresponds to the extreme
right position. It can be easily seen that the majority of respondents are loc-
ated at the centre-left position, which reects the political tendency which the
British electorate assumed during 2005 general elections.
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Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Persuasion attempt 3325 3.265865 .9664927 1 5
Meeting attendance 3325 3.571429 .8697147 1 5
Vote in 2005 3326 1.191221 .3933216 1 2
When decided to vote 2690 2.375465 1.341721 1 5
Contact 3326 1.6819 .4958324 1 3
Take part in protests 3326 1.900782 .3447819 1 3
Work with others 3326 1.806073 .4601135 1 3
Government affects personal finances 3326 2.084787 .9216021 1 5
Age 3326 44.69092 14.88701 19 76
Gender 3326 1.517739 .4997604 1 2
Education 3234 10.99474 5.482896 1 20
Belong trade union 3326 .1767889 .3815473 0 1
Belong business association 3326 .0222489 .1475143 0 1
Belong farmer association 3326 .002706 .0519562 0 1
Belong professional association 3326 .1304871 .3368892 0 1
Table 5: Descriptive statistics
Non-parametric Analysis
Kernel Density Estimation
Kernel Density Estimation intends to give a shape to the distribution of the
electorate for chosen variables (left-right political scale, judgement on how the
Government handled the economy and taxation). Kernel estimators smooth out
the contribution of each observed data point over a local neighbourhood of that
data point. Data point xi contributes to the estimate at point x depending on
how apart xi and x are. The extent of this contribution depends on two factors:
the shape of the kernel function chosen and its bandwidth. The estimated
density may be written as:
b = 1
n
nX
i=1
Ke

x  xi
j

where Ke is a kernel function, j the bandwidth and x the point where the
density is evaluated. The Epanechnikov
Ke [z] =
 3
4
 
1  15z2

=5 if jzj < p5
0 otherwise
is the kernel function I used, since it is the most e¢ cient in minimizing the
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mean integrated squared error. Notice that the choice of j will decide how many
values are included in estimating the density at each point and in this model is
determined as
m = min
p
variancex;
interquartile rangex
1:349

j =
0:9m
n
1
5
where x is the variable for which the kernel is estimated and n the number
of observations.
In order to perform a Kernel density estimation the presence of a continuous
random variable is required. Our data are taken from a survey based on scales,
which are discrete by denition; as a consequence Kernel density estimation
cannot be made, unless we transform the data from discrete to continuous. To
solve this problem, I then perform the analysis on predicted (ex-post) values
obtained by regressing age upon political variables. Since predicted values are
the probability which a single voter has to be located on a point of the scale we
have obtained a continuous random variable which may be tested.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests the equality of the comulative density function
of two distinct samples. In our case we have two sub-samples; I denote by Xo
the sub-sample of the old voters and by Xy the sub-sample of the young voters.
The size of the rst sub-sample is equal to o and that of the second sub-sample
is equal to y. Furthermore, I call F (Xo) the comulative density function of the
old and F (Xy) the comulative density function of the young. The goal of the
test is verify that:
H0 : F (Xo) = F (Xy) vs H1 : F (Xo) 6= F (Xy)
That is, the null hypothesis H0 assume the equality in distributions. In order
to pass the test, the statistic
oy =

oy
o+ y
 1
2
sup
x
jFo(x)  Fy(x)j
must not depend on F (distribution free property) and the comulative density
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function of the true underlying distribution of the data must converge to the
comulative density function of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distribution
H (t) = 1  2
1X
i=1
( 1)i 1 exp   2i2t
where t denotes the upper limit of the interval.
Performing the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test in our case may cause problems
with the standard errors, due to the transformation of the data from discrete
to continuous. As a consequence, the test is made on predicted values at the
second stage of the analysis. In principle, a correction in the standard errors
should be made, unless the test provides very low p-values which make this
correction useless.
Main ndings
Positioning on the Left-Right political scale
Table 6 reports the results of regressions. First of all, notice that results do not
di¤er with respect to the two methods: this is not surprising if we consider that
the LOGIT distribution di¤ers from the PROBIT only because of its fatter tails.
Due to this similarity, I will only comment the results obtained with LOGIT
estimations, but the same hold for PROBIT.
 The rst specication of the model says that variable region is not stat-
istically signicant, whilst variables age and gender are signicant at one
per cent and ten per cent of the condence interval respectively. The in-
signicance of the variable region is not surprising, since we do not expect
that a region is statistically oriented to the left rather than to the right.
Otherwise, age is strongly signicant, meaning that for an increase of one
year in age, the level on the left-right scale increases by 0.012 while the
other variables are held constant. Since higher values in the political scale
means one is more right-oriented, the sign of the log-odds indicates that
the old are more conservative than the young. Also the variable gender is
statistically signicant, this time with a negative coe¢ cient equal to -0.12.
This means that being a female decreases the expected change in the level
of the political scale which in an ultimate analysis indicates that women
are more labourist than conservative.
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 The second specication introduces other socio-economic variables, but we
can see that only education, size of community and religion mem-
bership are statistically signicant. Interpreting the education coe¢ cient
is not an easy task since elements of the variable do not follow a particular
ordering; thus we cannot say whether an increase in the level of education
increases the probability to be located on a higher level of the political
scale. Otherwise, size of community indicates that living in a bigger com-
munity decreases the expectation to be conservative by 0.055. Finally not
being a member of a religious group entails a decrease in the dependent
variable of 0.281, meaning that religious responders are more conservative.
 The third specication adds some proxies which measure the political
activism. With respect to the previous specication we may see that
the level of education is no longer signicant, whilst two new variables,
level of satisfaction about democracy in Britain and taking part
in protests are. In particular most satised people tend to be more
conservative (the expected increase on the political scale is 0.366) and so
are people who take part in protests.
 Finally, the fourth specication adds opinions about the Governments
job. It is interesting to notice that the overall judgement is not signicant
at all, whilst more specic assessments (apart from the management of
asylum seekers) are very signicant. As we expected a worse opinion
about the governments job on a single issue increases the expectation to
nd in higher levels on the left-right scale, or in other words to be more
conservative. Notice that this does not hold if we refers to the opinion
about terrorism where the higher the level of dissatisfaction, the higher
the expectations to be labourist (-0.249).
122
Emanuele Canegrati Essays on the Single-mindedness Theory
Dependent variable
left-right scale (Left-Right)
LOGIT
(1)
PROBIT
(1)
LOGIT
(2)
PROBIT
(2)
LOGIT
(3)
PROBIT
(3)
LOGIT
(4)
PROBIT
(4)
Region .001
(0.868)
.001
(0.798)
-.002
(0.857)
.000
(0.963)
Age .012***
(0.000)
.006***
(0.000)
.005*
(0.065)
.003*
(0.061)
.005*
(0.067)
.003**
(0.048)
.005**
(0.050)
.0034**
(0.023)
Gender -.12*
(0.085)
-.062
(0.124)
-.135*
(0.063)
-.070*
(0.093)
-.143**
(0.045)
-.069*
(0.093)
-.173**
(0.020)
-.1042**
(0.015)
Education -.018**
(0.015)
-.009**
(0.032)
-.009
(0.165)
-.004
(0.208)
.003
(0.641)
.001
(0.803)
Marital status -.024
(0.202)
-.015
(0.163)
Employment status .002
(0.875)
.000
(0.948)
Social-economic
conditions
-.022
(0.174)
-.010
(0.260)
Size of community -.055***
(0.000)
-.031***
(0.001)
-.055***
(0.000)
-.03***
(0.001)
-.033**
(0.029)
-.02**
(0.026)
Ethnicity -.019
(0.269)
-.009
(0.320)
Member of religion -.281***
(0.000)
-.170***
(0.000)
-.305***
(0.000)
-.181***
(0.000)
-.239***
(0.000)
-.147***
(0.000)
Persuasion attempt .039
(0.393)
.012
(0.639)
Meeting attendance -.059
(0.247)
-.032
(0.246)
Satisfaction about Democracy .366***
(0.000)
.192***
(0.000)
-.118**
(0.030)
-.057*
(0.070)
Take part to protest .869***
(0.000)
.465***
(0.000)
.626***
(0.000)
.353***
(0.000)
Judgement on Government job -.005
(0.873)
-.0024
(0.901)
Judgement how Labour
Government handled crime
.207***
(0.000)
.099***
(0.001)
Judgement how Labour
Government handled asylum
.329***
(0.000)
.19***
(0.000)
Judgement how Labour
Government handled NHS
.083*
(0.063)
.053**
(0.036)
Judgement how Labour
Government handled terrorism
-.249***
(0.000)
-.135***
(0.000)
Judgement how Labour
Government handled economy
.33***
(.000)
.171***
(0.000)
Judgement how Labour
Government handled taxation
.191***
(.000)
.094***
(0.000)
Cut point 1 -3.47 -1.80 -5.02 -2.68 -2.39 -1.30 -.98 -.46
Cut point 2 -2.84 -1.54 -4.44 -2.43 -1.78 -1.04 -.36 -.20
Cut point 3 -1.79 -1.03 -3.32 -1.90 -.66 -.50 .78 .35
Cut point 4 -.85 -.52 -2.37 -1.38 .30 .02 1.83 .92
Cut point 5 -.18 -.12 -1.68 -.96 1.01 .44 2.64 1.39
Cut point 6 1.05 .64 -.43 -.19 2.32 1.24 4.16 2.28
Cut point 7 1.59 .97 .11 .13 2.88 1.58 4.79 2.65
Cut point 8 2.37 1.40 .89 .56 3.67 2.02 5.65 3.13
Cut point 9 3.41 1.91 1.91 1.07 4.72 2.54 6.75 3.69
Cut point 10 4.19 2.26 2.73 1.43 5.53 2.90 7.58 4.06
Number of observations 2557 2557 2432 2432 2479 2479 2480 2480
Pseudo R2 0.0027 0.0026 0.0074 0.0195 0.0180 0.0180 0.0644 0.0586
TABLE 6: Positioning on the left-right scale. Regressions with robust standard
errors (p-values in parenthesis); (***) signicant at 1% of the C.I.; (**)
signicant at 5% of the C.I.; (*) signicant at 10% of the C.I.
Judgement on Governments policies
Tables 7-8 show results about judgements made by respondents on the way the
Government managed the economy and taxation.
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 economy : the judgement on how Blairs Government handled the economy
statistically depends on gender, being a member of a trade union
and being a member of a farmer association (all statistically sig-
nicant at the 1 per cent of the condence interval) and on the level of
education (5 per cent of the condence interval).
 taxation: the judgement on how Blairs Government handled taxation
statistically depends on age, gender, being a member of a trade
union and being member of a business association (all statistically
signicant at the 1 per cent of the condence interval) and on the size of
community (10 per cent of the condence interval).
Of course these are quite remarkable results. First, notice how the judgement
which voters give to how government handled taxation depends upon a more
complex set of variables, suggesting that taxation is a more specic and targeted
policy than the economy in general. Secondly, age is strongly statistically sig-
nicant in the judgement on the taxation policy; the coe¢ cient has a positive
sign, meaning that an increase in age generates more negative judgement on
policies.
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Dependent variable
government handles economy
Age -.000
(0.742)
Gender .328***
(0.000)
Education -.013**
(0.036)
Marital status -.008
(0.622)
Employment status .005
(0.697)
Religion .029
(0.591)
Belong trade union -.330***
(0.000)
Belong business association .165
(0.500)
Belong farmer association 2.535***
(0.000)
Belong professional union -.044
(0.684)
Size of community -.014
(0.310)
Number of observations 3067
Pseudo R2 0.0072
TABLE 7: Judgement on how the Government handled the economy. Ordered
Logit regressions with robust standard errors (p-values in parenthesis); (***)
signicant at 1% of the C.I.; (**) signicant at 5% of the C.I.; (*) signicant
at 10% of the C.I.
125
Emanuele Canegrati Essays on the Single-mindedness Theory
Dependent variable
government handles taxation
Age .008***
(0.002)
Gender -.306***
(0.000)
Education -.001
(0.823)
Marital status .016
(0.326)
Employment status -.005
(0.714)
Religion -.045
(0.385)
Belong trade union -.448***
(0.000)
Belong business association .401***
(0.09)
Belong farmer association .46
(0.577)
Belong professional union .067
(0.527)
Size of community -.023*
(0.078)
Number of observations 3064
Pseudo R2 0.0079
Table 8: Judgement on how the Government handled taxation. Ordered Logit
regressions with robust standard errors (p-values in parenthesis); (***)
signicant at 1% of the C.I.; (**) signicant at 5% of the C.I.; (*) signicant
at 10% of the C.I.
Results of non parametric analysis
Appendix 2 shows results of the non parametric analysis. Graphs show Kernel
Density estimations performed for the old and the young for every predicted level
of the left-right scale and for every question, whilst tables 9-11 show results of
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. As for the Kernel Density estimation it is easy to
see by the meaning of the graphs (Figure 7) how the two distribution functions
are separated, meaning that there is a clear di¤erence in distributions between
the two cohorts. Only in a single case this does not happen, Figure 7.a, which
refers to the probability to be located on the fth level of the left-right scale;
here the two distribution functions almost overlap, meaning that the di¤erence
in distributions is minimal. However, since this is an isolated case, we do not
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have elements to provide a plausible explanation about why this happens at this
level of the scale.
Analysing results obtained performing the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, it is
easy to see that the hypothesis of equality of distribution functions is strongly
rejected at 1 per cent of the signicance level, again allowing us to conclude
that the old and the young have di¤erent distributions. Notice that in the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p-values are always perfectly equal to zero, which is
absolutely a strong result and allow us to skip the correction of the standard
errors.
Corrected K-S D P-value Corrected
p1 1.0000 0.000 0.000
p2 1.0000 0.000 0.000
p3 1.0000 0.000 0.000
p4 0.4531 0.000 0.000
p5 1.0000 0.000 0.000
p6 1.0000 0.000 0.000
p7 1.0000 0.000 0.000
p8 1.0000 0.000 0.000
p9 1.0000 0.000 0.000
p10 1.0000 0.000 0.000
p11 1.0000 0.000 0.000
Table 9: Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution
functions: Positioning on the left-right scale
Corrected K-S D P-value Corrected
p1 1.0000 0.000 0.000
p2 1.0000 0.000 0.000
p3 1.0000 0.000 0.000
p4 0.4531 0.000 0.000
p5 1.0000 0.000 0.000
p6 1.0000 0.000 0.000
Table 10: Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution
functions: How government handled the economy
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Corrected K-S D P-value Corrected
p1 1.0000 0.000 0.000
p2 1.0000 0.000 0.000
p3 1.0000 0.000 0.000
p4 0.4531 0.000 0.000
p5 1.0000 0.000 0.000
p6 1.0000 0.000 0.000
Table 11: Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution
functions: How government handled taxation
Political competition and campaigning
As I said in the introductory chapter, political choices can be analysed either as
the product of a personal calculus or as a sum of sociological factors. The model
I presented spouses the former approach. Nevertheless, one may argue that also
the latter must be explored in order to have more robust results. From this
perspective it would be useful to analyse the manifestos of political parties, press
releases and the strategies used during the electoral campaign because it is easy
to image how these factors might have been inuencing votersopinion. Since
our empirical evidence demonstrated how the old are more conservative than
the young, one may wonder if the Conservative party was more focused on issues
related to the olds needs (i.e. social welfare, pensions, etc.). If so, this evidence
could represent a possible cause to explain this age bias. An interesting work by
Brandemburg (2005) collected all press releases published during the campaign
period from the websites of the three main parties (Labours, Tories and Liberal
Democrats)25 and discovered that "the Labour government was most single-
minded, devoting over a third of their output to economic questions, while the
Conservatives divided their attention almost equally between economy, welfare
and crime". Table 12 shows how the Labour party devoted 27.1 per cent of its
output to social welfare whilst the Tories only the 22.4 per cent and the Liberal
Democrats the 29.9 per cent.
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Labour Conservatives Liberal Democrats
Economy 33.6% Economy 25.6% Social Welfare 29.9%
Social Welfare 27.1% Social Welfare 22.4% Economy 22.1%
Education 15.8% Crime/Justice 18.6% Education 11.3%
Crime/Justice 8.2% Education 12.9% Iraq 10.7%
Immigration 4.4% Immigration 8.0% Crime/Justice 7.5%
Arts/Culture 2.9% Political System 3.6% Environment 5.8%
Table 12: Main Policy dimensions during the campaign
Furthermore, time series data found out (Graph 1) the existence of a signi-
cant correlation between Labour and Tories on social welfare (0.37)
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Graph 1: Time-series data, Labour-Tories: social welfare
This evidence claries that the idea according to which the old voted the
Conservative party because it devoted more emphasis to social welfare during
the electoral campaign is wrong. Actually these data show the opposite situ-
ation. One may also argue that the Conservative party was more covered by
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the media, but the study showed how "the 2005 campaign was notably in the
overrepresentation that the Labour party received". In fact the Labour party
obtained the 53.1 per cent of the total party coverage in the national press,
whilst the Conservative party only the 27.6 per cent26 . Thus, also this argu-
ment cannot be brough as evidence against the age bias.
Conclusions
In this paper I analysed the British Election Study 2005 in order to assess
whether political preferences for candidates and judgments made by voters on
Governments job depend on age. To achieve this goal, I run Ordered LOGIT
and PROBIT regressions using di¤erent specications of the model. Further-
more, I performed non-parametric analysis, using the Kernel Density estimation
and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Results are robust in showing that variable
age is strongly signicant, demonstrating that in the British electorate the old
are more conservative than the young. In particular, the old seem to be more
conservative than the young and particularly strict in their judgments on the
Governments policies. Even though statistical results are particularly robust
in showing this correlation it would be interesting to evaluate whether this
phenomenon takes place also in other countries. Furthermore, an interesting
research agenda can be set, in order to discover which individual characteristics
are statistically signicant in shaping electoral preferences. I hope these hints
may nd a room in future works.
Appendix 1
List of questions with relative answers
1. REGION
In which of the following do you live?
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East Anglia 7.398%
East Midlands 7.489%
Greater London 10.59%
North 5.113%
North West 10.92%
Scotland 9.383%
South East 16.3%
South West 9.835%
Wales 5.143%
West Midlands 7.218%
Yorkshire & Humberside 10.62%
2. AGE
What is your age (in years)?
3. GENDER
What is your gender?
Male 48.23%
Female 51.77
4. EDUCATION
What is your highest level of qualication?
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no formal qualications 9.802%
youth training certicate/skillseekers 0.371%
recognized trade apprenticeship 2.041%
clerical and commercial 2.566%
city and guild certicate 6.648%
city and guild certicate - advanced 2.721%
onc 1.33%
cse grades 2-5 1.701%
cse grade 1, gce o level, gcse, school 14.81%
scottish ordinary/ lower certicate 0.865%
gce a level or higher certicate 13.76%
scottish higher certicate 1.763%
nursing qualication (eg sen, srn, scm, rgn) 1.608%
teaching qualication (not degree) 2.257%
university diploma 3.741%
university or cnaa rst degree (eg ba) 16.2%
university or cnaa higher degree (eg m.phil, ph.d.) 5.226%
other technical, professional or higher 10.79%
dont know 1.2%
refused 0.556%
5. MARITAL STATUS
What is your marital status?
married 49.62%
living as married 14.26%
separated (after being married) 2.392%
divorced 8.235%
widowed 2.785%
never married 22.71%
6. EMPLOYMENT STATUS
What is your employment status?
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working full time (30 or more hours per week) 47.6%
working part time (8 - 29 hours per week) 13.09%
working part time (less than 8 hours a week) 1.451%
full time student 5.11%
retired 17.87%
unemployed 2.419%
not working 8.618%
other 3.84%
7. SOCIAL AND ECONOMICAL CONDITIONS
What is your type of work?
professional or higher technical work 21.53%
manager or senior administrator 17.67%
clerical 17.55%
sales or services 10.76%
foreman or supervisor of other workers 2.894%
skilled manual work 6.301%
semi-skilled or unskilled manual work 9.466%
other 11.97%
have never worked 1.896%
8. SIZE OF COMMUNITY
What is the size of the community you live in?
Live on a farm 0.751%
Village under 500 people 4.059%
500 to 1,000 people 5.292%
1,001 to 10,000 people 17.14%
10,000 to 50,000 people 17.23%
50,001 to 100,000 people 11.76%
100,001 to 500,000 people 13.71%
500,001 to 1,000,000 people 5.532%
Over 1,000,000 people 9.02%
Dont know 15.51%
9. ETHNICITY
What is your Ethnicity?
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white british 92.067%
any other white background 2.851%
white and black caribbean 0.558%
white and black african 0.124%
white and asian 0.403%
any other mixed background 0.496%
indian 0.620%
pakistani 0.341%
bangladeshi 0.062%
any other asian background 0.279%
black caribbean 0.434%
black african 0.155%
any other black background 0.031%
chinese 0.403%
other ethnic group 1.023%
refused 0.155%
10. MEMBER OF RELIGION
Are you a member of any religion?
yes 48.42%
no 48.08%
not sure/dont know 2.702%
refused 0.798%
11. PERSUASION ATTEMPT
Talked to other people to persuade them to vote for a particular party of
candidate?
Frequently 5.835%
Occasionally 18.59%
Rarely 19.58%
Never 55.16%
Dont know 0.842%
12. MEETING ATTENDANCE
Showed your support for a particular party or candidate by, for example,
attending a meeting, putting up campaign signs, or in some other way?
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Frequently 5.383%
Occasionally 8.571%
Rarely 10.41%
Never 74.8%
Dont know 0.842%
13. TAKE PART IN A PROTEST
Taken part in a protest, march or demonstration?
Yes 11.4%
No 87.13%
Dont know 1.473%
14. SATISFACTION ABOUT DEMOCRACY
On the whole, are you very satised, fairly satised, not very satised, or
not at all satised with the way democracy works in Great Britain?
Very satised 5.713%
Fairly satised 44.68%
Not very satised 29.68%
Not at all satised 17.02%
Dont know 2.916%
15. JUDGMENT ON GOVERNMENT JOB
How do you judge the job done by present Government about the most im-
portant issue over the last 4 years?
there was no one most important issue 6.434%
very good job 6.164%
good job 21.44%
bad job 32.68%
very bad job 27.42%
dont know 5.863%
16. JUDGMENT HOW LABOUR GOVERNMENT HANDLED
CRIME
How well do you think the present Government has handled crime in general?
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Very well 1.443%
Fairly well 20.05%
Neither well nor badly 28.56%
Fairly badly 24.71%
Very badly 22.7%
Dont know 2.526%
17. JUDGMENT HOW LABOUR GOVERNMENT HANDLED
ASYLUM SEEKERS
How well do you think the present Government has handled asylum seekers
in general?
Very well 1.323%
Fairly well 11.4%
Neither well nor badly 16.69%
Fairly badly 25.14%
Very badly 42.72%
Dont know 2.736%
18. JUDGMENT HOW LABOUR GOVERNMENT HANDLED
THE NHS
How well do you think the present Government has handled NHS in general?
Very well 4.991%
Fairly well 26.43%
Neither well nor badly 20.54%
Fairly badly 27.42%
Very badly 18.49%
Dont know 2.135
19. JUDGMENT HOW LABOUR GOVERNMENT HANDLED
TERRORISM
How well do you think the present Government has handled terrorism in
general?
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Very well 7.907%
Fairly well 33.13%
Neither well nor badly 24.38%
Fairly badly 15.63%
Very badly 14.85%
Dont know 4.089%
20. JUDGMENT HOW LABOUR GOVERNMENT HANDLED
THE ECONOMY
How well do you think the present Government has handled the economy in
general?
Very well 14.37%
Fairly well 36.35%
Neither well nor badly 24.35%
Fairly badly 14.22%
Very badly 6.584%
Dont know 4.119%
21. JUDGMENT HOW LABOUR GOVERNMENT HANDLED
TAXATION
How well do you think the present Government has handled taxation in gen-
eral?
Very well 3.788%
Fairly well 25.53%
Neither well nor badly 24.5%
Fairly badly 22.7%
Very badly 19.27%
Dont know 4.209%
22. LEFT-RIGHT SCALE
Thinking to the left-rightscale. In politics people sometimes talk of left and
right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means
the left, and 10 means the right?
137
Emanuele Canegrati Essays on the Single-mindedness Theory
0 left 2.072%
1 1.720%
2 6.372%
3 12.197%
4 13.526%
5 29.867%
6 10.907%
7 11.063%
8 7.506%
9 2.541%
10 - right 2.228%
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Appendix 2
Kernel-Density estimation
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Figure 7.a: Positioning on the left-right scale
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Notes
1Note that this is di¤erent with respect to Profeta (2002) who assumes that the two groups
have di¤erent sizes.
2Note that jt is a strictly concave function in a
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rst order derivative gives
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3Lindbeck and Weibull 1987 and Dixit and Londregan 1996 demonstrated that the Nash
equilibrium obtained if candidates maximize their vote share is identical to that obtained
when candidates maximize their probability of winning.
4Second order conditions give
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whose sign is undetermined.
5Note that group sizes do not determine the equilibrium because a larger group has more
voters to be won, but the cost of winning them is also proportionately higher.
6An extreme case is when pjt is a strictly convex function on

amint ; a
max
t

. In this case
each tax credit in the interval may be written as amint
amaxt  aIjt
amaxt  amint
+ amaxt

1  a
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t  aIjt
amaxt  amint

and have d

aIjt

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amaxt  aIjt
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
1  a
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
 max  amint ; amaxt 
7One may verify that indirect utility functions have two intersection points.
8Proposition 10 is applicable here because we are assuming that the solution deriving by
the resolution of Kuhn-Tucker conditions under assumption of local concavity at that point
is a maximum. If the function is not concave proposition 10 could not be applied because at
that point a maximum (and thus equilibrium) does not exist.
9The problem is that we cannot say if the value function is concave, convex or neither
concave nor convex, given the complexity of the expression. As a consequence, we cannot be
sure if stationary points we found from rst order conditions are maximum.
10 see Jones (2007) and Keen (2007)
11 In this model I do not take into account the impact of taxation on production.
12For a complete discussion on the Single Mindedness Theory see Canegrati (2006) and
Mulligan & Sala-i-Martin (1999)
13The marginal utility of income is decreasing in the level of income.
14For a more in details explanation of these denitions, see Canegrati (2006).
15 I assume that axioms of Anonymity, Population Principle, Principle of Transfers, Mono-
tonicity, Scale Invariance, Decomposability, Uniform income growth and Translation Invari-
ance (Cowell, 2000) are satised.
16The graph C (F ; q) against q describes the generalised Lorenz curve
17Occupational pensions include all pensions paid from non-social retirement schemes in-
cluding employer-based pensions for private sector workers and public employees.
18Other cash income includes regular private transfers, alimony and child support benets,
other sources of regular cash income, not classied above.
19Social insurance transfers include: accident or short-term disability pay, long-term dis-
ability pay, social retirement benets (old age and survivors), unemployment pay, maternity
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allowances, military or veterans benes, other social insurance.
20Universal cash transfers include child and/or family allowances if paid directly by govern-
ments. Universal cash transfers paid as refundable income tax credits are counted as negative
amounts in the income tax of some countries.
21Social assistance includes all income-tested and means-tested benets, both cash and
near-cash.
22 Inter-generational indexes for all the other countries are available upon request to the
author.
23 In principle, one may study the impact of political communications on voters in order to
assess how much the voting behaviour changes as a consequence of the exposure to messages.
For instance, one may study the political manifestos and the way they are communicated
to the audience and eventually calculate which party or candidate is directly favoured by
messages form intermediaries. Unfortunately, this analysis is not very reliable because it must
be inferred only via experiments; secondly, supposed that these experiments can be done, the
message sent is not necessarily the message received by individuals and it is extremely di¢ cult
measuring the degree of exposure and the degree of perception of messages. For instance, the
political bias should be measured at the source or at the receiver? What signal was sent?
How can we measure the degree of exposure to a message?
24 It is useful to remind that the voting age in the United Kingdom is 18.
25with respect to manifestos, press releases are more suited to give an insight into the
patterns of communication over the course of campaign.
26The sample includes seven newspapers: the Sun, the Daily Mirror, the Daily Mail, the
Daily Telegraph, the Times, the Guardian and the Independent.
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